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Editor’s Note
Spring, 2019
The year 2019 began with pleasant news for the journal. An email was sent to us on
January 30, 2019, by Ms. Ellen Amatangelo. She serves as the Scholarly
Communications Coordinator and is currently our main contact at the Harold B. Lee
Library of the Brigham Young University, in Provo, Utah.
First, I want to note that it is thanks to the assiduous work of our long-time member
and CCR editor, Connie Lamb, that the Harold B. Lee library now houses our journal
– one out of 27 – in its institutional repository, ScholarsArchive.
As those of you who attended the annual meeting of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations, held twice on the BYU campus over the years,
may recall, the library itself is huge; as of 2016, it contained over 4.7 million books,
held more than 10.6 million total materials, and served in excess of 10,000 patrons each
day.
This impressive and extensive library was awarded the title of Number One College
Library in 2004 by the Princeton Review, and it came in as number three on the list of
top university libraries in 2007 and 2012. Moreover, the American Library Association
awarded it the Library Instruction Round Table 2017 Innovation in Instruction Award.
What a contribution Prof. Lamb has made to the Comparative Civilizations Review
through this wonderful association.
Second, as a result of our journal’s being housed in ScholarsArchive at Brigham Young
University, we are now published online, each edition, via bepress™ of Berkeley,
California. That means in turn that we are part of bepress’s arm called Digital
Commons.
Bepress describes this as a “comprehensive showcase that lets institutions publish,
manage, and increase recognition for everything produced on campus—and (it is) the
only institutional repository and publishing platform that integrates with a full faculty
research and impact suite.”
In fact, more than 1800 scholarly journals are now published via Digital Commons
Publishing. A visit to:
https://www.bepress.com/products/digital-commons/features/journal-publishing/
will reveal the impressive list of scholarly publications from many of higher
education’s most distinguished campuses.
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Furthermore, among the many benefits for our journal of being published by bepress is
that the organization works with Google and Google Scholar “to make sure your work
is fully indexed and turns up near the top of academic and general search results.”
So, third, what did the letter to the editors from Ms. Amatangelo report that is so
dramatic?
Her letter was entitled “2018 Statistics for Comparative Civilizations Review.” It
reported:
Here are the 2018 readership statistics for your journal:
 61,148 downloads.
 38 new works posted.
 Top download: “The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts” by Mariana Tepfenhart,
2,749 downloads.
To repeat – over 61,000 full-text downloads last year!
Ms. Amatangelo kindly also informed us that ScholarsArchive readership statistics
for 2018 have been compiled in the following blog post:
https://sites.lib.byu.edu/scholarsarchive/2019/01/24/2018-readership-statistics/.
She added that she would welcome suggestions for scholarly communication topics
that people would like to know more about and will include them in her research list
for upcoming blog posts.
Statistics for all twenty-seven journals in the BYU repository can be found here:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1frWAHz54azk5nya1IYerWjSc5OQeZNls/view?usp=
sharing. The PDF also contains a link for each journal.
In addition to the letter from Ms. Amatangelo, Digital Commons wrote at the same
time to give us the results for the month of December. They reported that in
December the Comparative Civilizations Review had 5412 full-text downloads.
The most popular papers were:
The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts (236 downloads)
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol68/iss68/8
What is the Difference Between Culture and Civilization? Two Hundred Fifty
Years of Confusion (213 downloads)
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol66/iss66/4
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Globalization vs. Americanization: Is the World Being Americanized by the
Dominance of American Culture? (156 downloads)
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol47/iss47/7
So, the most popular journal article for downloading over the last year, and in the last
month, is entitled “The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts,” written by Prof. Mariana
Tepfenhart of New Jersey and published in Number 68, the issue which appeared in
Spring, 2013.
She begins her paper as follows:
Ethnic conflicts are not new phenomena. Such conflicts have existed all over
the world for centuries, but in the last 20 years, after the fall of Communism,
they are in the focus of public attention due to the civil war in Rwanda, the
events in Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
The post-Cold War world showed signs of decline with respect to the power of
states to maintain political stability. Since the two superpowers were no longer
competing for sphere of influences in the world, Third World countries suffered
primarily because they lost the support of their former patrons. What had once
served as a stabilizing force was gone.
The resulting conflicts are violent, bringing suffering, death, destruction, and
terrorism. They can escalate from local to regional areas. The casualties
resulting from ethnic conflicts are often in hundreds of thousands as one ethnic
group tries to eliminate another. The consequences can last generations.
This article discusses the most common causes that can trigger violent ethnic
conflicts. The author uses as examples two countries: the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Although the literature on this topic is
quite large and politicians and scholars come with different interpretations,
generally there is not only one cause for the conflict, but a combination of
factors. This paper emphasizes the role of belligerent leaders in triggering the
wars.
The editors congratulate Prof. Tepfenhart on this outstanding achievement.
Close behind, in second place for December, was the article by Thorsten BotzBornstein, published in Spring, 2012 (Volume 66). He argues in that paper that the
distinction between “culture” and “civilization” is not well embedded in the English
language but has remained relatively meaningful in both other European and nonEuropean languages.
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He starts his paper by discussing the contributions of the British scholar Edward B.
Tylor; Tylor abandoned the distinction between “culture” and “civilization” and for
him, the term “civilization” covered both culture and civilization. He reviews the
thoughts of many on this subject, including especially Charles Beard, Claude LéviStrauss, Norbert Elias, Samuel Huntington, Paul Ricoeur, Thomas Mann, Oswald
Spengler, W.E.B. DuBois, and others.
Author Botz-Bornstein concludes that “culture as a locally lived experience is always
mediated through civilization (otherwise it would be a dead culture stuffed away in a
museum or a theme park). In parallel, civilization in itself is a purely abstract universal
and becomes concrete only through cultural enactment.”
Third place went to Globalization vs. Americanization: Is the World Being
Americanized by the Dominance of American Culture?, an article by Yoichi
Shimemura of Japan. The article appeared in the Fall, 2002, edition, No. 47.
Her fascinating argument begins, in part, as follows:
… Instead of discussing all aspects of globalization, including its political and
economic ramifications, I would like to focus attention on the area of
globalization of culture. In other words, we are concerned here with how culture
all over the world has been affected by the phenomenon of globalization and
what sorts of transformation it has been undergoing.
By discussing globalization vs. Americanization, globalization vs. localization,
homogenization vs. heterogenization, I'd like to argue that the world, instead of
being homogenized into a single global culture by Americanization as some
people argue, is becoming more diversified, more complex, and more
multicultural.
Three important articles, all excellent reading.
Thus, for the editors, it is perhaps bordering on hubris, but it is now clear that the reach
of the journal electronically may be measured by the metrics created by Digital
Commons and ScholarsArchive. Another set of metrics is the number of “hits”
recorded by Google. I have just typed in Comparative Civilizations Review and a total
of 3,510,000 came up. Then, I went to Google Scholar and this showed 116,000 “hits”.
These various figures may be challenged for a wide range of reasons as to accuracy,
but the conclusion has to be evident: These support, in general but without much
dispute, the decision of the Editorial Board to expand from only issuing the paper
version of the journal, which was the sole medium for many years following the
founding of the CCR in the winter of 1979, to the electronic form, as well.
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In other news, the Board of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations has filled a vacancy with the election of Dr. John Berteaux to the Board.
Prof. Berteaux has been active with the ISCSC for many years. He holds the PhD in
Philosophy from the University of California San Diego, is widely published, and has
been for many years on the faculty of the School of Humanities and Communication at
California State University Monterey Bay.

Welcome to the Board, Dr. Berteaux.

Reminder of conferences of interest coming up:


The annual conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study
of Civilizations is scheduled to be held from July 25 to July 28, 2019, at El
Retiro San Iñigo, The Jesuit Retreat Center of Los Altos, California. This
year’s theme is: Comparison of Civilizations: Ancient and Modern and
Theories of Civilizational Studies.
This year one goal is to encourage student participation. Interested students
who wish to attend are requested to contact the Sub-committee for Young
Scholar Assistance. Please write to either
Dr. Michael Andregg (Conference Chair) at mmandregg@stthomas.edu, or
Dr. John Grayzel, at jagrayzel@alumni.stanford.edu.
More information on this exciting venue and the upcoming meeting can be
found at www.iscsc.org.
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Plans are nearing completion for a meeting to be jointly sponsored by the
ISCSC, the Asian Politics and History Association and Clarewood University
to be held in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in September 2019. Other organizations
are indicating their interest in participation, as well. Top officials of Mongolia
and of the Mongolia Society in the United States are working to make this a
very desirable session. Details are still being worked out as of press time and
will soon be posted on www.iscsc.org.



A conference entitled “From ‘Holocaust By Bullets’ To Auschwitz: Regional
Dimensions Of The Final Solution” will be held from June 16 to June 19, 2019,
at Uzhgorod National University, Transcarpathia, Ukraine. Keynote speakers
and organizers include prominent experts on the Holocaust in this region, along
the border of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania – much of which
lies within the old Austro-Hungarian crown lands of Galicia. For more
information, please go to the following URL:
www.frombulletstoauschwitz.com

Finally, the journal wishes to solicit expressions of interest from members of the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations who desire to join our
Editorial Board as Copy Editors, Peer Reviewers, or in other positions. Please contact
either Peter Hecht, Managing Editor, at peter.hecht@iscsc.org or myself, at
joseph.drew@iscsc.org. Thank you.
Here’s wishing a happy 2019 to all readers.

Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
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Polynesian Civilization and the Future Colonization of Space
John Grayzel
Abstract
Polynesian civilization was configured — prior to Western colonization — in ways
similar to that sometimes described as necessary for humanity's interstellar migration
into space. Over thousands of years and miles, across open ocean, a core population
expanded to settle on hundreds of scattered islands, while maintaining shared identity,
continued awareness and repetitive contact with each other. Key to their expansion
was their development of robust ocean-going vessels and their extraordinary abilities
to navigate across vast expanses of open water. The first half of the 1800s saw a surge
in contacts between Polynesia and western missionaries and whalers, followed by
significant depopulation due to disease and, after 1850, the imposition of Western
political control. The result was a dramatic disruption of many elements of Polynesian
life. At the same time, the propensity of many outsiders was to characterize Polynesia
as uncivilized or as an “arrested” civilization. However, in the 1970s, there began a
pan-Polynesian revitalization, including, and exhilarated by, the resurrection of
traditional blue ocean navigation. This paper explores this role of navigation as a
major institutional repository of Polynesian civilization writ large, as well as the
analytic importance of differentiating between “culture” and “civilization”, and the
possibility that Polynesian civilization is beginning a “gregarious flowering”1 in
preparation for its participation in the coming dispersal of humanity into interstellar
space.

1

Gregarious flowering means that all plants of a particular species flower at the same time, regardless
of differences in geographic locations or climate conditions... (e.g.) when a certain bamboo species
starts to flower gregariously, they do this all over the world for a several year period until... (either) the
entire forest has died (or)....only the bamboo stems die, while rhizomes become activated again to start
the natural regeneration of the species." Schröder, Stéphane. Bamboo Flowering Habits. December 18,
2011. https://www.guaduabamboo.com/ identification/bamboo-flowering-habits. Accessed
01/15/2019.
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Introduction
It was by responding boldly and successfully to this challenge of the estranging sea
— by achieving, with their rudimentary means of navigation, the tour de force of
establishing a regular maritime traffic across the open waters between island and
island — that the Polynesian pioneers won their footing on the specks of dry land,
which are scattered through the vast watery wilderness of the Pacific Ocean almost
as rarely as the stars are scattered through the depths of Space.2 Arnold Toynbee
On Raraka, we so discovered a party of natives… partially dressed, some in shirts…
others with vests... Others again with trowsers of all colors… Among the
inhabitants was a native missionary… This was the first island on which we
observed the dawning of Christianity and civilization. Lt. Charles Wilkes, U.S.
Exploring Expedition, 18383
Generally, when Europeans or Americans think about civilization they think in terms
of large cities, large-land masses, large populations, and grand monuments as the
context in which one has “a civilization.” When people think of Pacific islands they
often think of hula skirts, palm trees and pristine sunny beaches; places where “people
can take a vacation to escape from civilization.” To a large extent, this reflects the
mentality of the “large-land mass scholars” who have championed the word
“civilization”. To many of them and others, oceans are bodies of water that create
barriers of separation between societies, nations and civilizations. In contrast, for the
people of the Pacific, themselves, the ocean and its waves and currents are the weft and
the warp upon which their civilization has been woven.
Arnold Toynbee saw Polynesia as an “arrested” civilization. He believed that the high
accomplishments and specializations of “arrested" civilization in adapting to the unique
challenges of their environment also limited their abilities to substantially change.

2

Toynbee, Arnold. 1947. Abridgment. A History of Civilization. Oxford University Press. New YorkLondon. Vol 1 p.83.
3
In 1838, six U.S. Navy vessels set out on a great voyage of exploration. Aboard were several hundred
seamen and scientists under the command of Lt. Charles Wilkes. Authorized by Congress, the U.S.
Exploring Expedition (also known as the "U.S. Ex. Ex.", or the Wilkes Expedition) would explore and
map the Pacific, Antarctica, and the northwest coast of the United States. Wilkes, Charles. 1849.
Voyage Round the World. George W. Gordon. Philadelphia.
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A high technique has been developed by everyone of the arrested civilizations.
The Polynesians have excelled as navigators, the Eskimos as fishermen, the
Spartans as soldiers, the nomads as tamers of horses, the 'Osmalis as tamers of
men. These are all cases in which civilizations have remained static while
technique has improved. They are like climbers who have been brought up short
and can go neither backward or forward. 4
My own initial orientation to Polynesia occurred when I was responsible for closing
out a series of environmental projects across the Pacific region for the US Agency for
International Development (USAID). The deciding U.S. government authorities had
concluded that their limited resources would be better used if concentrated among more
"substantial" entities and programs, rather than scattering them across a host of (what
they perceived as) “separate micro-entities.” The only dissent came from U.S. naval
parties who shook their heads at their associates' inability to comprehend the full
expanse of the area, known as the Polynesian Triangle, or its strategic importance. The
region spans over 10 million square miles — about the size of Canada, the USA and
Brazil combined,5 with some 1,000 scattered islands, whose total land mass only
approximates the size of Massachusetts (using the equivalent of 1,000 square miles of
water to one square mile of land).
This bias, which equates “big” and “territory” with “mass” and “land”, has multiple
negative consequences in terms of hobbling the scholarly study and analysis of
civilization; limiting our understanding of contemporary world dynamics and, in
extremis6, hindering adequate identification of the challenges, and possible responses,
to the future expansion of human civilization across "outer space"7 to remote
extraterrestrial masses.
This last insight, which may strike some as farfetched, was first given to me years ago
by Dr. Lyn Poyer, an anthropologist and South Pacific expert,8 who, as a Peace Corps
volunteer, lived on a Pacific island so small that, she said, as I remember, when
someone hit a home run it inevitably went into the ocean. It was her experiencing the
ability of a small concentrated population of people to maintain a thriving peaceful
society on a sliver of relatively isolated land that gave rise to her speculation that
Polynesia was possibly the living culture most adapted for sustained functioning during
an extension of human civilization through space colonization.
4

Toynbee, Arnold. 1947. Abridgment. A History of Civilization. Oxford University Press. New YorkLondon. p.193.
5
The Telegraph. 2016. Seven fascinating facts about the South Pacific. https://www.telegraph.co.
uk/films/moana/south-pacific-islands-fascinating-facts/ Accessed 01/30/2019.
6
I use the expression here to mean as, in the literal Latin, "in the farthest reaches", rather than the more
common translation: “at the point of death.”
7
(That is, the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies.)
8
E.g., Linnekin, J and Poyer, L. 1990. Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the South Pacific. University
of Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press.
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Since then, I have come to believe, as this paper will seek to demonstrate, that being
"arrested" is not necessarily a death warrant, or permanent state, for either people or a
civilization. As regards Polynesia, in the 1970s, a variety of efforts began to emerge
for the revitalization of Polynesian culture and the revival of a Pan-Polynesian identity.
This paper seeks to make the case that this has been possible only because Polynesia is
a living "civilization", not just a culture - and thus possesses institutions capable of
purposely promoting replication of its foundational ways of thinking and acting. Of
these "navigation" is pivotal, playing a much greater role than that of a "technique," as
labelled by Toynbee. As such, understandably, the creation and now expanding
activities of the Polynesian Voyaging Society (PVS) has played a predominant role in
this phenomenon. Moreover, since traditional Polynesian navigation was very much
about the capacity for discovering, voyaging to, and settling far away areas, it is
suggested that Polynesian civilization may well be moving into a new role as a
significant influence on humanity's eventual efforts to colonize outer space.
Aiming for the Stars
Of course, the challenges of adapting human civilization to space will be many. They
will involve prolonged voyages towards uncertain destinations; the establishment of
encapsulated communities separated over immense distances; long-term intercommunal isolation; small populations crowded into very limited areas; requisite selfsufficiency and self-administration; and the need for continuous collaboration and
toleration between the assorted participants. The challenges will not only be technical
and logistic but social and psychological. At the same time as establishing their
different settlement units, space settlements will need to maintain a common identity
and a sense of shared destiny — what might be called a “unity of conscience” —
possibly through periodic communications and occasional visits.
Unfortunately, many of the requisite social and psychological profiles seem to conflict
with many of the characteristics of the populations and cultures of present-day “big
civilizations,” such as China, the United States, Europe, India or Latin America. In
contrast, many of the necessary configurations are embedded in the psyche and social
orientation traditionally encouraged within many Polynesian cultures. This should not
be surprising since traditional Polynesian civilization was formed by challenges and
responses similar to those described as facing the coming space age, wherein, over
thousands of years, a core population expanded, over thousands of miles of open ocean,
to settle on hundreds of dispersed islands, while maintaining a shared identity and
repetitive contact with each other.
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Civilization as a Key to Expansive Human Social Evolution
Debating whether a particular society, or specific conglomeration of peoples and
cultures, is, or isn't, a “civilization” might be considered little more than academic
dalliance when the distinction is without significant real-world consequences.
Therefore, it is important to emphasize that recognizing Polynesia as a full and dynamic
“civilization” is critical to understanding the mechanisms and sustainability of the
phenomenon of the Polynesian migration; and why its example can be a formative
factor for humanity’s next coming extraterrestrial civilization.
For the purposes of this paper, it is critical to make a clear distinction between “culture”
and “civilization”. By “culture” is meant those shared behaviors and understandings
which are fashioned, expressed and integrated into the lives of a self-identifying group
of people, and which they transmit from person-to-person and generation to generation.
A corollary is that cultures, as defined, die with their last practitioner. They may leave
behind artifacts and images and remembrances, but they no longer exist outside the
dynamic lives of their members, through and in which they are created and carried.
In contrast, “civilizations” arise as societies become increasingly complex, diverse and
extensive, till it is no longer possible for individuals, by themselves, to incorporate,
carry and transmit the formulations of their systematized shared constructs (such as
law, religion, and science). Rather the formulations become embedded in codified
rules, structures and practices that reflect, retain, transmit and reproduce them,
independent of their originating individuals or groups. In this sense, a civilization can
outlive its original practitioners. Thus, though the Romans are long gone, Roman law
remains not only knowable but still in play across Western civilization, in both church
and secular legal institutions, and in geographic areas far removed from what was the
territory of the Roman Empire.
Geographic Setting
The islands of the Pacific are generally divided into three main groups — Polynesia
(“many islands”), Melanesia (“black islands”), and Micronesia (“small islands”). Each
of these have different histories, cultures and populations, though on the fringes there
has been cultural overlapping and mixings. The focus of this article is only on
Polynesia, the largest division. It is made up of a large triangle of islands in the central
and southeastern Pacific. These islands include American Samoa/Samoa; the Cook
Islands; Easter Island; French Polynesia (including the Marquesas Islands, and the
Society Islands and Tahiti); Kiribati; Midway; New Zealand; Niue; Pitcairn Island; the
Hawaiian Islands; Tokelau; Tonga; Tuvalu; and the Wallis and Futuna Islands.
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Figure 1: Polynesian Triangle Map

The Polynesian Migration
The precise dates, directions and origins of the Polynesian migration remains a matter
of debate. However, broad approximations suffice for the purposes of this paper.
Accordingly, we can identify the first great entrance of humanity into the Pacific area,
towards what is today's Australia, and New Guinea, as occurring somewhere between
45,000 and 60,000 years ago. This first wave was by populations out of Africa, who,
quite likely, took advantage of overland bridges and shallow waters then present
between various land masses. By the time of the much later Polynesian migration, such
connections no longer existed. Rather, the Polynesian migration depended on robust
sailing vessels and sophisticated capacities in sailing technology, as well as, in many
cases, pre-existing knowledge as to the location of the likely destination.
It appears that there were two major migrations, by a population originally coming out
of East Asia and the area around Taiwan. One from around 1300 BC to 900 BC reached
Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa. The other, from around 300 AD to 1300 AD, reached Hawai’i
and Easter Island (400 AD-500 AD) and New Zealand (1200 AD -1300 AD). Together,
this represented exploration of over 16 million square miles of ocean and the eventual
settlement of almost all the inhabitable islands situated therein.
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Figure 2: Polynesian Migration Map

But Are They Really a Civilization?
Both “culture” and “civilization” are concepts that have wide, diverse and highly
malleable definitions, which are often used as supports to a larger issue or an
encompassing understanding being advocated.9 As already noted, as regards this
analysis, there is a need to distinguish between
group ...behaviors ...that are fashioned and transmitted by people themselves, over
generations, (e.g. "culture") and more complex "systems of behavioral and
relationship patterns" that... function across an entire society....and order and
structure the behavior of individuals by means of their normative character.10 (e.g.,
“civilization”)
For our immediate purposes, a simple sufficing definition of culture, is that by Ralph
Linton:
The culture of the society is the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas
and habits which they learn, share and transmit from generation to generation.11

9

c.f. Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten. 2012. What is the Difference Between Culture and Civilization? Two
Hundred Fifty Years of Confusion. Comparative Civilizations Review. Volume 66, Number 66, Spring.
10
Verwiebe, Roland. "Social Institutions". Encyclopedia of Quality of Life. University of Vienna,
https://www.soz.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_soziologie/Personen/Institutsmitglieder/Verwi
ebe/Social_nstitutions_in_Encyclopedia_of_Quality_of_Life_Research.pdf. Accessed 01/10/2019.
11
Linton, Ralph. 1945. Present World Conditions in Cultural Perspective, Columbia University Press,
New York, NY, USA.
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In contrast, “civilization” refers to a higher level of complexity and diversity than
“culture”. An empirical definition/description, expressed by Laina Farhat-Holzman,
is:
A civilization must have a concentration of people in one or more urban areas. It
must have (at a minimum) division of labor and specialization (people supported
by the community to perform professional specialties), and it must have a surplus
of food (wealth) to be used in support of such specializations (army, priesthood,
etc.)12
Andrew Bosworth provides a more functional-operational definition:13
Civilization is fundamentally a cultural infrastructure of information and
knowledge that serves survival and continuity. What distinguishes a civilization
from a culture is that this infrastructure, having reached a critical level of
complexity, becomes autonomous from constituent cities, nations, and empires. In
ordinary cultures, the passing of information and knowledge may depend upon
imitation or oral communication; in civilizations, this cultural memory...takes on a
life of its own....supported, protected and replicated by institutions which purposely
promote acceptance and replication of its recognized ways of thinking and doing.14
The institutions of a civilization, and their array and their roles, is a vast subject.
Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table manners, and
firms (and other organizations) are ... all institutions.” (Hodgson, 2006. p.2)15
Such institutions craft the actions, thoughts, understandings, and social personalities of
those affected by them, in ways reflective of the patterns of the civilization in
question.16
12

Targowski, A. Towards a Composite Definition and Classification of Civilization. Comparative
Civilizations Review, Vol. 60 (2009), No. 60, Art. 6, p. 87.
13
Ibid. p 87.
14
Bosworth, Andrew. 2003. The Genetics of Civilization: An Empirical Classification of Civilizations
Based on Writing Systems. Comparative Civilizations Review. No. 49, Fall. On p. 9. Bosworth
emphasizes writing systems as the key mechanism for the transmission of a civilizations. I would
disagree that such a system is absolutely essential. However, there is some scant evidence of such a
possible system for Polynesia (Rapanui of Easter Island) c.f. Winters, Clyde. 14:44 Aug 2016 From
Easter Island to Hawaii: Was there a Common Writing System used by Pacific Islanders?
https://www.ancient-origins.net/opinion-guest-authors/easter-island-hawaii-was-there-commonwriting-system-used-pacific-islanders. Accessed 02/09/2019.
15
Hodgson, Geoffrey. 2006. What Are Institutions? Journal of Economic Issues. Vol. XL. March.
No.1. 2.
16
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011. Social Institutions.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/. Accessed 01/07/2019.
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Examples of other key "institutions" of civilizations that serve to keep those
civilizations in some play today are Roman Law, key scriptures (such as the Old and
New Testaments, the Koran, etc.), the Hindu caste system, Confucianism, Greek logic,
the Western Corporation, Korean Chaebols, Japanese Zaibatsu, African performance
arts for African civilization, the civil bureaucracy for China, the university system,
etc.17
Many civilizations grow through expanding outwardly, and by incorporating additional
populations, often through military conquest. Over their amalgamation of new
populations, they throw a public “cloak” of behaviors, ideologies, practices, values,
customs, aesthetics, social roles and institutions. To those under this cover, they ascribe
membership in the larger “civilization.” However, there usually remains very
substantial cultural divergences that differentiate the hegemonic elites and the various
sub-cultures, clients and subservient members within that civilization.
The diverse Polynesian societies situated on different islands did reflect cultural
differentiations, but the single greatest determinant of the differences seems to have
been the nature of the Pacific island(s) each concerned group had settled. Across
Polynesia, there are large and small, flat and mountainous, coral reef and volcanic
islands. Each configuration presented their original settlers with a specific reality as to
the type and extent of resources available, constraints on production, and overall
population carrying-size. Pre-contact estimates range from small island populations
of a few hundred people to, at least, 250,000 on Hawaii's major islands.
Within their particular circumstantial parameters, each group crafted its own adaptive
responses. At the same time, groups under like circumstances reproduced much the
same basic configurations. These included, when feasible, irrigated agriculture, temple
mounds, concentrated and fortified settlements, stratified classes and highly
differentiated and specialized social, productive, craft and religious roles. Despite
significant differences, even as they adapted to their different specific circumstances,
most of the Polynesian island societies also retained the general ability to set off for
— and readapt to — other island circumstances, as necessary.

Figure 3: Taiaro, French Polynesia

Figure 4: Moorea Tahiti

17

It might be mistakenly understood that "institutions", as described, are entirely independent of
people. In fact, people make institutions work. The difference is between individuals and their
collective institutional groups. Thus, culture relies on the priest; civilization relies on the priesthood.
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But Are They Really One?

Figure 5: Polynesian Images

In the case of Polynesian civilization, we find a somewhat different situation. Thus,
one of the many things that amazed Capt. James Cook, who made three voyages “of
discovery” around the Polynesian triangle between 1768 and 1779, was the
commonalities of language, crops, navigation, cosmology and religion found in the
various islands visited. For example, the original settlers of Hawaii and New Zealand
came from Tahiti and the larger Society Island area. Both Hawaii and New Zealand are
over 2600 miles away from this area, one north of it, the other to its south-west.
On his first voyage, Cook, upon the
urging of his naturalist Joseph Banks,
took upon his boat a Polynesian
named Tupaia, who was both a
navigator and a priest from the island
of Raiatea, approximately 135 miles
West of Tahiti.
While for many centuries there had
been voyages between the homeland
and these new settlements, for
unknown reasons, approximately 400
years before Cook's arrival, such
occasional exchanges ceased. Yet,
Tupaia was still able to draw maps
and explain how to navigate to both.18

Figure 6: Banks & Tupaia

Di Piazza, Anne & Peartree, Erik. 2007. A New Reading of Tupaia’s Chart. Journal of Polynesian
Studies. Polynesian Society. Auckland. NZ Sept. p.321-340. “Tupaia’s Chart, while having the
18
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Thereafter, Tupaia accompanied Cook to New Zealand where, despite the more than
four centuries of separation, he could still converse with its inhabitants, discuss
historical events, and assert his high social rank as a priest.19
Unlike so many other civilizations, Polynesians did not expand through conquest but
diffused from a shared cultural core area across an open uninhabited area. Rather than
having to incorporate (or destroy) others encountered on their way, their challenge was
to maintain, in the face of repeated distance separations and necessary local
adaptations, the connectivities, continuity and coherence of their larger common body
of people and their shared capacities for future diffusion and resettlement. Among the
populations of specific clusters, sub-cultural differences could be keep harmonized
through regular human interactions. But across the large expanse of the entire triangle
of Polynesian civilizations, only durable institutions — the institutions of their
civilization independent of particular individuals and sub-groups — could fulfill this
need.
The Institutions of Polynesian Civilization
Traditionally, Polynesia civilization had a set of widely shared psycho-social values,
beliefs and practices that were defined and exercised around a set of core concepts:
i.e. tapu (taboos/prohibitions), mana (power) noa (blessing, freedom, the opposite of
tapu), mauri (the life principle that binds all things) and which was protected by tika
(truth, correctness, directness, justice, fairness, righteousness), pono (honesty,
genuineness, sincerity) and aroha (affection, sympathy, charity, compassion, love,
empathy).
That for so long, outsiders failed to see, let alone fully appreciate, the accoutrements
and accomplishments of Polynesian civilizations can largely be attributed to two
factors. First is the already noted ethnocentrism of massive land-based civilizations
which have viewed Polynesia as composed of independent micro-cultures separated by
vast expanses of ocean rather than as an ocean civilization with scattered centers and
outposts. The second is the challenges of understanding, let alone accurately
translating, the concepts and perspectives of an ocean, rather than land-based, people.

appearance of a map, is in fact a mosaic of sailing directions or plotting diagrams drawn on paper,
similar to those made by master navigators tracing lines in the sand or arranging pebbles on a mat to
instruct their pupils. p 321... (It) is not a map, nor a representation of Cartesian space, but a mosaic of
subject-centered sailing directions or bearings to distant islands.” p.324.
19
“On shore, in recognition of his prestige as a Tahitian tahua, Tupaia was greeted as an honoured
guest, enfolded in valuable cloaks and entrusted with ancient treasures. Disassociated from the
homeland for perhaps 500 years, elders, priests, chiefs and their people welcomed this heaven-sent
chance to reclaim their ancient past. Hundreds gathered to hear Tupaia preach....” c.f. Druett, Joan.
2017. Tupaia. Dictionary of New Zealand Biography.
https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/6t2/tupaia/print. Accessed 02/10/2019.
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Such dissonance has long affected many western interpretations of Polynesia. For
example, for Bosworth, the most foundational institution of a "civilization" is
“writing”.20 Polynesia is generally not seen as having a “writing” system.21 Yet
tattooing, which westerners generally view as a decorative practice, was traditionally a
highly developed symbolic accounting of an array of information, from social status
and genealogy to life experiences and spiritual protections - all written, in very
systematic fashion, upon the skin. It turned its bearer into what might be seen as a
living human document and was considered an indispensable element of Polynesia life
and society.22

Figure 7: Polynesian Images

Navigation: A Defining Institution of Polynesian Civilization
For this paper, no misunderstanding is in greater need of clarification than that
pertaining to the nature, roles and function of “navigation” as a key institution of
Polynesian civilization. For while the actual accomplishments of Polynesians as
seafarers have been widely acknowledged, till recently, the characterization has
generally been that of a technologically rudimentary people. For example:

20

Bosworth, Andrew. 2003. The Genetics of Civilization: An Empirical Classification of Civilizations
Based on Writing Systems. Comparative Civilizations Review. Number 49, Fall p. 9.
21
Missionaries often did develop new alphabets for the local dialects/ language. In Hawaii this was
done as early as 1820 and by the second half of the 19th century literacy among native Hawaiians was
higher than on mainland USA. Kirch, Patrick. 2012. A Shark Going In Is My Chief. The Island
Civilization of Ancient Hawaii. University Of California Press p. 21.
22
In fact, “Christian missionary instigated efforts to forbid the practice resulted in several rebellions led
by traditional Polynesian poets, priests and historians.” c.f. Dehart, Jonathan.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/ sacred-ink-tattoos-of-polynesia/.
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In 1956, New Zealand historian Andrew Sharp claimed that the Polynesians could
not have intentionally set out to explore and settle their island realm because their
canoes were too flimsy and unseaworthy, their wayfinding methods too imprecise,
and their seamanship skills too lacking for the task of sailing east against the
easterly Pacific trade winds, from Indonesia and Melanesia to the Polynesian
archipelagos. Sharp believed that the islands had been settled by accident-by the
crews of canoes that had been blown off course during storms or that had simply
gone off course due to navigational incompetence or to cloudy weather hiding their
navigational stars. He believed that the stories of long-distance, open-ocean
voyaging found in the traditions of the Pacific islands were pure fantasy.23
In fact, nothing could be further from reality than Sharp's claims!

Figure 8: Polynesian Sailing Images

Sharp, and many others, have been wrong not only in terms of underestimating the
technical sophistication of Polynesian ocean navigation, but also in being oblivious to
its critical role in expanding, maintaining, sustaining and periodically refreshing
Polynesian civilization itself. It does this by playing not only a pivotal role as a material
conveyor of people and goods but also as a social, psychological, spiritual and
informational galvanizer and guide. Ironically, the very institution (e.g. writing)
Bosworth feels is so vital to civilization, has also been cited by others as a significant
determinant of Europe's false denigration of Polynesian, and other, civilizations.

23

Polynesian Voyaging Society. 1962. A Summation by Sharp's Opinion As Expressed In His Work:
Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific. Wellington, N.Z. Polynesian Society.
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In the early 19th century, sophisticated Europeans had only arrived at a more
complicated way of doing what the Polynesians, Micronesian, the Arabs and the
Vikings had long since achieved.… The key to this paradox lies in the fact that a
literate society faces the particular difficulty that it must be able to set down on
paper, in this case maps, charts and almanacs, what not-literate people might easily
read in the sky and carry in their heads. In the end it comes to imagine that the job
can be done in no other way.24

Rather than Polynesian navigation being, as portrayed in the past by many Westerners,
the expert application of rudimentary skills and technology, it is, in fact, a complex
system of interdependent skills, understandings and knowledge, closely linked to those
of sea craft design and construction. A common translation for Polynesian navigation
is “wayfinding”; with the navigator being a “wayfinder”. For both wayfinding and
traditional canoe building, there were established schools taught by recognized master
practitioners. Instruction covered a wide array of topics and practices and could
continue for ten to twenty years before a student became an initiated master.
Empirically, a Polynesian navigator had to
memorize precise information across an array of
natural phenomena: star positions, wind patterns,
currents, the habits of specific fish and birds,
cloud formations, and Te Lapa (“The Flashing” a water-bound light phenomenon that appears to
emanate from land and is, apparently still
unknown to Western scientists).25 Of particular
importance was knowing how to read and follow
swells, (waves that propagate along the interface
between water and air and which can travel
thousands of miles). 26
Figure 9: Polynesian Stick Chart

24

Golson, Jack. ed. 1962. Polynesian Navigation: A Symposium on Andrew Sharp's Theory of
Accidental Voyages. Memoire No. 34 Supplement to the Journal of the Polynesian Society. Vol. 71,
No. 3 September p. 59.
25
George, Marianne. 2012. Polynesian Navigation and Te Lapa—“The Flashing”. Time and Mind The
Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness and Culture, Volume 5, Issue 2.
26
Snodgrass et al. 1966. Propagation of Ocean Swell Across the Pacific. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London. Series A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences No. 1103 Vol. 259 pp.
431-497, May 5.
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Until chaos theory we (the West) had no way to exam turbulent systems like the
ocean. Science just assumed sea waves were random…Today the surface of the
ocean turns out to be highly modulated…. For example, a swell bending around
an Island casts a turbulent shadow downward of the Island with a pattern that
reveals the island's location…. Swells … shouldn't be confused with surface
waves… Swells march in consistent ranks across thousands of miles.… If you can
read the shape of the swell, you can tell the direction and strength of the current.27
Technically, traditional Polynesian navigation
depended on a constellation of capacities
adequate for someone, such as Tupaia, to guide
a voyage neither he, nor anyone else, had made
for several hundred years. Aligned with this was
the expertise of canoe building masters in
constructing sea craft capable of travelling over
those thousands of miles, filled with people and
provisions. Polynesians used a "star compass"
to guide them to specific destinations as well as
maps (made of sticks) to indicate the patterns of
swells and the location of islands over the area
to be sailed.

Figure 10: Polynesian Stick Compass

Before sailing, they would memorize the pattern which led to their intended precise
destination. They could feel and taste changing differences in ocean waters. They used
their own bodies as instruments. For example, in what is called testicular navigation,
“the wayfarer reads the swell by sitting cross-legged and nearly naked on the bottom
of his all vegetable matter canoe and feeling it in his testicles”.28
Socially, large canoe construction required organizing the efforts of hundreds of
people.29 Most boats, of course, were smaller, and most navigation was over short
distances. During select periods of time, island groups would make visiting voyages
to each other. Such voyages might serve as opportunities for the exchange of goods
and crops but were generally more social than economic. Young people sometimes
went on “touring” voyages to perform for each other. Of course, not all was peaceful,
and voyages for war, often over status or land, were common.

27

Witt, Harriet. 1991. The Soft, Warm, Wet Technology of Native Oceana. Whole Earth Review, Fall
Point Foundation San Francisco. p 3. (Some of the swells which surfers ride in Hawaii apparently
originate from around New Zealand.)
28
Ibid p. 1.
29
Oliver, Douglas. 2002. Polynesian in Early Historic Times. Bess Press. Honolulu p. 121 - Gives an
historic example of over 400 people working under 4 experts (Kahuna) on Hiva Oa.
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In terms of interpersonal behavior, Levy discusses the challenges and abilities of the
Polynesians to maintain peaceful communities amongst tight concentrations of people
on a small land-mass. He describes their ability throughout the day to navigate
themselves around each other and problematic conditions, so as to avoid behavioral
confrontations and emotional collisions. He sees this as engendered in childhood,
citing that the usual term (in Tahitian) for actively dealing with children is fa'atere,
literally “to steer.”30 Levy notes that:
at an early age the child must learn to coordinate and maneuver himself in relatively
unprotected environments....proper performance consists of scanning for and
avoiding errors...(and) to be sensitive to the mobile, context-determined situation
of his community.31
Psychologically, especially for a long voyage, the skills to use techniques on an expert
level had to be matched with accommodating personalities of both crew and
passengers. Crew and passengers had to live in tightly cramped quarters and, if settlers,
quickly establish functioning communities and production units upon arrival.
Navigators had to maintain a honed focus over long hours.
In terms of personality, John Robison, an autism specialist and scholar of
neurodiversity, has suggested that the very capacity to be a great Polynesian navigator
was tied to the special sensitives of the Polynesian master navigators themselves.32
Piailug (a modern-day navigator) described how as a toddler his father would hold him
in the ocean waters encouraging him to sense the feel of the different movements of
the water.33
Robinson notes that:

30

Levy, Robert. 1973. Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Islands. University of Chicago
Press. Chicago. p. 447.
31
Ibid. pp. 460-61.
32
Robison, John. 2017. Autism in the South Pacific: A Different Way of Seeing? Psychology Today
Blog. Posted Feb. 26. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/my-life-aspergers/201702/autism-inthe-south-pacific-different-way-seeing. accessed 1/12/2019.
33
Golson, Jack. Ed. 1962. The wayfinder, with no mathematical model between him and his environs,
concentrates 100% of his intention on his place in the sea and the sky. With this one pointedness he
processes all of his data on his course, speed, the current etc. His point of concentration is in his navel,
called the piko in Hawaiian. This is considered the center of one's body and being, so that it - not the
brain – is the point from which to live. Instructions for psychologically locating one's piko and for
staying centered there have been passed down through the centuries in chants. Instructions for
wayfinding explained that your piko is your canoe. p.1.
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For navigators like Piailug ...exceptional sensitivity isn’t disabling. It is lifesaving... it is apparent that he accurately senses things many others cannot see....
Where a typical person merely feels a wave rock the boat, he senses the angle of
the rocking and realizes when it's different from the angle he felt a moment ago.
From that he knows the canoe has wandered from its course. He has similar
ability to sense changes in the patterns in the sky, and in the winds he feels
against his face. American schools are filled with children who have similarly
extreme sensory sensitivity. Almost to a one their sensitivity is described as
highly disabling.34
Religiously, Polynesian spiritual beliefs and practices were an integral and
indispensable part of Polynesian navigation. On a daily basis, it was the web of
Polynesian rules of taboo (tapu) and free choice (noa) that structured so many
aspects of their life and around which they had to navigate daily.
With the Maori there was no one special day, no Sunday, on which tapu must be
particularly observed. One day was as another. It was a perpetual Sabbath; ... the
Maori's religion was his daily life.35 Every Polynesian lived in “a rich, vibrant,
‘living’ Polynesian world where everyday encounters with things and people are
heavily cosmologically textured... The ocean (was) a living thing... the sea and its
inhabitants belonged to the powerful god Tangoroa ...the building of a canoe was
an affair of religion... (with) extensive spatial and temporal structure of rites
surrounding (it)...”36
Under such circumstances as described, that fact that the taboo system has been shown
to have had substantial benefits in the management of local sea and land resources 37
reinforces the logic of having navigators undergo ritual initiation before being awarded
“master” status.
Motivation
It seems simple to understand the motivation of Polynesians for regular inter-island
voyaging. But why were they motivated to migrate over long distances to uninhabited
and never seen locations?

34

In the USA, a fixation on lining up objects and on geometric patterns, a key Polynesian navigation
skill, is considered a common indicator of autism.
35
Andersen, J. 1940. Maori Religion. The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 49(4(196)), 513-555.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20702839 p. 518. Accessed 01/14/2019.
36
Richards, Colin. 2008. The Substance of Polynesian Voyaging. World Archaeology. 40:2. pp.213215.
37
Colding, J and Folke, C. Social Taboos: "Invisible" Systems of Local Resource Management and
Biological Conservation. Ecological Applications Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 584-600.
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Commonly suggested reasons -- overpopulation, resource depletion, search for wealth,
or fleeing from conflict – are largely built on European colonial experience and do not
really seem to fit.
At most, the size of any migration apparently was in the hundreds, a number that would
not seem to be significant in terms of alleviating a home island's overpopulation for
any appreciable time. Given the large resources of time, materials and human labor
necessary to execute a migration, its organizer(s) had to already possess riches, power,
time and peace with which to assemble the effort. Nor did Polynesian migrants (unlike
Europeans) bring back "foreign" wealth to their originating island. Migrants stayed
where they found themselves, as independent entities. A good case can be made that
the reasons were actually psychological and spiritual.
One of the many reasons why Polynesians set out on hazardous voyages to other
Islands is the restless desire to visit strange places, to go sightseeing .... Firth ...
describes just such an attitude with the Tikopia. Too frequently, perhaps, Western
anthropologists attribute the actions of ... people to environmental or utilitarian
motives. But to the Polynesians, “the undiscovered lands beyond the horizon” were
a space frontier, as the solar system is today... and the simple desire to conquer this
frontier may have dominated all other motives for voyaging and colonization.38
Polynesian identity was tied to the ancestors who had come from an original
homeland. “Hawaiki” was the legendary homeland of the Maori peoples and to which
they believed they returned in death.
Now do I direct the bow of my canoe
To the opening whence arises the sun god, Tama-nui-te-ra,
Great son of the sun,
Let me not deviate from the course,
But sail direct to the land, the Homeland.39
Thus, Colin suggests that, from the Polynesian perspective, each great voyage was seen
as a transformative experience.

38

Kirch, Patrick. 1989. The Evolution of the Polynesian Chiefdoms. Cambridge University Press. New
York. p. 82.
39

Richards, Colin. 2008. The Substance of Polynesian Voyaging. World Archaeology. 40:2. Pages 215,
216.
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In re-interpreting Polynesian voyaging it is worth considering that many
traditional stories tell ‘neither of deliberate nor accidental cruising, but
supernatural transport’ ....Clearly, the voyaging canoe was considered to be
sacred in character and all the special conditions and rules of tapu surrounding
its construction were to sanction the creation of a vehicle essentially of another
place and time.40
In 1893, Fredrick Jackson Turner presented his famous “frontier thesis” at the World's
Columbian Exposition, marking the 400th Anniversary of Columbus' voyage. He
wrote (except for the added Polynesian “equivalents”):
The peculiarity of American (Polynesian) institutions…furnish the forces
dominating American (Polynesian) character….the frontier is the outer edge of the
wave ....each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area
the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics…the universal disposition of
Americans (Polynesians)....is the actual result of an expansive power which is
inherent in them…It is like the steady growth of a complex nervous system....Thus
wave after wave is rolling westward (eastward); the real Eldorado (Hawaiki) is still
farther on….Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of
primitive organization based on the family.....no homogeneous public sentiment
can be formed to legislate immediately into being the requisite institutions. …. And
yet they are all needed immediately The most effective efforts...came through its
educational and religious activity, … now, four centuries from the discovery of
America (The Hawaii-New Zealand islands),.... the frontier has gone, and with its
going has closed the first period of American (Polynesian) history.
Turner feared that the end of the frontier would spell the end of America's dynamic,
innovative, democratic character. He underestimated America's ability to find new
colonial, neo-colonial and global market frontiers. The Polynesians were not so
fortunate.
The Great Pauses
As already noted, it appears that there were two major migrations, coming out of East
Asia and the area around Taiwan. One was from around 1300 BC to 900 BC reaching
Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa. The other occurred from around 300 AD to 1300 AD,
eventually reaching Hawai'i, Easter Island, and New Zealand.
Regarding the first pause, one of the plausible explanations is that given the variation
in island environments, the process was somewhat cybernetic.

40

Ibid, p. 21.
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Each new settlement met new challenges that required the development of, first, new
solutions for maximizing its immediate success and, only thereafter, new discoveries
leading to new solutions for its next eventual migration.
The island landscapes of the Pacific were gradually encompassed over time, during
movements that required the development and deployment of skills sufficient to
overcome unimagined conditions. ...as... colonists reached Fiji/Samoa/Tonga, they
encountered islands smaller, more isolated and less environmentally diverse.41
Regarding the second pause, with the settlement of what is now present-day Hawaii
and New Zealand, the possibilities for significant new discoveries were basically over.
For a while exchange voyages continued, but for reasons not known, sometime after
1300 AD, the great voyages between the widely separated island groups ceased.
Various explanations have been given for this pause in such longer distance voyages.
These include a change in the currents and winds due to climatic cooling, deforestation
(which made it more difficult to build the large vessels necessary), the development
and expansion of the society on each of the islands (which turned their powerful leaders'
attentions more and more to internal jockeying for power and control), and, after
settlements were well established, a diminishing need for any exchanges of biological
material, or marriage, political or social alliances.
When Arnold Toynbee called Polynesia an ‘arrested’ civilization, he considered it in
its “last agonies.” He stated that the growth of a civilization consists in a “progressive
and inward self-determination or self articulation” of the civilization;.... In the growth
phase the civilization successfully responds to a series of ever new challenges, while
in the disintegration stage, it fails to give such a response to a given challenge. It tries
to answer it again and again, but recurrently fails.” (IV 20)42
When Captain Cook arrived in Polynesia in the 1770s, Polynesian civilization was still
intact and vibrant. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter, European-brought diseases began
to ravage the various island populations. (From 1791 to 1863; approximately 80% of
the Marquesas population died; on Rapa, 80%.)43 By the 1880s, European and
American social, political and religious contacts had captured much of Polynesian daily
life and ended most "self-determination" and "self-articulation" by Polynesia's
decimated population.
41

Thomas, T. (2008). The Long Pause and the Last Pulse: Mapping East Polynesian Colonisation. In
Clark G., Leach F., & O'Connor S. (Eds.), Islands of Inquiry: Colonisation, seafaring and the
archaeology of maritime landscapes (pp. 97-112). ANU Press.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h8gp.9. Accessed 02/01/2019.
42
Sorokin, Pitirim. 1940. Review Article: Arnold J. Toynbee's Philosophy of History. The Journal of
Modern History. Vol. 12, No. 3 Sept. pp. 374-376.
43
Martin, P. M., & Combes, C. 1996. Emerging Infectious Diseases and the Depopulation of French
Polynesia in the 19th Century. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2(4), pp. 359-361.
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0204.960416. Accessed 02/10/2019.
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The Role of Hōkūle‘a
By 1975, no living Hawaiian knew the ancient techniques for long distance ocean
navigation. Yet, at that very moment, new stirrings in Polynesia were beginning to
emerge. What has happened since raises questions as to whether Toynbee's pessimism
was not misplaced and whether Polynesian civilization wasn't always stronger than he
thought, and more dormant than “arrested.”
In 1973, Ben Finney, an anthropologist at the University of Hawaii, along with artist
Herb Kawainui Kane and sailor Tommy Holmes, established the Polynesian Voyaging
Society (PVS). Their aim was to show that ancient Polynesians could have purposely
settled the Polynesian Triangle using non-instrument navigation . The PVS began work
on a sixty foot Polynesian double-hulled voyaging canoe, based on drawings of Captain
Cook. They called it Hōkūle‘a — the name of one of the major navigating stars of traditional
Polynesian sailing.
Though there were no qualified living Hawaiian ocean navigators, Finney was able to
recruit Mau Piailug, a Micronesian navigator from the tiny (1 mile by 1 1/2 mile, 600
population) Carolinian island of Satawal in Micronesia.44 With his help, efforts began
to recover Hawaiian knowledge and techniques and adopt them for the proposed first
voyage of the Hōkūle‘a.
In 1976, Captain Kawika Kapahulehua and navigator Mau Piailug sailed the Hōkūle‘a,
from Hawaii to Tahiti, exclusively using Polynesian navigation techniques. Thirtythree days later they arrived in Tahiti, 600 years after the last Polynesian canoe had
made such a journey.
Had I not had the occasion to be present, in 1992, when the voyaging canoe Hōkūle‘a
stopped at the Cook Islands, I would never have understood the full emotional reaction
of Polynesians to the event of a pan-Polynesia voyage as a manifestation of their panPolynesian identity.
What began in 1973 as a scientific experiment to build a replica of a traditional
voyaging canoe for a one-time sail to Tahiti, had become an important catalyst for
a generation of cultural renewal. By the end of the century, Hōkūle‘a would have
sailed more than 100,000 miles; reaching every corner in the Polynesian Triangle,
and the West Coast of the United States…
44

In fact, in the 20th century, traditional Pacific navigation skills appear to have been better preserved
in select areas of Micronesia and Melanesia, perhaps because continuous sailing between neighboring
islands remained longer as a characteristic activity of regular life than in the larger island societies of
Polynesia. C.f. Gladwin, Thomas. 1970. East is a Big Bird: Navigation & Logic on Puluwat Atoll.
Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
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(Today, there are 25 deep-sea voyaging canoes with crews from 13 different Pacific
countries and 10 master navigators ... training the next generation of wayfinders.)45

Figure 11: Wa‘a Kaulua Double Canoe

Figure 12: Hōkūle‘a

But Are They Really Predisposed for Space?
As already noted, Toynbee considered Polynesia an “arrested civilization.” He
characterized “arrested civilizations” as “climbers who have reached a certain height
but now find themselves blocked; they can go neither forward nor backward.” But
today Polynesians from all over the Polynesian Triangle are both reviving old, and
creating new, possibilities for future expressions of Polynesian civilization. One
avenue which Toynbee probably never imagined involves engagement with humanity's
efforts to colonize outer space.
In fact, at the beginning of space travel,
Hawaii provided sites for the geology
training of Apollo astronauts and then served
as the port for astronauts returning from the
Moon. It now provides landscapes that
mimic the surface of Mars, for training the
first manned mission to that planet.
It has also provided Ellison Shoji Onizuka,
from Kealakekua, Hawaii, who successfully
flew into space with the Space Shuttle
Figure 13: Hawaiian Space Dome
Discovery (and later sadly died in the
destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger.) The Mānoa Hawaii's Space Flight
Laboratory (HSFL) at the University of Hawaii is a multi-disciplinary research and
education center dedicated to meeting the challenges to space exploration.

45

Thompson, Nainoa. 2000. Hawaiian Voyaging Traditions. Twenty-Five Years of Voyaging, 19752000. http://archive.hokulea.com/holokai/nainoa_twenty_five_years.html. Accessed 01/04/2019.
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Meanwhile, an independent citizen group, known as “The Lawful Hawaiian
Government”, which seeks to restore the authority of the old Hawaiian Kingdom, has
designated a field of lava on Hawaii’s Big Island as its official UFO Landing Pad and
Star Visitor Sanctuary.

Figure 14: Star Visitor’s Landing Area

However, the possible relevance of Polynesian civilization to future space activities is
more than an associative relationship with present-day efforts for space exploration
located in Hawaii. As already recognized by NASA, “the long-term success of the
interstellar migration will depend on human motivation and the provision for human
creativity, discovery, inventiveness and serendipity.”46
Through the direct participation of Finney and others, the Polynesian experience has
already been introduced into NASA's thinking on the nature of interstellar migration.
The present prevailing practices for space exploration favor independent specific
objective voyages, conducted and directed by authorities on earth. However, the
Polynesian experience demonstrates the viability of an alternative process, one
implemented as a serial unfolding of explorations, occurring in a step by step fashion.
Under such a scenario, each new step would be generated after the consolidation of the
efforts and learnings of the most recent past migration group. New exploration would
then directly emanate from that last group, rather than exclusively from independent
missions directed from the originating home base.

46

Cohen, Marc et al Ed. 1991. Human Factors Issues for Interstellar Spacecraft. 28th Space Congress
Canaveral Council of Technical Societies http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1991spco.proc. Accessed
1/31/2019.
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For the Polynesians, such a process occurred over thousands of years, with substantial
periods of pause — thereby permitting full adaptation by the most recent migration
group to its new circumstances, including the local development of new technologies
and capacities necessary for the next stage.
What the Polynesian migration experience very importantly demonstrated was that,
even though the process was not centrally controlled or driven, a unity of conscience
and a core retention of shared institutions was maintainable through the dynamic of
interim reciprocal voyaging visits; mostly between settlements within relative
proximity, but supplemented by occasional grand voyages back to their centers of
origin. Since the challenges will be social and psychological, as well as technical and
logistical, and since the requisite social and psychological profiles seem far different
from that of the populations of the “big” civilizations of our time, and since the
necessary configurations are reflective of Polynesian civilization, it is suggested that it
is around such experience of Polynesian civilization that the future Argonauts of outer
space may well be formed.
Lastly, the Polynesian experience challenges any assumptions that humanity's
expansion to outer space should be entirely “scientifically” motivated and devoid of
any purposely spiritual component.
In fact, “(the) idea of seeing space exploration as a religion has a long history, dating
back to the Russians of the early twentieth century, many of whom self-identified as
"Cosmists.”47 James C. Fletcher, a Mormon who headed NASA (1971-1977 and 19861989) was openly motivated by “...the ideas expressed in the Mormon temple...(that)
humans were not the only intelligent beings in the universe...(and he) was interested in
the probability of finding other civilizations in space and commented on it repeatedly.”48
When Fletcher combined his faith with science, as well as Frederick Jackson Turner’s
frontier thesis, he sounded like Toynbee, proclaiming that:
Like Darwin, we have set sail upon an ocean: the cosmic sea of the Universe. There
can be no turning back. To do so could well prove to be a guarantee of extinction.
When a nation, or a race or a planet turns its back on the future, to concentrate on
the present, it cannot see what lies ahead. It can neither plan nor prepare for the
future, and thus discards the vital opportunity for determining its evolutionary
heritage and perhaps its survival.49

47

Andersen, Ross. 2012. The Holy Cosmos: The New Religion of Space Exploration. The Atlantic. May 29.
Launius, Roger. 1999. A Western Mormon in Washington, D.C.: James C. Fletcher, NASA, and the
Final Frontier. The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, May. p. 232.
49
Ibid p. 230.
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Conclusion
As humanity moves into outer space, the very understandings and definition of
civilization will have to undergo major rethinking. Already concepts such as "cosmic
civilization" and "astrosociology" are finding their way into the thinking of NASA. But
the requisite rethinking may well be not only of the next civilization to come but also
of civilizations that are now, and those that have already been.
Arnold Toynbee said “the next problem of study is why and how, out of twenty-six
civilizations, four (Far Western Christian, Far Eastern Christian, Scandinavian, and
Syriac) miscarried and turned to be abortive; five (Polynesian, Eskimo, Nomadic,
Spartan, and Ottoman) were arrested in a growth at an early stage; while the remaining
civilizations grew through an élan that carried them from challenge response to further
challenge and from differentiation through integration to differentiation again?” (III,
128)
Consideration of Polynesian civilization, and its ongoing transformation through
revitalized navigation, raises questions not only as to its proper classification in the
typology of civilizations, but, also as concerns our understanding of the life cycles of
civilizations themselves. Rethinking opens up the possibility that what Toynbee
thought of as an “arrested” civilization may actually be a civilization in the process of
metamorphosis. One that may even be, with élan, already beginning to unfold its wings
in preparation for humanity's future migration into the new frontier of outer space and
the emergence of interstellar civilization.
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Image References
Though there are thousands of pictures and drawings available related to Polynesia,
with a few exceptions they can be reduced to a handful of original sources and
perspectives. With disease decimating Polynesia's inhabitants during early contact,
followed by missionary teachings and Christianity that rapidly displaced many
traditional religious and cultural norms, the little visual evidence of classical
Polynesian life is heavily dependent on the drawings of members of early expeditions.
For the purposes of this article, all illustrations and photos have been acquired from
open widely available sources under the fair use doctrine or under an authorized policy
of the copywriter owner (i.e., https://corporate.britannica.com/termsofuse.html.)
Fig 1. Polynesian Triangle Map.
https://polyhubonline.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/126157-004-e1cbe88f.jpg
Fig 2. Polynesian Migration Map.
http://www.micronesiaforum.org/index.php?p=/discussion/11400/chamorros-andbeing-micronesian-guam-cnmi/p2
Fig 3. Taiaro, French Polynesia.
https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacificnews/367637/french-polynesia-keen-to-buy-taiaro-atoll-reports
Fig 4. Moorea Tahiti.
https://www.pinterest.com/ddheppner/moorea-tahiti/
Fig 5. L to R. Above & Below.
A) Oahu statue. https://www.hawaiiecotourism.org/members/and-you-creations/
B) Temple-Maha'iatea. https://www.tahiti-infos.com/Le-site-du-marae-Mahaiatea-bientot-amenage_a156233.html
C) Maori defensive settlement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pā
D) Polynesian village. http://creativeartsinc.com/
E) Hawaiian Temple. Wikimapia. http://creativeartsinc.com/
F) Polynesian "sacrifice" temple. https://www.tripadvisor.com.pe/LocationPhoto
DirectLink-g60656-d1083842-i43530965-Polynesian_Cultural_CenterLaie_Oahu_Hawaii.html
Fig 6. Banks & Tupaia. https://astrofella.wordpress.com/2018/06/
Fig 7. L to R. Above & Below.
A) Hawaiian Ad 1940. https://thesocietypages.org/socimages /2013/03/27/thedancing-hawaiian-girl-at-your-service/
B) Traditional Hawaiian Chief. 1819 Bancroft Library, University of California
Berkeley
C) A New Zealand warrior from A Journal of a Voyage to the South Seas in his
Majesty's Ship, the Endeavor. Sydney Parkinson. Circa 1768.
D) Tonga Tattoo Women. Krutak #Hawaiian Tattoos
E) Polynesian warrior cloaks. https://www.meetup.com/de/WarriorsOfThePacific/
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F) Captain Cook in Hawaii. Engraved by R.B. Godfrey and S. Parkinson, A
Voyage to the South Seas (1773). https://captainjohndesilva.blogspot.com/
2017/01/ repost-tupaia-captain-cooks-polynesian.html
G) Sydney Morning Herald. 01 January,1935.
https://professional.fairfaxsyndication.com/CS.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&VBI
D =2ITP1G382HNBW&POPUPPN=5&POPUPIID=2ITHRGY8D2
Fig 8. L to R. Above & Below.
A) Outrigger canoe. https://outriggersailingcanoes.blogspot.com /2017/
B) Te Whakatere Waka Hourua. University of Waikato NZ
https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/~tetaka/tuhingaroa/ index.htm
C) Hōkūleʻa. https://alchetron.com/Hokulea
D) Traditional Fiji sailing canoe. University of St Mary.
https://www.stmuhistorymedia.org/traditional-wayfinding-ancient-navigationthrough-the-pacific-2/comment-page-2/
E) Ancient Polynesian Sailing Canoe. https://cellcode.us/quotes/ancientpolynesian-sailing-canoe.html
F) New Zealand War canoe. Cambridge Library Collection.
https://cambridgelibrarycollection.wordpress.com / 2014/06/23/to-newzealand-and-back-with-captain-cook/
Fig 9. Polynesian Stick Chart.
http://www.ourpacificocean.com/micronesian_stick_chart/index.htm
Fig 10. Polynesian Stick Compass. Wikimedia Commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File Mau-star-compass.png
Fig 11. Wa‘a Kaulua Double Canoe: 1975 First Voyage. 1976/ben_finney.html
Fig 12. Hokule'a. Wikimedia Commons.
https://www.google.com/search?sa=G&hl=enCY&q=hokulea+canoe&tbm=isch&tbs=simg
Fig 13. Hawaiian Space Dome.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/video/2015/oct/05/the-hawaiian-dome-wherenasa-prepares-humanity-for-life-on-mars-video
Fig 14. Star Visitor’s Landing Area.
https://www.exopolitics.org/page/30/?search=predictions
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In and Out of Place:
Civilizational Interaction and the Making of Australia in Oceania and Asia
Jeremy C. A. Smith
Abstract
The making of Euro-Australia occurred against the backdrop of two dimensions of its
historical constitution. First, it occurred on the back of Britain’s entry into the
Oceanian world and its intercivilizational encounters with Pacific cultures. The second
dimension was the appropriation of the land of a complex and internally diverse
Aboriginal civilization and suppression of its social world view. This was vital to a
lasting sense of ambivalence in Australian identity and in the relations of the
Commonwealth of Australia with island states in the Pacific. After Federation (1901),
Australia became more independent in the context of devolution of the Commonwealth.
Engagement in the Pacific War heralded a turn from allegiance to Britain to alliance
with the United States. A new orientation to the Asia-Pacific was not a chosen course,
but one compelled by geo-political conditions and a growing dynamism in this multicivilizational world region. From the 1970s to the end of the twentieth century,
engagement in Asia accelerated with the onset of a policy regime of multiculturalism
and a process of neo-liberal modernization.
This essay argues that Euro-Australia emerged out of complex intercivilizational
interactions entailing colonialism, diverse migratory and cultural flows, and the
creation of a homogenizing collective memory. I contend that Australian modernity,
due in part to its suppression of its indigenous civilization and accompanying denial of
that suppression, has borne considerable cultural and political ambivalence about its
place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its economic and political
relations with neighbouring countries. In this essay, I focus on Pacific relations. I
compare developments and turns in Australian foreign policy with patterns of cultural
engagement since the 1970s. Towards the end, I raise the Australian regime of refugee
detention in relation to climate refugees. The essay concludes with notes on the merits
of civilizational analysis in understanding the Oceanian constellation and its potential
futures and points for further research on Australia in a multi-civilizational context.
Introduction
This essay addresses two lacunae in civilizational analysis. First, it makes a small
attempt to repair the neglect of the Pacific in civilizational analysis. Second, it turns to
the making of Euro-Australia as a general feature of the interaction of civilization and,
more precisely, as a middle power in relation to the Pacific civilizational world.
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My specific argument is that, due to the character of its colonial conquest of Aboriginal
civilization, Australian modernity has borne considerable cultural and political
ambivalence about its place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its
economic and political relations with neighbouring countries. I prosecute this
argument in three parts.
First, I briefly sketch my concept of intercivilizational engagement as a reconstruction
of Benjamin Nelson’s and Johann Árnason’s theories of intercivilizational encounters.
Second, I present the case for considering the Pacific as a civilization in its own right
(Árnason 2003, Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason, Eisenstadt, and Wittrock 2005,
Árnason and Hann 2018, Árnason 1997). This sets up a discussion of the legacies of
intercivilizational interaction that influenced the formation of Euro-Australia.
In a third part, I argue that Australian culture exhibits an ambivalence towards the
Pacific region and issues from the conditions of its formation and the ongoing political
and commercial vision of the Pacific as a ‘deficient’ region in need of neoliberal
reconstruction. The theoretical re-orientation is crucial to understanding the basis for
the ambivalent relationship with the Pacific that Australia has. I conclude with notes
on the merits of civilizational analysis in pursuing further research on the Australian
relationship with a multi-civilizational Asia-Pacific.
The theoretical component on intercivilizational interaction comes in an abbreviated
form. Elsewhere, I elaborate the argument for the utility of the concept of
intercivilizational engagement (Smith 2017). In this essay, I condense a great deal of
material from the book into a short passage. My variation of the notion of
intercivilizational encounters draws on a number of sources of critical inspiration: S.
N. Eisenstadt, Nelson, Árnason, and Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1994, Eisenstadt 2003,
Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason 2003, Ben Rafael, Sternberg, and Eisenstadt 2005).
Cornelius Castoriadis is not a known civilizationalist, but his ontology of the imaginary
institution of society resonates clearly with the objectives of civilizational analysis, as
Árnason so capably argues (Castoriadis 1987). Readers of Comparative Civilizations
Review will be familiar with Nelson.
In this passage, I generalize Árnason’s elucidation of intercivilizational encounters.
Taking Nelson and others fully into account, Arnason argues that ‘mutually formative
relations between civilizational complexes’ constitute civilizations (Árnason 2003,
p.287). Árnason follows Nelson, while also revising his earlier formulations. For
Árnason, the crucial question is what makes specific civilizations more open to
confrontation with other sociocultural constellations? Encounters that take place in
multi-civilizational zones and have an impact are especially important. Arnason also
brings in economic and political factors to supplement cultural ones.
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Following Nelson and Árnason, but also going beyond them, I emphasize deeper
connections between different constellations. Globalisation analysis might stress
connections between nations and blocs in the post-war world of the twentieth century.
However, globalization analysis rarely highlights the longer histories of interregional
connectivity. For this reason alone, civilizational analysis is more appealing. The
transactions between civilizations are, overall, deeper than many of the major accounts
than globalization analysis has suggested.
With Árnason, I contend that civilizations become meaningful at points of intersection.
Historical patterns of connection and obstruction produce a remarkable diversity of
linkages. Seen from this point of view, it is possible to define my main concept.
Intercivilizational engagement is the regularisation of contact and encounter.
To quote from my more extensive elaboration of the concept:
(Intercivilizational engagement) has a heavier gravity in the structures of daily
existence. Regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are
of a different order to encounters. Where encounters are treated analytically as
episodic and time-bound forms of interaction, inter-civilizational engagement can
be applied as a problematic of the connectedness of world regions, societies and
cultures over a longer duration. Of course, there are differing degrees of intercivilizational engagement just as encounters differ widely in the significance that
the literature attributes to them. Be that as it may, there are precious few societies
and civilisations that have been isolated from inter-cultural contact altogether or
that have completely closed and fixed symbolic borders for lasting periods of time.
(Smith 2017, p.81)
My methodology takes the reader into examples and case studies of intercivilizational
engagement across four dimensions of collective life: migration, deep engagement in
economic relations, cultural exchange, and transformative borrowing of models of
polity.
I distinguish this from encounters in the following way. Theorists of encounters rightly
emphasize mutually formative engagement as ground-breaking. In their eyes,
intercivilizational encounters have wider and lasting ramifications. The accent falls on
the intensity of periods of what I call deep intercivilizational engagement. However,
the regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are of a different
order to encounters, especially across the four dimensions. I operationalize the concept
in case studies of Latin America, Japan, and the Pacific.
In considering the Pacific, some comments on the civilizational background of
connectivity are called for. I begin by noting that the Pacific figures all too rarely in
discussions of civilization and intercivilizational encounters.
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The field can amend that situation. Archaeologists, anthropologists, and historians
have developed a scholarship of engagement, which magnifies the civilizational
character of the Pacific world (Matsuda 2012, Scarr 1990, Shilliam 2015).
Moreover, indigenous movements, artists, and political and community leaders have
given voice to the longer and distinct precolonial history of engagement. They are
leaders in the recovery and reconstruction of identity and a form of cultural and
historical memory that demarcates islands of the Pacific as a distinct imaginary and
civilizational constellation.
Intercivilizational engagement took the form of: (a) three great waves of migration, the
first beginning as far back as 40000 years BP; (b) reciprocal inter-island exchange; (c)
a rich and complex cosmology comprised on multiple traditions of legend, adding up
to a common fund of myths of creation, movement and settlement; and, (d) transfer of
models of rule and power within groups of islands. Over millennia, these added up to
a paradigm of connection. Here is an old world that was already relational when
Europeans first intruded on the seas of the Pacific.
In their landmark anthropologies of the Pacific, Marcel Mauss and Bronislav
Malinowski had small but sufficient and important insights into the moral ontology,
social relations, and material life of Pacific Islander civilization. Their published
ethnographies of the complexity of islander cultures and their ethnographic surveys did
much to illuminate key aspects of this civilization, especially for non-Oceanian
audiences.
By the time Mauss and Malinowski published their findings, British and French
colonialism had violently disordered this civilization, although far from completely.
Since the 1960s, there has been a reconstruction of historical and cultural memory in
the Pacific, which has been possible due to the upsurge in indigenous activism and the
revival in the arts and the human sciences.
Viewed from the point of view of this history of a connected Pacific world, Australia
is a peculiar case. The British colonized the southern continent as part of the thrust
into Asia and in a counter-move to growing French interest in the South Pacific.
Scientific pursuits were a stimulus to the incursion also. Within comparative
civilizational analysis, there are three reasons to treat Australia as a distinct case:
1. The British expropriation of the Aboriginal civilization had no identical
counterpart in the world. Unlike other colonized lands, British authorities never
settled any treaty on which a legal contest of sovereignty could take place. The
Australian state has not settled a treaty either.
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Since none exists, Australia is quite exceptional in terms of ‘fourth world’
societies. For much of Euro-Australian history, the state has utterly suppressed
Aboriginal civilization in the national memory.
A multifaceted Australian war upon Aboriginal society was first challenged in
the late 1930s, and then again in the 1960s and since. A significant shift has
occurred in the discipline and practice of Australian history, with revisionist
currents re-writing this past and to some degree altering the national education
curriculum. There are ramifications for wider historiographical practice, and
Australian perspectives on historiography have been part of the debate on postcolonial identity in other settler-colonizer countries of the Commonwealth.
2. Although the British had an accumulated history of colonization from their
historical experiences in North America and the early gains of their trading
empire in India and Asia, the British initially understood contexts outside of the
Pacific far better. The new antipodean colonies were a laboratory for
experiments in creating governmental institutions alongside of a nascent
Victorian-era social order. Cities arose rapidly. In some instances, colonial
leaders based newly founded settlements on Victorian urban design and built
up public infrastructure in accordance with a Victorian vision of orderly
civilized life. Victorian cities were the creative mark of the British colonies on
the mainland southern continent.
3. After Federation, Australia assumed a neo-colonial role in the region. The
largest state in the region continued in that vein in a formal military alliance
signed in 1952 — the ANZUS alliance with the United States and New Zealand.
As a middle-power in world terms, Australian governments enjoyed
disproportionate influence in the Pacific, an influence not replicated in Asia,
where Australia is a member of the ASEAN security treaty with comparable
and confident partners.
That is a brief summary, which calls for more elaboration. Prior to British claims on
the southern land, an immensely diverse Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander imagery
had flourished. That civilization had rich relationships to the north of the continent
through the islands up to Timor and beyond. The conquest and internal colonisation of
Aboriginal civilization fostered the fiction and the myth of an ‘empty’ state of
uninhabited lands.
Of course, the southern continent had been occupied and shaped by Aboriginal people
for tens of thousands of years. British colonialism and the federated Commonwealth
of Australia that succeeded it were in denial of the presence and civilization of
Aboriginal First Nations.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

47

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 80 [2019], No. 80, Art. 18

42

Number 80, Spring 2019
Based on coastal observations of the southern continent by Banks and Matra, who
were botanists on board Captain James Cook’s reconnaissance of the east coast of
the continent in 1770, the British government invoked a paradox: the Aboriginal
peoples sighted on the coast were rendered invisible on the assumption that the
interior was entirely uninhabited. The British considered it their right — the land
being apparently uninhabited — to claim full ownership, since no prior ownership
could be established or claimed (Rundell 2004, p.202, p.206).

So began the myth of terra nullius, a legal fiction that the land was empty of culture
and civilization and that therefore there was no prior sovereign people with which to
negotiate a treaty. In the nineteenth century, the judiciary reaffirmed terra nullius in
five separate judgements and legislative acts. This underpinned the wider resonance
that the image of the empty land had in Australian culture.
Yet, the Aboriginal presence remained as a troubling reminder of the colonial past and
colonizing present. In the first half of the twentieth century, many Australians
reassured themselves of the moral worth of the civilizing mission by deeming that the
Aboriginal race was ‘dying out’ and that the Christian duty was to ease the passing of
Aboriginality through Christian education in the manners, language and customs of
white Australia. Combined with frontier violence against Aboriginal people in the
nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries, this amounted to a ‘war’ on Aboriginal
civilization.
The legal fiction of terra nullius came to haunt the national mindset, with the growing
sense of doubt about the foundational basis of white Australia. In the post-war period,
and particularly from the 1960s onwards, critical challenges to the dominant historical
understanding of the foundational story shed light on the undeclared war on the
peoples, signs, semiotics and Dreamtime cosmology of Australian Aboriginal
civilization.
This was one critical side of the process of making white civilization in Australia.
Civilization-making coincided with Australian modernity. In other words, EuroAustralia was ‘born modern’.
Being a modern society from the outset, and yet one at war with the ancient Aboriginal
civilization it had supplanted, created a strange cultural condition of uncertain and
ambivalent belonging (Beilharz and Smith 1997). Deep ambivalence epitomises
cultural perceptions in Australia, partly because of the occlusion of the colonial
conquest. Australian modernity has rested on the problem of how to combine a denied
Aboriginal old world with a new world that has no antiquity, no Middle Ages and no
revolutionary foundation — in other words, none of the foundations of other states with
which it might be compared.
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Thus, there was no political foundation like that possessed by many European and
Asian societies, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union in particular.
Contrasting the deep temporality of the Aboriginal Dreamtime — with its stories of
Creation from land and sea in a distant undated past — is a Euro-Australian historical
memory of two short centuries. No other contrast of antique and modern civilizations
is as sharp as this one.
Of course, Australia did have two British myths as a backdrop to its constitution
(Rundell 2004).
The first was that Australia was terra nullius, as discussed above. It was the official
doctrine of British colonial rule and then of the government in federated Australia.
More importantly, terra nullius penetrated deeply into Australian cultural life. When
combined with the second foundational myth (that the southern continent would host a
‘new’ white society based on an imported British constitutional tradition), the basis for
racism was set.
As Aboriginal social movements asserted the living presence of indigenous civilization
and as the Australian population diversified, the two myths have steadily been
destabilized. With the adoption of multiculturalism in the 1970s, the lasting culture of
Australian racism started to erode. Although multiculturalism is a complex and
multidimensional problematic beyond this essay (but see Castles, Haas, and Miller
2014, pp.166-8), one short comment is necessary. Official multiculturalism, as
formulated and practiced by Federal and State Governments, is a cultural dimension of
a wider process of neo-liberal modernization. It was a crucial component of neoliberalism — a process that came earlier to Australia than many other countries in the
OECD.
Notwithstanding the undertow of revision of Australian identity, Euro-Australia still
struggles with its past, a struggle that reverberates in debates about the cultural,
collective and historical memory. Irresolution of the historical issues inhibits efforts to
tackle social problems of the present. Aboriginal communities suffer acutely from high
levels of unemployment, unconscionable disparities in health and education, and
confrontations with the criminal justice system.
Questions of sovereignty in Aboriginal affairs hang over all this. There is more success
in multiculturalism, but as with other polities with multiculturalist regimes of
management of ethnic diversity, a populist backlash based on white identity has
occurred since the late 1990s. Even so, right-wing populism has not entered the
mainstream in the manner it did in the United States in 2016. There is no Australian
Trump.
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These are the cultural, historical and political settings for engagement with the Pacific
since the 1970s. Australia inherited a political economy in the region based on the
extraction of resources and has sustained the asymmetrical relationship. Like other
powers, Australia engaged in the infamous practice of ‘blackbirding’ in the nineteenth
century by seizing Pacific Islanders and transferring them to Australia to work as
coerced labourers. For affected Pacific Islands, the result was a wave of depopulation.
While there has been no repeat of such dehumanizing practices, the terms of trade
between Australia and Pacific producers remain profoundly unequal. An export trade
in copra, guano, phosphate, sugar and coffee were at the heart of the plantation
economy run by Australian and New Zealand companies. Towards the end of the
twentieth century, mining, fishing and logging reached unsustainable levels on many
islands, especially Fiji, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, wrecking terrestrial and
marine environments.
To avoid a one-sided analysis at this stage, I wish to also point to the multidimensional
complexity of economic transactions, the patterns of land ownership, and some
ontological aspects of economic relations between Australia and the Pacific. In this
respect, it is important to keep the breadth of the process of intercivilizational
engagement in the picture. The extractive logic of Australian capital is inseparable
from the historical inter-connexion of Pacific and Eurasian worlds.
As Marshall Sahlins eloquently argues, islanders bring their own experiences of
exchange to economic relations with larger powers (Sahlins 1989). In Hawaii and
throughout Polynesia, island societies negotiated the goods, networks and hierarchies
of Western intruders. The intercultural character of economic engagement continued
to involve exchanges in values and obligations, as well as exchange of goods and
services. Those instances of reciprocal exchange may well fall under the constellation
of worldwide capitalist trade patterns and their long chains of connection.
Still, there are limits to the integration of the economic culture of reciprocity.
Limitations to the takeover of the ways of islander life by developmental patterns are
evident in the ongoing advice of economists at the end of the twentieth century that
Pacific Islanders need to embrace the capitalist spirit more (Dirlik 1998, 1997, pp.12933). To the extent that Pacific patterns of economic culture persist, then the “social
centrality of the ancient practice of reciprocity — the core of all oceanic cultures”
remains in a complex and incomplete relationship to the economic orders of capitalism,
as a Tongan artist, anthropologist, and advocate notes (Hauʹofa 2008, p.36).
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The economic cultural complex of Pacific civilization has limited direct influence on
Australian capital and the Australian state. Australia in the 1960s retreated from
trusteeships in the Cook Islands and Nauru and, a little later, Papua New Guinea. In
the wake of the decolonisation of Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji, Western Samoa and the
Solomon Islands, Australian policy cast the Pacific as a zone of few economic
prospects, heightened political instability and pending environmental decline.
In the political discourse on the Pacific in Australia, there is no equivalent of the
American imagination of the Pacific as a multipolar ‘rim’ of states surrounding the
‘empty’ ocean that has no centre (Dirlik 1998). Australian foreign policy casts the
Pacific instead as a region. In the Australian imagination, the whole zone is still
‘deficient’, but with definite places and contents, for which Australia is responsible.
While the Australian polity has restructured itself around a coalescing model of
neoliberal modernization, political leaders, policy advisors, some journalists, business
spokespeople, and even some NGOs have projected the standards of neoliberal
governance to nascent states as the only viable developmental model. As Jolly states,
they have arrived at the categorical view that Pacific states “need to open their
economies; effect structural change and good governance; abolish customary land
tenure and inappropriate, undemocratic traditions; and connect with the dynamism of
Asia” (Jolly 2007, p.527).
With that outlook, fear of the absolute marginalisation of the Pacific from globalising
processes has guided Australian governments in their development, aid and foreign
policies. The worst fear in this respect lies in the nightmare of “failed states.”
Consequently, Australian governments calibrate diplomatic and foreign policy settings
on the belief that Pacific states are flawed. Irrespective of political persuasion, all
Federal Governments since the mid-1970s have acted within a paradigm of neoliberal
economic development for the region.
Though responsive to claims of neo-colonialism, Australia acts paternalistically as aid
donor, security expert in geo-strategic affairs, major investor and source of tourism,
and neighbouring military power. Its entire vision of the Pacific centers on Australia
leading Pacific states to a viable developmental path. As Jolly maintains, the relevant
policy settings have Australia “both as model and saviour of the Pacific, its future and
its prophet” (Jolly 2007, p.527).
As discussed above, in an early passage of this essay, Árnason’s approach to
intercivilizational encounters emphasizes the interchange, transactions, and even
encounters between different cultures, even in situations of great asymmetry. Noting
this, I point out that there is another and less often acknowledged side to the regional
political economy. Epeli Hauʹofa highlights it in his 1990s project of ‘New Oceania’.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

51

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 80 [2019], No. 80, Art. 18

46

Number 80, Spring 2019

During that period, he asserted economic self-reliance, mutual ownership of land,
movement and connectivity as elements of a millennia-old identity, precisely those
elements of Pacific civilization that Australian governments have regarded as
obstructions in the modernization and globalization process.
In displacing the deficit image of the Pacific, Hauʹofa inserts a vision of a densely
connected network of island societies with histories that can serve islanders’ pursuit of
greater sovereign control (Hauʹofa et al. 1993). He casts this as the alternative to the
historical narratives told by Western states (Hauʹofa 2008, pp.60-79). In other words,
the political and cultural resources that the Tongan intellectual is alluding to are, as a
whole, nothing less than “the historicity of the indigenous peoples themselves and,
therefore, their contemporaneity” (Dirlik 1997, p.140).
Memory is especially important in this context, not because the past is readily
accessible and recoverable in a naïve positivist sense, but because islander values are
being pressed into the service of contemporary projects of sustainable development and
cultural renewal (Dirlik 1997, p.141). Pacific Islanders are reconstructing memories,
whether cultural and public memory or communicative and popular memory. Both are
involved in the potential reconfiguration of power according to Hauʹofa.
The regional context that Hauʹofa is working in is a world of motion, with people, ideas,
values and goods all on the move (Scarr 1990, Matsuda 2012).
The values, practices, and relationality of Oceania find a place in Australia via four
areas of contemporary engagement: diasporic migration to Australasia and California,
greater travel and communication, acquisition of property and jobs in Australia, and
popularization of the visual arts, film, literature and music.
As a category of migration, Oceania had the greatest percentage of international
immigrants of any world region (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014, p.166). The lion’s
share of islander movement involves islanders travelling to New Zealand and Australia,
whether in travel or to re-settle. The critical impact of climate change will undoubtedly
accelerate those movements. It may already be doing so.
Economically, Polynesian regional networks exercise an informal regional economy
comprising a circulation of goods and monies between island homes and emigrants
living in New Zealand and on the eastern seaboard of Australia. Not only is money
remitted — a sure sign of dependency, when that is all that is transacted — but a vast
array of objects, technology materials and symbolic foodstuffs flow back and forth in
consignments. The informal trade circuit is reminiscent of ‘old’ Pacific more than new
developmental strategies.
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The general pattern re-creates elements of the reciprocity of economic and cultural
engagement of Oceanian civilization. I want to highlight the fact that migration
continues in patterns reminiscent of great traditions of travel. Migration and travel of
this kind is consonant with Pacific Islander efforts to construct cultural memory.
Civilizational analysis can capture the multivalence of this regional context well. To
be sure, Australia as a middle power dominates regional affairs and sets a political
model for the Pacific. Yet, within the regional field of power, islander agency, meaning
and reconstructed memory have impact and alter the terms of power.
On the other side, civilizational analysis can bring out the contradictions of antipodean
modernity. Australia is far from reconciled to a Pacific identity with which the nation
could engage culturally and on political and economic terms that are reciprocal. The
cruel current day practice of shipping asylum seekers to offshore detention centers in
Nauru and in PNG betray the inconsistencies in Australian foreign policy.
On one hand, Australian political discourse focuses on regional leadership and
partnerships with island states. On the other hand, the acid-test issue of refugees is
resolved through treatment of immediate neighbours as extra-territorial holding pens
for excluded asylum seekers. More than in any other area of policy, Australian
governments project ambivalence here about their entire relationship with the Pacific.
In doing so, they reflect a more general ambivalence of place.
Conclusion
Terra Australis would be British, but other than Britain; Oceanian, but a huge continent,
not an island; connected through its north (in a deep Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander history as well as through contemporary globalization) but populated in a
different and much older migration than the voyaging patterns that created Polynesia.
The short history of Euro-Australia contrasts with a long Aboriginal civilizational
history and sense of place so strong that it has survived colonialism. Pacific Islander
societies also have a longer history and current day projects of cultural renewal and
reconstruction of memory. Both Australia and the individual states of the Pacific are
part of greater civilizational constellations constituted in engagement. Consequently,
they engage with each other in and through contrasts.
Can Australian modernity adapt to place through intercivilizational encounters? The
question is one for further research. Two preliminary points can foreshadow future
work in this area. Australia sits in flows of engagement across the four dimensions of
migration, economic connectedness, adaption of political models, and cultural traffic.
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However, engagement with Aboriginal and Oceanian civilizations has not involved
learning encounters conducive to a strong sense of antipodean place that incorporates
a sensitivity to the ecology of the southern land, or the constitutive and living traditions
of the region.
Still lacking place-specific learning processes, Australian modernity looks ill-equipped
to meet the decisive challenge of our times: climate change and creating a new
civilizational base for sustainability (see Camilleri 1976). A full reconciliation with
the peoples of the region in the present is a prerequisite to a sustainable orientation for
the future. Finding a new direction is urgently necessary.
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Multiple Identities: Touchstones
in Terrorism, Democratic Institutions, and the Rule of Law
Mary Frances Lebamoff
Abstract. This paper explores the underlying, foundational politico-social theories and
themes that relate closely to radicalization, terrorism, democracy and the rule of law.
It examines factors (touchstones) critical to these areas (political violence, terrorism,
rule of law and democracy, along with democratic institutions). Some of these
touchstones include the ‘lenses’ of identities, tribalism, and contrasts between
identities, including cultural, linguistic, socialization and civilizational aspects.
Keywords. Identity, multiple identities, amoral familism, ethnicity, ethnic identity,
civic identity, political identity/identity politics, national identity, political tribes,
religious and sectarian affiliations

Introduction
Identity is a potent force in today’s world, much as it has been in the past. One need
only consider recent events in Spain and the identities that some claim — Catalan or
Basque — that set individuals and groups who hold those identities as crucial against
or apart from the state itself. Consider, too, countries in Eastern Europe like Bosnia,
Macedonia and Kosovo. Identity, with its potentially many characteristics, is often
shaped by social organizations. Examples of such identities and social organizations
include age, religion, social class or caste, culture, dialect, disability, education,
ethnicity, language, nationality, sex, gender identity, generation, occupation,
profession, race, political party affiliation, sexual orientation, settlement, urban and
rural environments, and veteran status. Yet not all members of a given group are
involved in identity politics. Identity politics are frequently used by minority and civil
rights organizations to form a coalition with or against members of the majority.
One person may hold several of these identities, and therefore have multiple identities.
Awareness and understanding of multiple identities are crucial when objectively
considering aspects of an individual, of groups, political activity, and propensity for or
against violence or illicit activities such as smuggling or money-laundering, to name a
few traits that may be reviewed or researched. Some are socially determined; others
are determined communally or are civilizational. One may be, in a manner of speaking,
“born into” specific identities related to ethnicity or religious beliefs, or those important
to family and familial ties. Some personal identities are associated with cultural or
linguistic characteristics. Indeed, throughout time, people have held (and sometimes
juggled) multiple identities.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18
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An example might be a person who is simultaneously female, a mother, an aunt or
grandmother, a wife and later a widow, an educator, a business owner, a Native
American, and a marketer. Which identities rise to the fore is based on civilization,
socialization, environment, cultures, situations and circumstances, along with the need
to reconcile potential and actual facets of the various identities a person holds.
Kwame Anthony Appiah wrote cogently of multiple identities, “Identities are complex
and multiple and grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political,
and cultural forces, almost always in opposition to other identities.”1
Identity politics and nationalism have become much-researched areas in recent
decades; one only need think of the break-ups of the former Soviet Union and the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to recall how identity issues, especially those
associated with nationalism, came to the fore. Turkey, too, has strong and very serious
nationalist movements at present, as do Poland and Hungary. All three of these latter
countries are seeing significant erosion of checks and balances, democratic institutions
(especially the judiciary), and a measurable move to the right politically.
Identity politics in political organizing is usually closely connected to the concepts of
deprivation, repression and oppression of one or more minorities in a state—or, in
response to those minorities, the organization of a countervailing identity political
effort by the majority to maintain their political power.2
Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural
society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the
development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks and
accommodative elements can lead to tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society,
economic prosperity, and stable and equitable institutions, or they can lead to violent
and other levels of conflict and tensions, economic displacement and upheaval,
institutional fragility and inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access,
justice and additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between ethnicities.
These frameworks (constitutional and through other means) become particularly
critical in a new state, particularly one in which there are known ethnic and even
civilizational clefts, such as the Republic of Macedonia (which I will examine as a
case), and even more so when ethno-religious fragmentation is pervasive.

Kwame Anthony Appiah. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford
University Press, London, 1993.
2
“Identity Politics”, at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/, Stanford University,
California, 2016 (revised).
1
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Huntington argues, in his “Clash of Civilizations” (1993), that major, ongoing conflicts
will occur in various areas of the world because of clashing cultural and religious
identities between groups, and that Islamic extremism would become the most
threatening movement to world peace and order. Eastern Europe is one of the areas on
a highly significant “cultural fault-line” or cleft between major civilizations (the
uppermost level of culture). In the case of Eastern Europe, the two civilizations that
come up against one another in that cleft are generally the Orthodox (Christian) and the
Islamic ones. 3 Huntington’s physical divisions of the various civilizations also indicate
that Western civilization has a place in Eastern Europe.
In post-modern discussions, the importance of democracy in developing and
determining structures, policies, and laws in states with multi-cultural, multipleidentity citizenry cannot be overstated. Democracy has become equivalent to
specifying “majority rule” and was originally linked with “tolerance” by Pericles in
430 BCE. Democracy today no longer means “direct rule” by the people, but instead,
usually representative democracy, where representatives are elected by the citizens to
whom they are answerable at least at the next election. Power rests in the hands of the
people who may elect official representatives to rule directly or indirectly. Today, too,
tolerance and establishment of various rights are sometimes viewed as preconditions to
democracy but “not as constitutive of democracy itself.”4 That all “democracies” are
not created equal nor do they include the constitutive elements of democracy is evident,
too: “democratic” in a country’s name does not indicate it is indeed a true democracy
or anything even resembling a democracy — take the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), or the People’s
Democratic Republic of Algeria, as examples.
There are many variations of democracy: direct and representative democracy;
presidential and parliamentary democracy; authoritarian and participatory democracy;
Islamic and social democracy.5 One often hears about liberal and illiberal democracy,
too. Most democracies, however, are basically majoritarian — that is, decisions are
made in line with majority rule. Those who hold leadership positions have, in most
cases under majoritarian democracy, been elected by the people they are to represent,
although there are also indirect ways of attaining leadership (appointments to
committees, affiliation with others who hold a similar mindset on particular issues, and
the like).

3

Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1998.
4
Iain McLean and A. McMillan. Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003, 140-141.
5
Vaishnavi Patil, “What are the different types of democracy?” at http://sciabc.us/iPAD8.
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This can lead to what Amy Chua terms “political tribes” in certain cases and is closely
tied to “identity politics”.6
Conflict and Ethnic Conflict
Conflict emphasizes struggle and collision. Donald L. Horowitz’s definition is typical:
“Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.”7 Add this to Stefan Wolff’s ethnic conflict
specifications, and the complexities are apparent: “…that in which the goals of at least
one conflict party are defined in [exclusively] ethnic terms, and in which the primary
fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.” While it does not occur in
every society, in some, ethnic difference or cleavages can lead to frustration and
violence when “ethnic groups are forced to integrate into the national culture of the
state in which they find themselves.”
Ethnic conflicts may fall into one of three categories: group-state conflicts between the
minority and the institutions of the host state; inter-group conflicts, pitting the minority
against the host-nation or the majority; and between different ethnic groups
(sometimes, but not always, minority versus minority). There may be elements of
simultaneity in the types of conflicts. These categories tend to hold true no matter if
the geographic location is the Balkans, African states, North or Latin America, Western
Europe or Asia.
Harff and Gurr define ethnic groups as “psychological communities” whose members
hold a persistent sense of common interest and identity based on shared historical
experiences and valued cultural traits. These may include language, beliefs, lifestyles,
institutions, and a common homeland or established physical living space. 8 The
authors assert that the “ethnic groups whose status is of greatest concern…are those
that are the target of discrimination and that have organized to take political action to
promote or defend their interests.”9 Since they have already opened themselves to
being activists, it can be a relatively short step to considering violence, especially if
more peaceful forms of activism do not appear successful or do not meet group
demands/expectations.
6

Amy Chua. Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations. New York: Penguin Press,
2018; World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Instability. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).
7
Donald L. Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press
1985), 95.
8
Benedict Anderson discusses “imagined communities”, a closely related concept to ethnicity and
ethnic groups, in his seminal work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism Rev. Ed. New York and London: Verso Books, 1991. It follows that if communities can be
imagined, they can also be re-imagined, an important concept for this paper.
9
Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 2nd Ed. Boulder CO: Westview
Press, 2004, 3.
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One of the factors can be thought of as a “touchstone” for varieties of political activism
helps explain why specific groups do become politically active: relative deprivation.
This theory was developed in the 1960s to examine and analyze situations in which
individuals or groups subjectively perceive themselves to be in an unfair (even unjust)
status or condition compared to their “advantaged” reference groups who have similar
attributes; therefore, they are deserving of similar rewards but are not receiving them.
Subjective experiences and interpretations of deprivation are more likely when the
differences between two groups shrink so that comparisons can be made fairly easily.
The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used to explain radical
politics (whether of the left or the right), some religions, the rise of social movements,
industrial disputes, and crime. “The usual distinction made is that religious fervor or
demands for political change are a collective response to relative deprivation whereas
crime is an individualized response. But this is certainly not true of many crimes - for
example, smuggling, poaching or terrorism — which have a collective nature and a
communal base…”10
Relative deprivation theory may, in other words, assist in explaining some actions of
specific “discontented” groups, but not all. This is especially true when there are valid
and available pathways in a democratic system by which a “deprived” group or person
may register discontents and hopefully receive relief. If a specific group feels that they
have no practical, meaningful way to approach a state’s institutions or its
representatives, the situation will undoubtedly become more difficult to resolve.
But the signs and language of relative deprivation can be useful, especially in a
democracy with free speech and rule of law, in identifying and assessing groups or
persons at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities, such as terrorism, human
trafficking, organized crime, money-laundering, and interethnic conflict or violence, to
name a few of the risk areas. Not all persons who have a sense of relative deprivation
will be activists or, more significantly, will become radicalized as part of their claimed
identities. Nor does this indicate whether a person will engage in political violence or
its cousin, terrorism.11 The point here is that when persons believe themselves to be
disadvantaged for reasons of their identities, or because they may apparently lack an
identity others value, such as citizenship beliefs and ties to the state, crisis points can
more easily arise.

10

Jock Young, The Exclusive Society. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publishing, 1999, and at
http://www.malcolmread.com/JockYoung/relative.htm.
11
John Alan Cohan, “Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism”, Stetson Law Review 35, 904-981
(2006).
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Another theory, that of the “good vs. bad neighborhood”, also offers some explanatory
and guiding power regarding conflict: if a state is in a “good” neighborhood, one that
is stable, friendly, and with citizens who are like those in other nearby states, conflict
is less likely internally or with other states. If one instead has “bad neighbors” (is
located in a bad neighborhood, in other words), not only is inter-state conflict likely,
but other types of instability will also be present (economic, employment, sectarian,
and so on). Intra-state conflict is also more probable. The state which may be rather
good but finds itself in a bad neighborhood because of changes in the surrounding states
or regimes is also more likely to engage in “bad” behavior both internally and in its
interstate relations.12
Another danger has recently arisen, the decline in democracies: fully one-third of the
world’s population lives in a “back-sliding democracy”, one in which authoritarian
traits are on the rise and have already had an impact. Even the U.S. is in this group.13
This decline is a worrisome trend, especially as newer states attempt to consolidate
democracy, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and to battle corruption.
Identities and the State
Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural
civil society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the
development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks, especially
democracy and the rule of law, with other accommodative elements, can lead to
tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society, general economic prosperity, and stable
and equitable institutions — or they can lead to violent and other damaging levels of
conflict, economic displacement and upheaval, institutional fragility and
inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access, corruption, justice and
additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between groups (ethnicities in particular).
The constitutional framework and other practices, policies or programs become
particularly critical in a new state, especially in one in which there are identified, known
ethnic cleavages, and even more so when specific ethno-religious fragmentation is
pervasive.

12

Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee
Flows", International Security 21, 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; see also the important research of
Michael Edward Brown in this area regarding proximate causes and underlying causes that may lead to
conflict.
13
“Democracy for All? V-DEM Democracy Report 2018”, University of Gothenburg, at
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/vdem_democracy_report_2018.pdf.
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Using Harff and Gurr’s typology of politically active ethnic groups (ethnonationalists,
indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses and communal contenders), one may classify, as they
do, the ethnic tensions situation in Macedonia, for example, as ethnonationalist, driven
by the minority ethnicity’s aspiration to establish an independent state, or to be
autonomous (in varying degrees) from the present ruling state. Some ethnicities may
also wish closer ties with a national homeland outside of the one they currently live in.
These traits are generally true of Albanians in Macedonia.14
Again, Amy Chua’s “political tribalism” working theory may be of use: individuals of
a particular group gather together, shunning those who are not considered “like them”,
to engage in political actions and activities aimed at achieving the group’s goals. 15
There are those applying this theory even to current events in the United States, which
should come as no surprise. Political tribalism is closely related to amoral familism as
Edward Banfield explained it in the mid-1950s after a close case study of a northern
Italian community.16 It has been applied more to social and economic endeavors than
to wholly political ones. There are those who argue that today’s Kosovo resembles the
Italian community that Banfield examined in his case study. What both amoral
familism and political tribalism have most strongly in common is their foundational
belief that if it is good for the family (tribe), then it is good. Full stop. No further
moral, ethical, or other examination need occur.17 Some might also argue that this
conclusion helps to explain mafias and some criminal organizations.
The Rule of Law
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies (and other relevant institutions and
organizations), both national and international, know all of this, of course. It is when
trust erodes in an institution or its practices that serious problems can arise in society
and the institutions which are tasked with supporting that society.
The rule of law is based on four cornerstones:
1. Accountability: the government as well as private actors are accountable under
the law;

Ibid. 19. “Macedonia” is used throughout this paper for purposes of simplicity and because of
majority formal international recognition of the Republic under its constitutional name, including the
United States’ recognition.
15
Amy Chua. Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations. New York: Penguin Press,
2018; World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Instability. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).
16
Edward C. Banfield. Moral Bases of Backward Societies. Chicago: Free Press (University of
Chicago), 1955; revised and republished 1967.
17
Agron Demi. “The Society of Amoral Familism”. 22 Feb 2017 accessed at
https://prishtinainsight.com/society-amoral-familism/ on 21 March 2018.
14
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2. Just Laws: laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and
protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and
certain core human rights;
3. Open Government: processes by which the laws are enacted, administered,
and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient; and
4. Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution: Justice is delivered timely by
competent, ethical, and independent representatives and by neutrals who are
accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities
they serve.18
There are other critical areas to the rule of law that arise from these four bases, and that
also may be affected by multiple identities: the World Justice Project (WJP) utilizes
these additional traits in its annual assessment and surveys. These nine additional traits
are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Constraints on Government Powers;
Absence of Corruption;
Open Government;
Fundamental Rights;
Order and Security;
Regulatory Enforcement;
Civil Justice;
Criminal Justice; and
Informal Justice.19

WJP’s survey for 2017-2018 placed Macedonia at 0.53, or in a weaker status, on par
with Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. All these states ranked better
than Turkey, and just slightly behind Greece regionally. Macedonia, however, is
trending downward as of the most recent data, along with Bulgaria, not a positive sign
for the rule of law in these states. Deeper dives into the data on Rule of Law as part of
the World Justice Project’s surveys are available at http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/,
with an interactive map of the world and the results. They are quite enlightening.
The Rule of Law is one of the facets of democracy and good governance that creates
and permits “space” for political activities and activism. Under positive Rule of Law,
that space is orderly and transparent; if Rule of Law breaks down, that space becomes
more risk-filled, radicalized, and usually but not always more violent and less
democratic.

18
19

https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index
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Democracy and Democratic Institutions
It is important to remember that, when examining Eastern European states, they are
nascent democracies – none even 50 years old yet, and several are not yet three decades
old (this includes Macedonia). One cannot expect these states to have mature
democratic institutions, much less the established and balanced Rule of Law and
consistency that more mature democracies often have (although sometimes not
constantly; much depends on the type of democracy and regime, as previously noted).
Add to youthfulness the fact that there is a history of corruption in most of these
countries that continues even today, and it is easier to understand why these newer
states face issues that at least some older states have largely overcome. Lack of trust
exacerbates the challenges in Eastern Europe — between countries and within each of
them. Political tribalism adds to the complexities, without a doubt, especially in states
with distinctive (often historical) ethnic rivalries.
Tribalism has two faces: it is inclusive for those in the defined group (that definition
usually developed and created by its members); it is also exclusive to those outside of
the defined group. Some have ethnonationalist traits and bases (even in the United
States). Some political tribalism is zero-sum (that is, anything lost from one group is
gained in total by the other). What one group or “tribe” (ethnic or ethnoreligious group,
in many cases) gains, the opposing group or other(s) lose.20
The trust issue is a major one in infant democracies (and even in older ones),
particularly if any incidents occur that affect minority groups, and even more
specifically, if those impact a “majority-minority” (that is, a group holding a high
percentage of the minority populace. The Albanian-Macedonians are such a group in
Macedonia, for example, at roughly around 25-30% of the state’s total population).21

20

See Thomas Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990;
also, Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 2006; and Ken Binmore.
Game Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair (Vol I). Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994. These
are all classics in the field of game theory. See also Chua, 2018.
21
Jens Reuter. 1993. “Policy and Economy in Macedonia,” in The Macedonian Question, ed. James
Pettifer (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 28-38. The percentage is an estimate, as Albanian-Macedonians
have not taken part in any national censuses to date. Explanations for their boycott vary. Ethnic
Albanians boycotted the 1991 census as a protest against the government’s census: forms were not
printed in Albanian. The results of the 1994 Census are also formally disputed by ethnic Albanians,
particularly by ethnic Albanian political party leaders. See Reuter, and P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb,
Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 66 and passim. Therefore, the
2002 census was similarly indeterminate for Albanian-Macedonians. The actual population percent of
ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians is a commonly raised issue by partisan political leaders from
both ethnicities.
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There have been many such incidents in Macedonia involving Albanian-Macedonians,
unfortunately; one need only review issues of the Balkan Investigative Reporting
Network (BIRN, at birn.eu.com, is a “network of local non-governmental organizations
promoting freedom of speech, human rights and democratic values.”)22 They focus on
recent past and current reports from the Balkans. As a further example, BosniaHerzegovina has no actual majority, although Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) are
believed to comprise about 48% of the country’s population prior to the wars there.23
In Macedonia, Albanian-Macedonians are currently working with ethnic Macedonians
and the government under the terms of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001. It was
negotiated mostly by the international community (externally, in other words). This
technically did not and does not augur well for it; historically, externally developed
agreements, such as this one, do not hold up over time. Consider the very fragile
Dayton Accords or the Good Friday/Belfast agreements as examples of difficult,
externally designed agreements that are at risk.
If one accepts that it is unlikely these demographics are likely to change in any
statistically significant fashion, this means that democratic institutions must be highly
transparent and consistent in the manners in which they address their citizens’ issues,
and free from corruption if they wish to gain their populace’s trust, no matter which
ethnicity or other tribal group or affiliation any person claims.
Some even have sectarian aspects (again, see Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations).
This is certainly the case in Serbia, Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Poland, and other
countries. Finding common ground and building consensus among the various political
parties and other activists are often viewed as next to impossible; this makes liberal
democracy and a stable, balanced and respected Rule of Law even more difficult to
instill. When powerful nationalist, sectarian or populist sentiments are included in the
variables that must be addressed in these endeavors, the chances of formulating and
holding together a liberal democracy with a solid and transparent rule of law look
somewhat bleak, to say the least. Recent rises in nationalism and populism, as
mentioned, have placed several Eastern and Central European countries at significant
risk.
Sectarianism is a well-determined touchstone for terrorism: this applies both to
terrorism occurring within a state and those who act as “foreign fighters” (seen most
recently in ISIS, the Islamic State in Syria).

22
23

www.birn.eu.com (Homepage note).
“Ethnic composition of Bosnia & Herzegovina 1991,” at Pop-stat.mashke.org.
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Because nationalist and/or sectarian sentiments do not necessarily stop at a state’s
border, there are transnational and diaspora aspects included in this. There are also
important issues that arise when such foreign fighters return to their home state after
involvement elsewhere. How can they be reintegrated into their home country and
society — and some ask if they even should be.
Banking systems associated with certain religious groups may make money laundering
more direct. Hawala or hewala is a much-used, informal funding transfer system based
not on the movement of cash, or wire transfers between banks, but instead on the
performance, confidentiality, and honor of a huge network of Islamic money handlers
(brokers). It is often used worldwide by those sending remittances back to a “home
country”, or to other individuals or organizations, including, it is suspected, terrorist
groups. One of the pillars of Islam, zakat, also specifies that charitable giving, in some
cases, may be appropriately used to fund fighters for Islamic goals and purposes.24 So
assets could be transferred to terrorists by the mosque. Add these factors to tightly knit
ethnic groups and kin groups, and the challenge of shutting down terrorism and its
resources, along with other forms of political activism, increases exponentially.
Understanding the causes, dynamics and progression of conflicts, particularly violent
ones which border on actual terrorism, and the potential forms of resolution are key
points in a move toward such resolution with a goal of attaining societal security. In a
democracy, whether relatively new or more mature, one approach is to consider the
various identities the parties hold who are involved in such tensions, and to attempt to
sort through which tensions are associated with which identities. Which are most likely
to have been or to become politicized? Where will support for the contending group
come from? Potentially, it could arise from organized crime, mafia-type criminal
“families”, money-laundering, the diaspora community, religiously affiliated
organizations and entities, traditional and new smuggling operations, and so on.
Conflict is broad-ranging and far-reaching, in most cases. It need not take place on the
parties’ doorsteps. Indeed, much of terrorism takes place away from the fighters’
homelands. That such action occurs makes the return and reintegration of those who
have been involved in foreign conflicts even more crucial if peace, positive or negative,
is to be maintained on the “home front”. If one’s identity as a terrorist, together with
the associated ideologies and belief sets, is ascendant, reintegration may not be possible
or desirable. In that case, the justice system and its democratic institutions must step
in to handle these cases.

William A. Gawthrop. 2010. “Zakat: A Warfare Funding Mechanism”, at
http://micastore.com/Vanguard/
PastIssues/2010April.pdf.
24
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Handling Conflicts: Management, Settlement, Resolution and Consolidation
Albert Einstein’s definition of peace may be useful in this respect: “Peace is not merely
the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order — in short, of
government.”
Important to positive peace then are aspects of interethnic tolerance or harmony, and
positive attitudes such as generosity, tolerance or inclusion of minorities by the
majority group. Control of violence matters and is often achieved by dissociation
(conflicting parties are separated, whether by their own efforts or through governmental
or military efforts). In general, policies based on negative peace (the absence of
war/conflict) rather than positive peace do not deal with the underlying causes of
violence, only its manifestations. Negative peace efforts may actually lead to future
escalation of violence rather than a lasting peace, since tensions from social conflict
are merely repressed rather than fully resolved.25
Conflict management and associated regulation are attempts to “contain, limit, or direct
the effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict on the wider society in which it takes place.”
This can be a society/location, as indicated, far from one’s home state. Conflict
settlement’s goal is to implement “an institutional framework in which the conflicting
interests of different ethnic groups can be accommodated [so]…that incentives for
cooperation and non-violent pursuit of conflicts…through compromise outweigh any
benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation.” 26
Conflict resolution demands identification of causal factors fundamental to the conflict
and developing means to address them effectively. This infers, in turn, that attitudes
and behavior that view violence as an acceptable means to address difference must be
changed, that systems and structures may require alteration to be responsive and
adaptive to ethnicities within a state, and furthermore, the recognition that conflict
resolution is both a process and the process’s terminal result.
The negotiation process determines outcome (management, settlement or resolution),
whether the real causes are recognized and considered by the negotiators, or whether
they are deflected or avoided because discussing them is too high-risk. Consolidation
of the conflict management’s terms may occur at the same time, or later.
D.C. Woolman, “Education and Peace in the Thought of Johan Galtung,” Currents: Issues in
Education and Human Development Education and Peace 3, no. 2 (Spring 1985), 7-20. Quoted in
Sandy and Perkins, Jr., 3-4. See also Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and
War,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), reprinted in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments
on Causes of War and Peace 2nd ed., Richard K. Betts, ed. (NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 318-30.
26
Stefan Wolff, “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts:
Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, eds. Ulrich Schneckener and
Stefan Wolff (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 12.
25
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It also depends on attitudes toward violence among the conflicting groups. Continuing
to use Macedonia as an exemplar, consider that crucial to inter-ethnic violence
potential, the 2001 UNDP polls indicated 60% of Albanian-Macedonian male
respondents (ages 18-24) found violence an acceptable political approach.
In comparison, about 16.4% of Macedonian males in the same age group accepted
violence as a political practice.27 When one considers these factors [willingness to use
violence, high unemployment, pervasive mistrust of the Macedonian state (more
specifically, the Macedonian national police and other security and military forces),
civilizational cleavages, with limited education and economic prospects among
younger Albanian men in Macedonia)], it is little wonder Albanian paramilitaries and
other groups advocating political violence were perceived to be a credible option
(perhaps even an attractive one in some respects).28
From 1990 through 2001, conflict management efforts in Macedonia ranged from
unsuccessful integration attempts to various proposals for partition. With its symbolic
shift toward emphasis on ethnic Macedonians as the “titular nation” (a “hybrid mix of
the nation-state and state-nation concepts”)29, the 1991 Constitution intended to
integrate Macedonian citizens at the individual, not the group, level. Albanian
Macedonians found this “national minority” status unacceptable; as indicated, they
demanded constituent nation status as a group. In 2001, several members of the
Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Prime Minister of Macedonia
advocated partition of the state along Macedonian-Albanian ethnic lines; the proposal
was abandoned due to open domestic and international disapproval of it. This issue
remains an open one legally, although attempts were (and are presently being) made by
various parties to resolve it. As a result, outbreaks of ethnic violence and preservation
of delicate inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia were addressed through a combination
of gradual concessions toward ethnic Albanians, the Ohrid Framework Agreement’s
terms, application of coercive means, and corrupt exchanges between ethnic elites.30

United Nations Development Programme, “Early warning report no. 4”, Feb/Mar 2001, accessed at
http://earlywarning.undp.sk/Reports/index.cfm?page=TeamReports&TeamID=5. Other early warning
reports sound similar and sometimes more extensive alarms.
28
Hislope, Robert, “Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost war in
Macedonia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 1 (2004), 129-51.
29
Marko, 5.
30
Hislope, Robert. 1998. “Ethnic Conflict and the “Generosity Moment,” Journal of Democracy 9, no.
1 (1998), 140-153, at 145-46. See also Hislope, “Bad Peace, Good War,” 138-40.
27
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Corrupt exchange is, unfortunately, a signature trait of Macedonia’s ethnic conflict
management, since “between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (characteristic
of certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the
use of force is too risky).”31 Corrupt exchange provides “incentives to ethnic party
elites to maintain coalition government despite the pressures that typically emanate
from intra-ethnic party competition and the general absence of political or value
consensus among coalition partners”.32
Short-term, government partners from all ethnic groups have an interest in maintaining
the coalition and staying in power since substantial material rewards are at stake.
While these are expected (and rational) outcomes of political participation in the
highest levels of government, corrupt elites in multi-ethnic coalitions further act to
“avoid interethnic confrontations; de-mobilizing elites thereby tone down their
nationalist rhetoric and adopt a more pragmatic approach upon taking office.”33
Macedonia’s government has not seen much in the way of interethnic conflict
avoidance and the like, given frequent (and ongoing) spates of verbal and physical
violence (in Parliament among elected officials, and elsewhere), at least some of which
is rooted in ethnicity, and nearly all of which has weakened inter-group trust,
democracy, rule of law and democratic institutionalization/institutions, while
strengthening corruption.34
In his research of corruption and its influence on inter-ethnic relations, Hislope dissects
the connection between corrupt exchange among ethnic elites and the stability of the
multi-ethnic coalitions governing Macedonia from 1992 until 2001.35 While corrupt
exchange helped hold together multi-ethnic coalitions until 2001, its consequences
were disastrous for institutions, democratic development, and for the rule of law. It is
no coincidence that the first clashes in 2001 between ethnic Albanian fighters and the
Macedonian national security forces occurred in villages left for years without the
presence of police or border patrols, thereby allowing safe haven for a variety of
smugglers and other lawbreakers who undermined societal security, civic affiliations
and identities. Accusations of internal security negligence and irregularities were
numerous.

Antonio Gramsci, in Robert Hislope, “When Being Bad is Good: Corrupt Exchange in Divided
Societies”, Conference Paper presented at Syracuse University, 2005 (unpublished), accessed on
February 14, 2017, at www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/ces/pcconfpdfs/Hislope.pdf, 1..
32
Hislope, “When Being Bad”, 3.
33
Hislope, “When Being Bad”, 3.
34
See reports on these incidents over the years at www.birn.eu.com. Refer also to various works in
Bibliography of this paper for further information.
35
See Hislope, “Calm Before the Storm? ...”, and “When Being Bad”.
31
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A former Minister of Interior of Macedonia, Pavle Trajanov, blames subsequent
Macedonian governments from the time of the “double embargo” in 1992 (by Greece
to its south and Serbia to its north) until at least the early to mid-2000s for organizing
or tolerating the smuggling of cigarettes, oil and a variety of arms from or through
Macedonia to Kosovo, Albania, and Serbia.36
Although the legal instruments of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement
should prevail and be fully implemented, the long practice of tolerating corruption
continues to take its toll on the institutions and peoples of Macedonia. A focused crossethnic battle against corruption must be waged, if Macedonia wishes to function under
the rule of law and democracy, with democratic institutions, to improve its economy
and meet the standards expected by its citizens and the international organizations such
as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) that the
country wishes to join.37
Developments after the 2001 armed conflict support the contention that this ethnic
conflict falls short of resolution, since the fundamental causes of the conflict have not
been obviated. This is not unexpected, since dealing with the underlying causes is the
most difficult aspect. Such a process requires strong domestic political will, the
consistent support of the international community, and a significant amount of time.
The cleavages from prior to and after 2001’s conflict must be attended to before
proceeding to the underlying causal factors, in order to achieve real conflict resolution
(rather than simply settlement) in Macedonia.
It is both probable and likely, as was discussed by other presenters at the NATO
Advanced Research Workshop in Skopje, Macedonia (April 11-14, 2018) that arms,
oil and other conflict-related materiel (especially small arms) are going to terrorist
groups in various global locations, and more particularly to the conflict-ridden Fertile
Crescent region which includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, a part of Egypt, southern Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia (it is sometimes called the Cradle of Civilization.)38 Some may also be
destined for Yemen and other Middle Eastern states and ethnic groups (such as the
Kurds), and the hands of ISIS and similar terrorist groups.

Center for the Study of Democracy, CSD Reports: “Cigarette Smuggling”,
http://www.csd.bg/publications/ book10/2.2.pdf; “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags
the Country Down” (International Crisis Group Balkan Report no.133, 14 August 2002), 22-23,
accessed at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/
A400739_14082002.pdf; and Hislope, “When Being Bad is Good”, 34. Trajanov was Minister of
Interior, 1998-99.
37
Interview with V. Georgiev, Office of Prevention of Corruption, June 14, 2006, Skopje, Macedonia.
38
Mark, Joshua J. “Fertile Crescent”, 28 March 2018, in Ancient History Encyclopedia, at
https://www.ancient.eu/ Fertile_Crescent/.
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Remaining Issues for Conflict Settlement
In order to treat the unresolved underlying causes of ethnic conflict in Macedonia,
action is required to resolve structural and economic problems, as well as addressing
the factors of fear. Structural factors necessitating immediate attention are a broad and
effective battle against corruption and organized-crime, and deep, cross-cutting
reforms in the judiciary and public administration. A solution must be acceptable to
both sides in order to be sustainable and contribute to the stability and security of the
entire region. It is best if the proposed solutions are developed by the main parties to
them (the ethnic groups and their political representation).39
The importance of deep and significant reforms in the judiciary and public
administration sectors in Macedonia cannot be overstated and has been the subject of
much political posturing and publicity. Ensuring an efficient and professional
administration and judiciary, free from political machinations, is crucial for the rule of
law, non-discrimination and fight against corruption. It is also a necessary precondition
for improving the business climate and attracting foreign investment in Macedonia.
Only by taking such measures can Macedonia begin addressing the two major problems
for all citizens of the country regardless of their ethnicity: unemployment and poverty.40
The aid and assistance the international community has given Macedonia to undertake
reforms in these fields has been valuable over the past decade, but without strong
domestic political will and dedication to reforms that are often painful, not to mention
embarrassing, no significant or sustainable progress can be achieved.
Education is a crucial long-term investment in reconciliation and ethnic conflict
resolution. Macedonia's educational system must reinforce the positive values of
diversity, tolerance, and the cultural benefits of living in such a multi-cultural society.
The education system must provide students with the possibility for elective classes in
minority languages and, at the same time, should improve the quality of training in the
Macedonian language for students from other ethnic communities educated in a
primary language other than Macedonian.
It is important, not only for Macedonia but also for the entire Western Balkans region,
that the EU keeps commitments made as part of the 2003 Thessaloniki EU Council
regarding the future inclusion of the Western Balkan states as members.

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), pp.
379-399; at stable URL https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717.
40
In the IRI Macedonia Survey, March 2006, http://macedonia.usaid.gov/, 52% of the citizens
responded that unemployment is the most serious problem facing Macedonia.
39
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If the EU elects to postpone the Euro-integrative processes for an extended period or
offers alternatives other than the prospect of EU membership, its conflict resolution
efforts in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Western Balkans will be undermined, since
its conditionality will not hold the same positive force as it has had. In such a situation,
radical forces likely would question whether “incentives for cooperation and the nonviolent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that
might be expected from violent confrontation.”41
The focus on Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process and prospects supported
the country’s willingness to cooperate in the conflict resolution mechanisms proposed
by these international organizations and entities. In Macedonia, the struggle for
political stability and security, economic progress and democratic reform continues.
These issues are undoubtedly connected with successful ethnic conflict resolution and
once again point to the third side of Macedonia’s conflict resolution puzzle: Macedonia
cannot ignore the international community, especially EU and NATO. Only a serious
commitment from EU and NATO that includes the prospect of full membership in these
organizations at some realistic and specific future date will insulate Macedonia from
forthcoming risks and create a solid basis for the continuation of reforms needed to
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, and to resolve, not simply settle or mask, the country’s
internal ethnic conflicts.
There is significant power in the Macedonian and Albanian diasporas. The stronger
the ties to an identity and a “homeland” among those diasporas, the more active their
membership tends to be. This can offer opportunities and/or barriers to cracking the
touchstones of terrorism and political violence
Furthermore, international actors have tended to underestimate the depth and
complexity of cleavages themselves within Macedonia. What may appear rational,
unambiguous, uncontroversial and logical to those outside Macedonia may face hurdles
not immediately evident to those not intimately involved in the socio-cultural, sociopolitical and socio-economic fabric of daily life in Macedonia. Integration is not
pervasive, nor is there necessarily a commitment to it across the board. Identity as an
exclusionary factor still defines much of life; that nearly all political parties are
ethnically based is a cogent example of this, as are continuing claims that there are
ethnic restrictions on where one may safely or comfortably live, be employed, travel
without harm, where security may be enforced, and the like. Progress has been made,
but more is needed, including stronger emphasis on civic identity and citizenship of a
state (inclusivity) versus ethnicity or other identity (exclusivity and cleavages).
Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,”
International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994), 347-77; see also Peter Wallensteen and Margareta
Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97,” Journal of Peace Research
35:5 (1998), 621-34.
41
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In China’s Vanguard Civilization: Is there Shelter for the Third World?
Tseggai Isaac
Abstract
This paper looks at China’s civilizational and modernization heritages. Its ancient
civilization is described as the first phase of China’s civilization. In the first phase,
China’s Civilization was stellar, and creative, possessing well–structured bureaucratic
institutions with phenomenal capacities for artistic production and the advancement of
high sciences. The second phase of China’s civilization reflects its current
modernization, one inspired and operationalized by Marxism and Maoism. The earlier
phase of China’s Civilization was aloof, benign, self-sufficient, reticent and reluctant
to attract untoward global attention. This ancient civilization, rooted in the organic soil
of China itself, was holistic, robust on its own merit.
China's civilization was inspired by its ancient religions and social formations. From
such fountainheads, China’s institutional framework at the village, community, district,
and regional levels responded to bureaucratic authority to produce creative and
organically legitimate governance for centuries.
The ancient civilization of China represented a multidimensional grandeur. At its
height, it combined scientific rationalizations with productive outputs in material
science. There was a seamless integration of ancient technical and scientific
differentiation. These were ancient, but their scientific characteristics were rather
modern. If we average and standardize variation to account for epochal setbacks and
institutional aberrations, such as misguided actions by the emperors, it is not farfetched
to say that the level of scientific maturity that Great Britain reached in its industrial
revolution by the 16th and 17th centuries matched China’s scientific output of two
thousand years before.
China’s scientific output in ancient days represented functionally relevant and
exquisitely adaptive features in their effects and utility. Pre-modern China showed to
the world mastery of the hard sciences. Its engineering excellence testified to China’s
mastery of metallurgy, chemical sciences, physics, astronomy, medicine, and structural
engineering. Its socio-cultural development were the foundations of ancient China’s
highly matured political development. Political maturity of ancient China valued
human freedom with hierarchical order, revealing one of the oldest and most creative
civilizations in the world.
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China’s coming status as a superpower is unmistakable. As China’s superpower status
consolidates in the next few decades, Third World states are asking, naturally: “Is China
going to introduce celebratory developmental alternatives to the neocolonial structures
of the West?”
Introduction
The content of a nation's history is the foundation of its civilization. China’s history
and civilization reveal the country as having the oldest continuous state system, one
infused with a rich civilization. Historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political
scientists attempt to unfold the nearly boundless tapestry of China’s rich civilization
and come to the common conclusion affirming that the State of China prevailed for
millennia.
The enduring survivability of China is reflected in its cultural, traditional and religious
heritage. Irrespective of the numerous dynasties of ancient China, the creative and
productive emperors of the medieval years, or the struggling rulers on the eve of
European colonialism, the State of China kept the lights shining on its legitimacy.
China’s status of a superpower was predicted as early as the 1890s.
More than a century ago, James Whitford Bashford noted China’s status as a global
power. He stated:
In the problems of the twentieth century, the United States and China bulk large —
the United States because of her long line of sea coast on the Pacific, her high
industrial and commercial development, her enormous wealth, her energy, and the
inevitable increase of her population along the Pacific Coast. The completion of
the Panama Canal will put the entire United States, including the Atlantic Coast,
three thousand miles nearer China than is Europe. The Christian faith, which we
very imperfectly represent, may nevertheless through us become dominant in the
Pacific Basin.
China bulks large because she now has a population of 437,000,000 — threefourths the people of the Pacific basin — whose industry, energy, economy,
perseverance and fruitfulness make the Anglo-Saxon of the Orient. China sustains
this immense population wholly by farming and such crude manufacturing as can
be carried on by hand. China is just beginning to accept modern inventions and to
introduce modern machinery; and with far the largest and toughest, most
industrious and most economical laboring class on our globe, an era of vast
industrial expansion is immediately before her.
Moreover, China is now beginning to construct railroads and to open the largest
and finest coal and iron mines thus far known to man.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18
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Baron Richthofen, after a laborious investigation of many years, submitted to the
German government a three-volume report of the coal and iron resources of China,
showing that they are the finest in the world. He found coal in fifteen of the
eighteen provinces examined by him; and in the province of Shansi alone he
reported enough coal to supply the human race for several thousand years. Side by
side with these supplies of coal, Baron Richthofen found vast supplies of iron ore.
The German government was so amazed by Baron’s report that an expert
commission was sent to China in 1897 to reexamine his data, and this commission
fully verified Baron Richthofen’s estimates. It was the discovery of these
marvelous resources of China which led to the greedy attempts of European powers
to divide the empire — attempts which led to the Boxer uprising and which were
frustrated largely by the statesmanship of Secretary Hay and the power of the
United States. Surely, a population of 437,000,000 in a compact territory sustained
by agriculture alone is a phenomenon unmatched by any other country on our
globe.1
The lengthy quote above is a proper context for looking at China’s climb to the status
of a superpower. It shows that the essential elements of national power were available
in abundance for China to marshal those elements of power and embolden itself to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This paper begins by looking at China’s timeless civilization, its capabilities, and its
potentials to defend itself from external aggression. Yet, as China prepares to assume
a superpower status, its relationship to the Third World is facing criticism as being
exploitative and damaging. We should look at this argument and examine if the links
of ideology, national interest, and lack of skills in public policy are primary causes for
any foreign aid irrespective of the status of “communist” China or the “liberal” West.
China’s Timeless Civilization
The Chinese civilization commands unparalleled greatness among world civilizations.
Other civilizations have left little of material use that can be said to have value in the
21st century. Chinese civilization boasts of the continuity and utility of its civilizational
outcomes. China had the technical and strategic capabilities to embark on colonial
ventures before European nations initiated their colonial ambitions. What China lacked
at the time of European colonial expansion was simply the ambition to compete with
Western Imperialism.

1

Bashford, J. A (1907). The Awakening of China. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, China Sentential Commission, New York, NY: pp. 2-3.
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National ambition as a motivating factor for greatness is exemplified by the fact that
the great Chinese civilization that had accumulated vast technical, scientific, and legal
traditions failed in the nineteenth century to capitalize on those resources to prevent
China’s defeat and occupation by the European powers.2
The Chinese — whose mastery of medicine, technology, explosives, magnets, and
seafaring technology was incomparable from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries —
are now measuring their current economic boom against their past ambivalence for
imperial expansion. They see virtue in the pacifism and disinterest of their ancestors,
in their refraining from spearheading colonial ventures before the Europeans. China’s
emerging projection of power appears designed not to repeat past ambivalence, but
rather to meet any Western challenge on Chinese terms at any cost.
Unless the current totalitarian political system destroys the social system and leads to
national decay, the prospect of China emerging as a superpower of undisputed
supremacy is ineluctable.
The Chinese were oriented to think inward in terms of their perceived cultural
superiority. They felt invincible and as a result neglected the need for vigilance. Selfcontentedness at the highest level resulted in forgetting the call to develop and maintain
the essential elements of national power. They could not overcome their inner thoughts
and cultural practices to initiate aggression as a pretext for taking the lands of other
societies. The closing decades of the 19th century were painful ones for China, because
it could not mount any resistance against foreign occupation. Events such as the Boxer
Rebellion represent symbolic indicators of China’s indomitable spirit.
China slept for thousands of years and awoke to find itself embattled and ransacked
by foreign powers.3
The ancient Chinese technical and scientific creativity flowed from cultural norms that
permeated Chinese society, enabling them to solve immediate and local problems
(Mott, F. W. 2003). The Chinese of the middle ages were innovative in the technical
realms, but they lacked ambition and vision to channel their technical innovations for
imperial conquest. They were ambivalent as to the benefits that could be extracted by
marrying their scientific creativity with the contrivances of diplomacy, political
ambitions, thirst for adventure and risk taking.

2

Bailey, Thomas A. The Foreign Policy of the American People, Prentice-Hall, New York, NY: 1982.
Bailey is full of accolades and, at the same time, he is a dispassionate critic of American greatness. His
analysis is beneficial in looking at the pitfalls of uncouth diplomacy and the fortifying strengths of the
military-industrial complex aptly defined by President Eisenhower. See, President Eisenhower’s
Farewell Address to the Nation, January 17, 1961.
3
Bailey, pp. 439-48.
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Europeans borrowed and innovated from Chinese science and used this for global
conquest that brought them bountiful colonial possessions.
Revolutionary China vs. Imperial China
Careful study of Mao Zedong’s writings and wisdom reveals the difference between
his sharp critical analysis and the spasmodic events that sprung up during his leadership
to overshadow the implications of his ideology. The Cultural Revolution (CR) and the
Great Leap Forward (GLP) were expressions of his critical thinking. They were
introduced as the operationalization of his theory and the synthesis that he constructed
to apply Marxism in China.
Theoretically, logically, and synthetically, the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward were powerful inspirations capable of achieving great results. What was
missing was the lack of information for the effective implementation of public policy
methodologies and the development of technocratic skills similar to those of the Qin
and Han dynasties.
Some of early imperial China’s social and political features are rare in the histories
of early peoples: all political power was highly centralized; its government was a
bureaucracy of highly literate administrators who were men selected in principle
for their individual qualifications of learning and ability and its imperial
institutions. . . . the imperial state was a civil government, in which, nominally at
least, the civil virtues were held to be superior to the military (Mote, 2003, 3-4).
Chairman Mao believed that the Party is the macrocosm of the people. In his
estimation, the Party could multitask as a vanguard army, national service unit, and as
a bureaucratic civil service. What was needed was the institutional order that
differentiated professional skills and channeled them to work centers with clear
guidelines, clearer expectations, and accurate and precise measures of achieved results.
The Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward lacked the systemization of the
means of production and marshalling of appropriate professional skills.
Further, Mao believed that the masses give wisdom, inspiration, and guidance, to the
correct path. He had confidence in the dedicated spirit of the masses and in their
willingness to unite behind the Party as long as the Party did not betray their confidence
and shortchange their expectations. He spoke of the dictatorship of the people as a
collective application of a regimented society marching to the orders of the Party.
When the Party sidetracked itself from policy formation, and engaged in aimless
ideological regimentation of the masses, it began simultaneously to forget the ancestral
wisdom, inspiration, and guidance that were embedded in the consciousness of the
masses, and it became a party dictatorship instead of a people’s dictatorship.
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According to Mao’s analysis, a people’s dictatorship is legitimate; party dictatorship is
not, because it undermines the vision of the masses. When the Party shortchanges the
masses, Chairman Mao believed, the Republic will be confounded, and the Party will
have fallen short of the people’s expectations.
What constitutes the most remarkable and eye-opening realities of China today? It is
the fact that Maoism remains the guiding light of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao’s
doctrinal analysis envisioned post-1989 China and the CCP’s functional purposes. The
development and placement of differentiated skill, coordination of capital and policy
formations, and resources that were lacking during the Cultural Revolution and the
Great Leap Forward were met by the end of the twentieth century as the fulfillment of
Mao’s visions. The state and the Party were to merge in symbiotic relationship to
enhance the glow of a functional state.
Today’s China was predicted during the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward. It found its bearing during the third quarter of the 20th century. In the 21st
century, it is at the initial phase of its maturity. Its capacity for capital formation, its
systemization of a vast work force, and its inherent abilities to maximize the efficiency
of its material resources suggest the prospect of surpassing the EU, the United States,
or Russia in global influence. The productive and useful expectation of the Cultural
Revolution and the bench-marks of the Great Leap Forward can be realized with
maximum effect in the Third World if China commits enough resources for its own
investment returns while uplifting the Third World from its dismal position today.
The closing decade of the 19th century China positioned itself to overcome the
intrusions of colonialism in China. The years between the First and Second World
Wars witnessed the birth pains of the modern China. Events such as the Boxer
Rebellion represented symbolic indicators of an indomitable spirit.
The First World War years contained painful episodes that rendered China, once a great
power, possessing a majestic civilization, reduced to a defensive posture; at times it
was barely capable of defending its sovereignty against colonial powers and Japanese
imperialism. The devastation continued during the Second World War. The 1940s
witnessed the maturity and the determination of the Communist Party under the
leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong. The Chinese Communist Party at this stage
showed a combative spirit and intense discipline.
The military and political organizations were on sure footing as of mid-century, able to
defeat the Nationalists and consolidate China’s sovereignty in the post-post World War
II decades. After the Second World War, China’s role was regional, mainly in Korea
and Taiwan/Formosa. After 1976, the making of an impending superpower with
inspiring history and tradition embedded in its old civilization started to become
evident.
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Joseph Fewsmith describes China at this stage as “historically the most self-conscious
society in the world, and the legacy of its history and civilization continue to play an
important role, consciously and unconsciously, in the way that China is governed.”
When Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist revolution, sought guidance on
governing his nation, he turned not to the works of Marx and Lenin, whose
philosophy he espoused, but to China’s dynastic histories to better understand the
way in which China’s emperors had ruled the nation. He did so even as he
excoriated China’s imperial past as feudal.4
Once the China Communist Party inaugurated the People’s Republic of China, the
Republic started, metaphorically, learning to walk, to steady its footing, and then to
take off on its journey at its current swift pace. Fewsmith’s analysis offers important
perspective as to the options available to leadership for guiding China along the path
of its past civilization. The challenge was of choosing liberal democracy or
communism; which best approximated Chinese tradition and civilization?
The Cold War: A Defining Era for China and the Third World
The end of the Second World War introduced new geopolitical alliances. The former
European colonies of Africa and Asia were liberated, and they joined the community
of nations as sovereign states. European powers had divided China into spheres of
European economic interests, but the country nevertheless escaped European
colonization. Furthermore, the civil war between the nationalists and the communists
preoccupied Chinese patriots.
In 1949, the communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong defeated the Nationalists
and established themselves as the rulers of China with the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA.) The communists defeated the Nationalist hope of instituting liberal democracy
in China. Ever since then, the Chinese Communist Party has become the undisputed
authority, assuming the role of modernizing China and creating a formidable deterrent
as well as offensive capabilities.
The Cold War years (1945-1991) were defining decades for China. In the first place,
the army participated in the Korean War. Even though its military and strategic
resources were far more limited than those of the Allied forces, the numerical size and
the discipline within the PLA’s hierarchy enabled China to extract a settlement
resulting in the division of Korea. At this time the Chinese State morphed in ways that
blended Mao’s theory of the people’s dictatorship and Party rule.

Fewsmith, J. “The Government of China”, In Michael Curtis, General Editor, Introduction to
Comparative Politics, Longman, Inc. New York, NY: 1997: 397.
4
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The symbiotic blend of the Chinese State and the Party reveals the seamless overlap
between the powers of the state and the party, and the ideological framework that
defined their unity. Imperial China captured by Maoist China gained a Chairman
without royalty and state power without the imperial crown. The cultural attributes that
molded the Chinese citizen, the makings of individual resiliency to endure interminable
hardships while extolling imperial China as one of the highest civilizations in the world
was replaced by the People’s Party’s “permanent revolution” (Britten, 1968).
The “permanent revolution” was the costly preoccupation of the Party to create
dreadful purges of its bureaucratic ranks and its cadres on the pretext and fear of an
incipient betrayal of the revolution and a default to bourgeoisie mentality.
Revolutionary China defined its rationale for ruling on the logical abstractions of
Chairman Mao’s teachings; the force of his personality seemed to overshadow his
ideological abstractions and sidetracked the Party and the State into running in circles
diverted away from the healing cultural values of the Chinese people.
The best way to look at this abstract elaboration is to think of the undisputed legitimacy
of the Chinese state, its living history, civilization, culture, and heritages, all so
dominant that modification and political analysis and attempts to provide an alternative
view and alternative institutions or ideas, such as communism or liberalism, continually
appear out of place.
China’s long-established identity has proven to be beyond ideological or practical
innovations, even those of Mao himself. Revolutionary China began to play a global
role during the Cold War. Stalin’s Russia began as an ally of China, but the friendship
dissolved fast, because of border friction and Stalin’s misperception of Mao.5 At first,
the two regimes were ideological friends, but for Stalin it was difficult to control his
contrarian ego. He refused to reciprocate the same respect and ideological comradeship
that he received from Mao. Soon, the two communist giants split.
During this time, China embarked on a tumultuous ideological journey. The Party
wanted to create a monolithic communal state and concentrate its energies on
collectivism without giving due consideration to those technocratic resources that were
needed to facilitate developmental strategies that are efficient, expedient and nondisruptive. Lack of technical and systemic planning caused food shortages. Cadres
who showed ideological inspiration without any technical skills and administrative
strategies were ordered to achieve the same levels of performance that would be
expected of trained and experienced technicians and scientists.

New York Times, “Stalin-Mao Alliance was Uneasy: Newly Released Papers Show”,
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/10/world/stalin-mao-alliance-was-uneasy-newly-released-papersshow.html
5
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This failure to harmonize ideological visions with the development of bureaucratic and
civil service professionals resulted in the failure of the Cultural Revolution and the
Great Leap Forward to serve as a useful template for the Third World to emulate.
Such setbacks were mitigated by the sense of national freedom and state sovereignty
of China and its citizens. China had become totally free from foreign domination. It
revealed its confidence by following a philosophy of self-reliance. Perhaps most
significant, Mao’s logic on capitalism appears to have predicted the present market
system of 21st century China.
On the one hand, he condemns capitalism as a tool of mass oppression by the capitalist
classes. He makes exception to this theory by allowing small-scale capitalist activity
within the rank of the middle classes such as artisans, shop owners, individual farmers.
He believed the CCP’s task was to eliminate the residues of capitalism in private hands
and totally transfer the apparatus of capitalism to the state.
Ultimately, the problem of such an expectation is prioritization.
The period that Mao envisioned for the eradication of capitalism in one sector of society
and its replacement with people’s socialism was not set in stone. Even if rigid
mobilization and discipline are enforced on the formation and implementation of public
projects with tightly scheduled policies, the effect is a form of chaotic misery and
needless catastrophes such as were seen in the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap
Forward. Mao’s real communism is the expression of a state capable of attaining the
legitimacy to represent all of the masses and bring the entire economy under its control
by emulating the accumulative habits and practices of capitalism.
The following statement reflects Mao Zedong’s idea of capitalism, at least at the time
when it was published in 1952:
The present-day capitalist economy in China is a capitalist economy which for the
most part is under the control of the People's Government and which is linked with
the state-owned socialist economy in various forms and supervised by the workers.
It is not an ordinary but a particular kind of capitalist economy, namely, a statecapitalist economy of a new type. It exists not chiefly to make profits for the
capitalists but to meet the needs of the people and the state.
True, a share of the profits produced by the workers goes to the capitalists, but that
is only a small part, about one quarter, of the total. The remaining three quarters
are produced for the workers (in the form of the welfare fund), for the state (in the
form of income tax) and for expanding productive capacity (a small part of which
produces profits for the capitalists).
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Therefore, this state-capitalist economy of a new type takes on a socialist character
to a very great extent and benefits the workers and the state.6

The above quote is the heart of Mao’s thinking, in the opinion of this author. It is what
Mao prophesied would take place in China when he penned it barely a decade after he
led his army to victory in the civil war. It was realized in the precise manner that he
prophesied during the years 1989 to today. China today is what Mao envisioned in his
revolutionary days.
China is relatively new to the status of a superpower actor, so comparing the way China
interacts with the Third World will offer a useful context for what is to come for the
poor states of Africa and Asia as they raise their hopes and expectations about China.
How will China make a difference in the economic, educational, health, and overall
societal welfare of the Third World? China under the leadership of Chairman Mao was
friendly and sympathetic to Third World countries.
Will the Chinese state fulfill Chairman Mao’s vision for the Third World today, in the
present century, as it has done with respect to the people of China?
The following statement shows Mao’s good will and the genuine solidarity that he
extended to the Third World as it struggled against colonialism and the forms of
economic dependency that he recognized.
Chairman Mao Zedong referred to the Chinese people as comrades of the former
colonized peoples of Africa and Asia. He called for a common bond to throw off
the burdens of poverty and destitution that came about due to Western exploitation
and greed.
It is also instructive to catalogue the types of material, cultural, scientific,
economic, and developmental experiences China can share with the Third World.
Mao Zedong's strategic thinking shed light on the fact that the two super-powers
were then the main source of instability and turmoil in the world. Their acts of
pursuing hegemonism, power politics — the big bullying the small, the strong
bullying the weak, and the rich oppressing the poor — that gave rise to strong
opposition and resentment by countries of the third world.
As a member of the third world, China firmly supported other third world countries
in their struggles against hegemonism and struggles waged by countries of the
second world against interference and control by the super-powers.
Selected Works of Mao Zedong: “On State Capitalism”, (Written comment on a document of the
National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953), July 9, 1953.
6
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China was firmly opposed to the policy of expansionism pursued by the superpowers and carried out the policy of uniting with and struggling against the United
States to strike at Soviet hegemonism, thus effectively restraining the expansionist
forces of the Soviet Union.7
The People’s Army was conditioned to tolerate the bitter revolutionary struggles that
brought the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Mao organized a peasant army, the People’s Liberation Army, and created a strong
political organization, while the Chinese Communist Party indoctrinated cadres in
peasant-based guerrilla warfare, and confronted Chang Kai-shek’s nationalist army.
The PLA was an effective military force. It quickly matured and was superior in size,
discipline, and military strategy. It drove Chiang Kai-shek out of mainland China and
established a communist government in 1949. The CCP was Mao’s creation, organized
from the grassroots.
The Makings of a Powerful China
Revolutionary China embarked on its current journey in 1949 when the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) took power and inaugurated the People’s Republic. The new
communist state was on the experimental path to render Marxism as a practical guide
for political, economic, and social progress. Capitalism as a contending ideology to
Marxism was severely criticized by the newly mobilized communists when they
published their Communist Manifesto. They catalogued its harmful effects on the
working classes of the world. The toil of the industrial workers, the negative
capitalization of labor at far lower value compared to the goods produced by the
industrial laborers, and the exponential growth of capital accumulation without good
citizenship of industrialists offended Marx and Engels.
In the imagination of the revolutionary Marxists, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and
Stalin, Marxism provided an equalitarian solution (Wolfe, B. 1948; Moore, B. 1966).
Marxism in its experimental phase began when the Bolsheviks launched the
Communist state of Russia in 1917. After Lenin’s death, Joseph Stalin took over and
led Russia through the difficulties of the Second World War. Stalin’s brand of
leadership exploited the centralizing and dictatorial versions the communist doctrine.
He was gifted in commanding attention, generating fear in the heart of his comrades
and followers. He was unbending in the execution of his agenda.

See” Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the World and the Strategy of Forming
Alliance Against an Opponent, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml.
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Stalin ignored the philosophical and analytical foundations of Communism as he relied
on his dictatorial instincts to run the Soviet State. His personality dominated the
institutional hierarchies of the Leninist Party. Mao resembled Stalin in his
interpretation of Marxism. He differed from Stalin, because Mao, belatedly, modified
Marxism by waking up to the ancient Chinse cultural wisdoms, The Yenan Way”, as
having ideals worth considering.8
In 1934, Mao and the PLA made their “The Long March” from southeastern China.
They settled in the Province of Yenan, an impoverished rural section in northwestern
China. They established Yenan as their revolutionary base from where Mao’s thoughts
and ideological philosophy evolved from hardcore Marxism, gradually distancing
themselves from the Soviet Model. Mao’s version of Marxism needed theoretical
modification. It is not the Russian version of communism that China needed, but one
inspired by the ancient soil and soul of China. He found those inspirations in rural and
traditional Yenan.
Mao's theoretical elaboration was incremental. It was an amalgam of his writings,
poems, theoretical analysis, and China’s folklore linked together by a thread of
revolutionary zeal. Both Mao and Stalin converged in the similarity of their party
control. Stalin was much older, but they were ideological contemporaries. They
differed in their ideological orthodoxy. Mao shared Stalin’s practices of mass
mobilization. The severity of Stalinist collectivization and villagization and Mao’s
Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward have identical outcomes on their
respective societies. The outcomes were traumatic and destructive.
The Yenan way reoriented Mao’s views into reconsidering the great merits of the
Chinese heritage. He embarked on integrative theory by taking into consideration
Chinese ancient history and the lives of great Chinese emperors. In practice and reality,
he was self-assured, confident of the soundness of his own theory. Additionally, the
outcome of his policy decisions attracted attention to his forceful personality.
The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution were the climax of his way of
thinking, one that had evolved since the 1930s when he moved his base to Yenan. His
temperament and his personal idiosyncrasies compromised the soundness and the
objectivity of his theoretical thinking. His major decisions, such as the Cultural
Revolution and Great Leap Forward, bordered on irrationality.
The destruction and devastations they wrought and the pain they inflicted on the
longsuffering Chinese people did not make theoretical or common sense.

8

Selden, M. (1971). The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
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In discipline, combat preparation, and mobilization, Mao was an innovative trailblazer,
while always admiring and celebrating such ancient Chinese philosophies and
ideological inheritances as Confucianism. To elevate his revolutionary message, he
propagandized Maoism as a variant of Marxism rooted in the peasantry.
In Asia, the legacy of colonial policies with regard to border lines is being felt today
by China’s neighbors. The limits of China’s borders that had been drawn during
the colonial era and readjusted by Japan and the Great Powers after the Second
World War are now subject to China’s apparent intentions to redraw the limits of
its claims to the satisfaction of its newly regained self-assertion and grandeur.
China’s neighbors, namely Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Cambodia are protesting China’s unilateral decision to redraw their borders and
contest their territorial waters.9 Similar problems persist in the Middle East, Africa,
and South America and in Eastern Europe (Isaac, T. 2015:15).
Maoism as a special version of communism modified to fit Mao’s conceptions was not
crystalized to approximate the ideals of Marxism, Leninism, or Maoism. The CCP
charted its own version of ideological, political, industrial and economic policies as the
basis for launching the robust modernization journey that China embarked on in 1989.
From 1946 to 1949, China experienced a civil war between the nationalist Chinese
under liberal Chiang Kai-shek and Mao’s Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Chiang Kai-shek had started his own career as a communist. As he studied the
communists and understood their methods, he changed course to become a dedicated
liberal securing financial and military aid from the West, particularly the United States.
One of the first steps that he took after he changed his ideology was to fight to eliminate
the communists within his organization.
In 1927, Chang Kai-shek succeeded in defeating the communists. He severely crippled
and disrupted their organizational efforts, but a few fled to the rural areas under Mao’s
leadership. Chiang Kai-shek thus served as the preeminent leader of Mainland China
until 1949. In the civil war that culminated in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his National
Army were driven out of mainland China to create the Republic of China on Taiwan.
The People’s Liberation Army under the leadership of Mao Zedong declared the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

Wan, W. “China Wages a Quiet War of Maps with its Neighbors”, The Washington Post, electronic
edition, February 16, 2013.
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The Making of a Mercantilist and Powerful China
Following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the chaos and restlessness of the
revolutionary zeal was sorted out when a new group of leaders rose from the ranks of
the CCP and redirected China away from Maoism and toward state capitalism. China’s
state capitalism allowed small measures of private enterprise in commerce, IT
enterprises, real estate, and agriculture. Under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin,
in the early 1990s, a robust free market economy and entrepreneurial incentives were
encouraged. The upper echelon of the CCP controlled political power and, at the same
time, relaxed economic restrictions.
The Party woke up to realize that the Chinese genius for national renewal and
prosperity rested on the engine of private entrepreneurship, not as a result of ideological
sentiment but as an aspect of national character. As private capital was encouraged,
parts of the macroeconomics of China, including fiscal, monetary, foreign trade,
commerce, industrial, and policy matters were firmly under the grip and watchful eyes
of the CCP. The ideological party of the Mao years embraced the state as an
instrumental tool for mercantilism.
As a result, within the last 50 years, China has managed to stand tall as an economic
giant. Today, China’s economic tentacles span the globe. It uses its vast economic
surplus to stipulate its own dictates to achieve compound interest on the marginal
foreign aid it extends to the Third World. Will this dynamic accumulation differ from
the capitalist mode of economic interaction against which Chairman Mao used to rail?
The CCP certainly became adept at creating pragmatic and practical policy tools. At
the lower level of economic activities, the CCP allowed small businesses and single
input merchandising interests, such as consumable and perishable items, for its vast
consumer market. As Townsend stated:
Despite their sensitivity [to centralization] problems, Chinese elites apparently
remain committed to their pattern of diffused administrative responsibilities. It has
served as a check on bureaucratic expansionism, prepared the country for resistance
to foreign attack, and compiled a creditable record of economic growth.
Most significantly, perhaps, it has created an administrative system that is sensitive
to the growth potential of localities and encourages them to maximize the use of
their own resources. This aspect of decentralization, in combination with mass line
methods of work, supports political mobilization and community involvement
among the population.10

10
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This practice encouraged large-scale capital accumulation, the spinoff of which was
the increase of government revenue. Never mind that regulatory policies were lax or
that the greed associated with feverish capitalism resulted in the reciprocal exchanges
of benefits between grasping entrepreneurs and corrupt party cadres. In the larger
scheme of Chairman Mao’s analysis of the “contradictions” associated with the
revolutionary landscape, the economic sector manifests profit-seeking elements who
will use their bureaucratic positions to align with entrepreneurs to impede the
revolutionary struggle.
He was specific about the endemic tendencies of profit-seeking pointing out: “To
maintain public order and safeguard the interests of the people, it is necessary to
exercise dictatorship as well over thieves, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, criminal
gangs and other scoundrels who seriously disrupt public order”.11
For midlevel production, distribution and labor relations, a version of a neo-corporatist
system blending state and corporate interests as instrumental policy for national
mobilization became the chosen path for harmonious means of economic production,
distribution, and extraction. Government revenue skyrocketed as Chinese goods
flooded global markets. Governance mattered in the larger scope of the CCP’s national
agenda.
Once the benefits of a guided free market started accumulating, the CCP encouraged
intense capital accumulation. Its capacity for capital formation, for mobilizing the
workforce, identifying work centers, segmenting the workforce via work centers, and
identifying policy targets from the actual planning strategies was combined with the
force of its ability to inspire society for most productive activities. State autarchy was
unleashed and Chinse entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers all contributed to the rise of
a triumphant, increasingly wealthy state.
Mao was always optimistic about China’s potentials. His use of the concept of
“empiricism” to affirm his conviction of China’s stratospheric rise was looked at
askance by those who subjected his work to strict analysis. 12 He based his hopeful
optimism of China’s rise to prominence on purely Marxist logic. His “thoughts”,
strategies, and polemics were Marxist, but it is also apparent that he channeled
Confucianism, the values of which he was jealously proud.
After 1989, a new outlook and new ideas were elevated as ideological guides to be
embraced by an enlightened state and Party for the achievement of national prosperity.

11

Mao Tse Tung (1960). On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People. Peking,
Foreign Languages Press, 1957: 12.
12
Kraus, R. C., “The Limits of Maoist Egalitarianism,” Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 11 (November
1976), pp. 1084-1086
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China has rediscovered Mao’s philosophical thoughts and reconciled them with those
ancient Chinese cultural goals that he tried but could not accomplish due to his largerthan life image of himself in comparative terms. He was egotistic, self-assured,
brilliant in thoughts, thoughtless in actions, and unwilling to look back and take
corrective measures to correct or admit his failures. The succeeding leadership bettered
him in being rational, astute, wise, duty-bound, cautious, but prodding and taking risks
in global affairs.
The blend of ideology and culture are elevating the citizen as an engine of creative
ideas, boundless efforts, and a committed vanguard for a modernized and industrialized
China. Today, China is rising, and its bright future can shed rays of hope to Third
World Countries. The extent to which the Third World is going to fare better by
emulating the China model compared to the developmental model that was offered by
the liberal ideology is a legitimate topic of study.
China and the Third World Today
China has reignited its ancient culture of phenomenal creativity in growing areas of
science, the economy, Internet Technology, and globalization.13 It has climbed up the
ladder of the take-off stage and reached the economic heights, thus inching closer to
the developed stage. As it does so, its approach to development is a zero-sum game.
China is now viewed as lacking a sense of restraint in its exploitative relations to the
Third World.
China has evolved into a country that is accumulative and exploitative — in the process,
it has become far worse than the liberal capitalists whom Chairman Mao described as
“blood suckers.”
One former government official whose country was taken advantage of by the Chinese
International Development Bank lamented:
Venezuela has tried to finance itself with the help of the China Development Bank,
which does not impose the kind of conditionality that IMF bashers dislike. Instead,
the CDB lends on secret terms, for uses that are undisclosed and corrupt, and with
built-in privileges for Chinese companies in areas like telecommunications
(Huawei), appliances (Haier), cars (Chery), and oil drilling (ICTV).

Financial Times, January 2015, “Chinese GDP Growth Lowest in 24 Years”,
https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2014-1989-and-the-making-of-our-modernworld/chinas-1989-choice-paradox-seeking-wealth-and-democracy/; See also
https://www.ft.com/content/760621a8-9fcf-11e4-aa89-00144feab7de.
13
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The Chinese have not required that Venezuela do anything to increase the
likelihood it regains creditworthiness. They merely demand more oil as collateral.
Whatever the IMF’s faults, the CDB is a disgrace.14
China has earned the right to be regarded as a fully developed country. Its level of
modernization, both in the economic and the political arenas, is as robust as those states
who categorized China as a developing state less than 50 years ago.
China’s lightening economic development is spectacular, and the scale of
differentiation is vast in all categories of the sciences. China’s civil engineering feats
are creating islands out of the deep-sea oceans. China’s strategic and defense
developments are manned by the most sophisticated scientific skills under the
command of phalanxes of young scientists whose creativity, vision, dedication, and
Confucian discipline are awe-inspiring.15 Simultaneously, China is accelerating its
scientific speed with determined confidence to catch up with the West, and with the
United States, in particular.16
With the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after 1945, China was at a crossroads. Was
the Peoples Liberation Army to clench the revolutionary banner and launch China on a
radical revolutionary path or were the Nationalists going to prevail?
Until Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China was a vanguard leader of the Third
World. As such, it provided to the Third World countries an ideological vision of
egalitarian Marxism. However, the stridency of Maoism, the asymmetry of its
ideological vision, and the tactical errors committed in the selection of public policy
tools essential for the smooth implementation of the Great Leap forward, all attracted
negative attention.
The drama overshadowed the substantive contents and ideological intent of the Great
Leap Forward. For this reason, the “brotherhood” and the common vision that China
saw as the basis for cementing a strong bond with the Third World were not
consummated. The mechanical aspect of the Cultural Revolution also dissipated
popular energy as different social forces within the CCP battled each other while the
masses meekly fulfilled the Party’s objectives in terms of production goals.

Hausman, R. (2015), quoted in David Dollar, “China Investment in Latin America, The Brooking
Institute Governance and Global Issues, Paper 4, January 2017: page 9. Also,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fp_201701_china_investment_lat_am.pdf
15
Cong Cao. China’s New Scientific Elite: Routledge Curzon, Taylor and Francis Group, London, UK:
2004:35-48).
16
“Nine Ways Chinese Scientists are Pushing the Envelope in 2017”,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society, Viewed 26May2018.
14
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The organizational crisis within the Party was used by capitalists and imperialists to
paint a negative picture of Maoism. Third World countries were warned to distance
themselves from Maoism. President Kennedy’s warning “Those who ride on the back
of the tiger will end up inside” was frequently cited and was meant to sway the
geopolitical preferences of the Third World.
Still many Third World revolutionaries remained loyal comrades of China and admired
the CCP’s ability to rule effectively. Third World revolutionaries such as Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran were all dedicated
centralists whose ideological vision was similar to that of Maoism.
The ideological objectives and goals where China and Third World revolutionaries
agreed included, in this author’s view:
1. Equalitarian Marxism envisioned a strong centralizing developmental state.
2. The centralizing developmental state is ultimately dedicated to faithfully
striving for the realization of human rights, civil liberties, due process of law
and justice.
3. In order to achieve these ultimate objectives, the party must be disciplined and
trained in the art of selfless revolutionary thought. The rank and file members
must be valiant, relentless, loyal and conversant in Marxist analysis.
4. The state was to be governed by the rules and edicts of a centralized and
dominant party.
5. The party would rely on using authoritarian methods to realize totalitarian
governance without deviating from its mission to build a prosperous, peaceful,
and secure society.
6. Totalitarianism is a unitary system where social harmony is enforced,
individualism is subordinated to the collective objectives and goals, and
individual choices are curtailed for maximizing harmonious political and social
order.
Countries differed in their methodology of application and in the challenges they faced
to fully implement their policy goals. Nearly all of the above-cited revolutionary
leaders were confronted by foreign and domestic resistance. Those who overcome
foreign resistance were exceptions, such as Nyerere. Only China stands today fulfilling
the Maoist version of Marxism.
The warm embrace of the Third World by Mao is still enunciated by the leadership of
China. There is obvious goodwill from China and the huge investment that China is
making in the Third World is worthy of praise. As stated above, an ideological stand
without the technical support of an effective public administration and public policy
can fail and thus make heavy investment in the Third World meaningless.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18
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Patterns of China’s foreign aid programs seem designed to give mixed results of
promise and disappointing failure. The areas where China’s foreign investment and
foreign aid is making progress are seen in those countries that have established a
committed civil service sector. Thus, in countries such as Ethiopia where, in relative
terms, cultural habits repudiate corruption, China’s investment was fruitful. Those that
are failing are mostly in Africa where the civil service sector is fraught with corruption
and inefficiencies.
China’s interaction with the Third World is dynamic; it is evolving and changing. An
example of this is China is rethinking of its investments with corrupt and ineffective
governments. What positive returns will China’s investment bring can only be
measured over an extended period of time. The pitfalls that impaired the effectiveness
of the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward can also be challenges to
developmental cooperation. Skilled manpower, high ethical standards, transparency,
and, most of all, proven benefits that lift the lives of neglected societies must animate
China’s role in the Third World in order to make a difference. These are what China
wishes for its citizens and should be what China’s investment abroad may show to the
world in general and to the Third World in particular.
Conclusion
China stands self-assured, proud of its civilization and history. Its manpower and the
Chinese spirit and culture that animated its genius constitute an enviable resource that
many countries admire. Beyond that, as modern China expands its global influence to
distant lands, its mining and resource extraction ventures can easily turn to
misadventures if China neglects its obligation to profile ethical and honest exchange
with Third World interlocutors.
If China is aiming to help the Third World in ways that are better than those options
that were provided by the West, its motivation should be based on reciprocal benefits,
not on ways that compound the Third World’s economic impoverishment. Among
these options are:
1. China should reciprocate the generosity, trust, and high expectations that Third
World’s citizens have placed on China’s partnership as better alternatives in the
broad areas of the economy, diplomatic, and civilization.
2. Direct investment by capitalists, and what Chairman Mao called “their running
dogs,” was criticized by Chairman Mao, and by scholars from the dependency
theory field of study as form of neo-colonialism. China’s direct investment
must provide socio-economic benefits to its Third World partners enough to
elevate their poverty-stricken lives and to heal their wounded pride.
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3. China’s interaction and economic exchanges with the Third World are criticized
as being mechanical, one-sided and brutally exploitative. Critics argue that
China is interested only in what China can get by way of hoarding extracted
goods and industrial input and leaving Third World in worse situations. China
must work hard to dispel this criticism by aiming to better the lives of those
societies with whom China interacts in care, consciousness, and altruism similar
to its aims for its own citizens at home.

China has earned the right to be regarded as a fully developed country. Its level of
modernization, both in economic and political areas, is as robust as those states which
relegated China to developing status just recently. China’s lightening economic
development is spectacular, and the scale of differentiation is vast in all categories of
the sciences. China’s civil engineering feats are creating islands out of the deep-sea
oceans.
China’s strategic and defense developments are manned by the most sophisticated
scientific skills, under the command of phalanxes of young scientists whose creativity,
vision, dedication, and Confucian discipline are awe-inspiring.17 Scholars observe than
China is accelerating its scientific speed with determined confidence to catch up with
the West and the United States.18
Some look at China’s march forward as technical achievement and accumulation of
wealth. They measure China’s achievements by what is quantifiable. Such
quantifiable results cannot be disputed. However, there are normative elements in the
study of nations that are as effective as quantitative results. These include national
character, history, institutional accountability, and the harmonization of such
amorphous characteristics as ideological beliefs and the strict parameters of public
policy goals and objectives. The country that succeeds in the harmonization and in the
precision of these vectors will rule.

Gao, Ch ( 2018), “This War Turned China into a Super Power”, National Interest, January 2018:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-turned-china-military-superpower-23954.
18
Huang, K, (2018), “China Enlists Top Scientists in Mission to become Military Tech Super Power”,
in South China Morning Post: Diplomacy, August 31, 2018.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2130777/china-enlists-top-scientistsmission-become-military.
17
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Contemporary Contexts of Confucianism
Yuanhui Shi
Abstract
This paper discusses the possibility that Confucianism will be put into political practice
in present-day China. Although New Confucians in mainland China often call for the
revival of Confucianism for the cure of many current social problems, there are some
unconquerable obstacles, among which political construction is the most crucial. What
is more noteworthy is that Confucianism itself has some doctrinal defects provoking
those practical obstacles. Therefore, this paper argues that Confucianism, advocating
a moral government of benevolence, is a doctrine of idealized political order, but it
lacks the practical elements needed for realistic political operation.
Since 2014 some New Confucians in mainland China have been preaching that
Confucianism should to be inserted into political practice, and that China be
Confucianized, demanding “to return to Kang Youwei”.1
Now, somewhat
differentiated from their previously allied Taiwanese counterparts, from whom they
once obtained academic resources and inspirations, New Confucians support the idea
of having Confucianism adopted as the official ideology guiding the political life of the
entire state. Here lies the difference between the two groups: can Confucianism serve
as a political construction for the present China, or merely provide some spiritual and
moral guidelines for people in their common lives? A judgment by one New Confucian
in mainland China addressed this point. He described the New Taiwan Confucians as
“very abominable, shallow, cowardly and therefore futureless”,2 evidently because he
expected his cousins in Taiwan to have done more than merely emphasizing the
spiritual and moral significance of Confucianism.
The Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China
To understand how the political demands of New Confucians in mainland China are
pushing China to align with Confucianism instead of Marxist or Western political ideas
we will examine past events.

Ge, Zhaoguang, “A Daydream: The Political Claim of New Confucians in Mainland China.” July 6,
2017 <http://www. aisixiang.com/data/104951. html>.
2
Zeng, Yi, Guo Xiaodong, What Is Universalism, and Whose Values Is It?—Universalism from the
Perspectives of Contemporary Confucianism. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2013, p.
21.
1
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The First Opium War (1838–1842) awakened China out of a long-cherished illusion of
being a self-contained power of political, economical, military and cultural superiority.
From then on, many efforts were made to compensate for feelings of inferiority to
Western powers. The Self-Strengthening Movement, the Hundred Days’ Reform and
May Fourth Movements are examples of these efforts. The Self-Strengthening
Movement (1861-1895) was mainly focused on setting up factories for the purpose of
economic and military benefits. The Hundred Days' Reform (11 June to 22 September
1898, late Qing Dynasty) focused further on politically modernizing China (18611895). The May Fourth Movement (1917-1921) challenged traditional Chinese
Confucianism in its cultural and ideological validity.
Progressive demands for reformation were motivated by the deep anxiety inflicted by
foreign challenges to China's sovereignty during the period of colonization. The SelfStrengthening Movement and the Hundred Days Reform could be seen as two
preparatory stages for the May Fourth Movement. Failures of some of these reform
campaigns, along with disappointment with the Xinhai Revolution, ultimately drew
more attention to ideological Confucianism and enabled the coming cultural selfanalysis and doubt.
Differing from the two previous reformative efforts, the May Fourth Movement was
overwhelmingly successful in awakening cultural reformation in China. Subsequently
traditional Confucianism was marginalized in spite of strong support from some
conservative voices. This led to an acceleration of the course of modernization.
Although after 1949 mainland China and Taiwan chose two different political systems,
the modernizing course continued in both regions.
It is noteworthy that in Taiwan, mainland Confucianism was not completely rejected.
It was still preached by New Confucians, such as Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan.
Meanwhile in mainland China, many intellectuals were fiercely criticized for their antirevolutionary academic ideas, including New Confucians such as Xiong Shili, Liang
Shuming and Feng Youlan, and even Marxist academics Hou Wailu and Jian Bozan.
This nationwide mass denunciation reached its height when the Cultural Revolution
declared Confucianism one of its main targets. The traditional belief of thousands of
years was made into an historical outcast.
As economic growth became the focus of national policies in mainland China in 1977,
the course of modernization, mainly industrialization and commercialism, gradually
picked up speed and led to a period of economic prosperity in the 2010s. But beneath
the glittering surface of prosperity lay many disappointments and disillusionments that
were widely felt. Among the worst were environmental pollution, school disorder,
spiritual degradation and political corruption of all types.
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Many New Confucians in mainland China, with inspirations from Taiwanese
Confucianism, concluded that the renunciation of Confucianism was the cause of all
these social ills, and that to resolve them, China ought to rehabilitate the traditional
beliefs for the national ideological stage.
One point we have to admit is that Confucianism mainly speaks to the human mind and
aims at uplifting it morally,3 and so in this sense, those New Confucians are sensible in
their call for the revival of Confucianism.
Some Obstacles
But there are some obstacles to the political resurrection of Confucianism in mainland
China.
First, the crucial pillars for the medieval ideology of Confucianism are lacking.
According to thousands of years of history in China, phratrial management4, Imperial
Examinations and monarchical tyranny combined to put Confucianism into political
practice, which respectively organized people inside their clans by means of Confucian
ethics, implemented Confucian notions in political life through those officials selected
by their mastery of Confucian classics, and ensured that Confucianism would be
adopted as the national ideology and preached nationally. But with all of these
structural foundations disrupted long ago, how could it be possible for Confucianism
to restore its ancient tenets?
Another point is that the above-mentioned social problems in mainland China also
came as a result of global industrialization and commercialism, a world-wide epidemic.
In medieval times Confucianism in China can be recognized as a tool that was used to
foster and shape a healthy human mind among intellectuals and underprivileged people
in spite of the prevailing political corruption. But how could Confucianism alone act
as an effective buffer for such an overwhelming influence without any assistance from
outside, when it was still unknown if this traditional belief system was officially
adopted and enforced by the Chinese political system?
3

Liang, Shuming, Human Mind and Human Life. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House,
2011, p. 86.
4

This practice (宗族主义) stressed that hierarchical management must be established and respectfully
carried on within every kin phratry (usually made up of smaller families with the same male ancestor
and thus the same surname) in order to maintain a peaceful and orderly sustenance for all the phratrial
members, advantaged or disadvantaged. The phratrial management was originally advocated and
implemented by the initial rulers of the Zhou dynasty and later reinforced by Confucius and Mencius in
Confucianism, lasting until the end of the Qing dynasty. See Fu, Lecheng, A History of China.
Guiyang: Guizhou Education Press, 2010, pages 37-38; Li, Zehou, Historical Ontology & Five Essays
from 1999. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2008, p. 181; and Liang, Shuming, The Substance
of Chinese Culture. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2011, p. 77.
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Besides, “ren” (benevolence), the core ideas of Confucianism5 focus attention on
human morals and ethics. Political balance, economic exploitation, and military
mobilization are also areas of focus, but to a lesser extent.
As a founding doctrine for Chinese culture, Confucianism, established by Dong
Zhongshu as predominant in political affairs, ascended to its historical level of ideology
under the reign of the emperor Wu of Han (141-87 BCE). But in fact, the emperor
preferred military generals, cold-hearted administrators, efficient labor foremen, and
profit-thirsty financiers more than the Confucians for the simple reason that the former
were much more useful to his policies of foreign wars and hierarchical control of the
empire.
An example of this is that Sang Hongyang, one of emperor Wu of Han’s most
successful economic managers, completely defeated some highly-skilled Confucians
in a debate about his exploitive wealth-collecting practices. The Confucians knew little
about revenue generation and were only able to repeat the moral ideas of Confucius.
Wang Mang, who was a strong believer in Confucianism when he was enthroned as
part of the Han dynasty, planned to carry on a political reformation in line with
Confucianism, but he was overthrown and killed by rebels. Here we have to
acknowledge that Wang’s reformation failed partly for the reason that Confucianism
was not designed to effectively manage practical political, economic and military tasks.
In this sense, the emperor Xuan of Han, known for his political success, once warned
his prince that Confucianism and Legalism combined to make an effective government
for their Han Dynasty, but that Confucians were too impractical.6 The warning was
heeded by several emperors who followed Xuan, and this resulted in better control of
their empires. This is the reason why so many emperors in ancient China used Legalism
skills to keep control of their empires while, for the purpose of cultural gloss, pretended
to believe in Confucianism.
Why Is Confucianism Not Good in a Political Context?
Confucianism is actually a doctrine of moral ideas and ethic concerns. Although many
ancient Confucians declared that moral growth and political practice were both their
life ambitions, they were largely lacking in political skills.
To be a successful politician or statesman, in a larger sense, demands mastery of
knowledge and skills of various areas.
5

Feng, Youlan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin: Tianjin Social Sciences Press, 2005, p.
39; Lao, Siguang, A New History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University
Press, 2005, p. 83-87.
6
Ban, Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1964, p. 277.
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With this a leader may achieve a healthy power balance, a prosperous economy, a lively
and productive culture, and the security of military strength. But the focus of
Confucianism is on developing minds morally and ethically. The ideas of economic
construction, scientific research, technological uplift, balance of political power, and
military strength were occasionally recognized to be the result of moral and ethical
cultivation, but usually totally neglected in Confucian thought.
Private commercialism and industry were usually ranked low and sometimes even
suppressed in ancient China. According to Confucianism, the people who engaged in
business were mostly profit-thirsty and morally dishonest. Also, much more
dangerously, it was thought that these profiteers would greatly widen the wealth gap
between the rich and the poor, causing an increased risk of famine by attracting more
peasants to turn from farming to business, and greatly disrupt the national moral
standards by means of their expensive and immoral life.
Another reason, probably more intrinsically urgent to emperors, was that private
businesses would grow powerful enough to be a threat to the stability of their empires.
In this sense, many emperors, especially those inclined to an absolute hierarchical
control of the empire, such as emperor Wu of Han, acted forcefully to establish and
strengthen state-owned businesses, and to greatly reduce the power and size of the
private economy.
Amazing achievements in science and technology were once made in ancient China.
The famous Houmuwu Ding (a massive bronze vessel) was cast during the Shang
Dynasty, utilizing the most sophisticated chemical, physical and metallurgical
knowledge and skills in the world at the time.7 During the reign of the emperor Wu of
Han, weapons of the highest quality gave one Han soldier such an advantage that he
could be as effective as five Huns on the same battlefield.8 But such knowledge and
skills were believed to be low and insignificant by Confucians who believed that
science and technology were simply more particular, and thus less important, than the
development of moral principles throughout society. This was what would make the
empire more thoroughly healthy and everlasting than any other idea or practice,
according to the Confucians.
The historical fact related to a powerful Western cannon can be used to confirm this
point. During the Ming Dynasty, Xu Guangqi recommended use of the cannon, which
was finally put to the test on the Manchu battlefield, greatly assisting in the victory
over the troops of Nurhaci. But the Ming government still refused to widely use this
more effective weapon, probably as a result of bribery of Ming officials by some
businessmen to help the profiteers maintain their monopoly of all foreign trade.
7

Wu, Xiaobo, Chinese Enterprises from the7th Century B. C to the Year 1869. Beijing: China Critic
Press Group, 2017, p. x.
8
Ibid., p.80.
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Cannons would lead to profits for the Macau Spaniards who were ready to sell cannons
to the Ming leaders.
Some Ming officials, for the purpose of downplaying Xu Guangqi, even intentionally
withheld necessary supplies for the troops of Sun Yuanhua, a disciple of Xu. This led
the two officers under Sun to yield to the Manchu army, resulting in Sun's beheading
by the emperor. What is ironic is that the cannon was widely accepted and used by the
Manchu, vastly increasing their military strength, facilitating the victory over the Ming
empire, literally helping to establish Qing sovereignty.9
Johann Adam Schall von Bell, a Jesuit priest and close friend and counselor to the
emperor Shunzhi of Qing, did much to increase scientific knowledge and technology
in China. Although he was jailed for a time as a result of political subterfuge, he was
an expert in astronomy and even an accomplished engineer who designed a powerful
cannon.10
In the history of China, balance of political power always alternated between
establishing and collapsing, with the dynasties coming one after the one, without any
establishment of a solid political environment. Without an effective balance of power,
emperors often grew to be self-centered, indulgent, and tyrannical, with their favorite
eunuchs, relatives or officials getting more and more powerful and thus spreading
corruption.
On the other hand, some officials or generals used their influence to be independent
from central government, or even to attempt to seize power from an emperor who was
perceived to be weak. Out of the fear that their thrones might be endangered or taken
over, many emperors were most concerned with their own stability and tight control of
military power. At times of war throughout history, many emperors, in order to ensure
their control over soldiers, used their eunuchs to counterbalance their generals. Few
emperors would hand their troops over to the complete command of their officials or
generals with solid belief in that leadership. In this way military strength was greatly
diminished in ancient China.
Defects in Confucianism
Confucianism could not achieve a balance of political power because it sought to
provide a clear and actionable conception of personal duties and rights to shape
trustworthy human relations that was combined with the practical aspect of duties
fulfilled and rights secured.

9

Zhu, Weizheng, Out of the Medieval Times, Exp. edition. Shanghai: Fudan University, 2007, p. 116118.
10
Ibid., p. 163-192.
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This was not enough to maintain a stable balance of political power. Confucians were
mainly concentrated on preaching the merit of “ren” (benevolence) and thus only
wished to arouse the moral sense of others and achieve a mutually reliable human
relationship by means of constantly uplifting one’s own moral condition to be a moral
model for his neighborhood.
The Book of Lord Shang points out that the benevolent (those who have achieved the
merit of “ren”) can be benevolent to others, but can’t make others benevolent without
fail; that is, being benevolent or even shouldering one’s duties without asking for his
rights can’t necessarily arouse the moral sense of others so as to accomplish a moral
world.11 Since there was no reasonable and consistent understanding of duties and
rights, much less a multilateral one, a permanently trustworthy human relationship
couldn’t be established or solidly maintained while mutual disbelief would appear and
grow. What’s more, the highlighting of moral merit and the neglect of personal rights
combined to bring up many hypocritical saints and to provoke doubt and even repulsion
against Confucianism among some practical-minded people, thus making a mutuallytrusting human relationship more difficult or even more impossible.
According to Li Zehou, “ren”, is a kind of human psychology of benevolence radiating
from the affection between parent and child.12 He argued that the merit, having
originated from the emotional state of awe, piety and gravity in shamans during their
praying rituals, was finally conceptualized as “ren” by Confucius.13 This idea is no
doubt reasonable in that it highlights the significance of family relations, the state of
self-examining and self-disciplining, as well as the mindset of moral beneficence.
Therefore, we can arrive at the judgment that although Confucianism is also focused
on human benevolence, it is different from the Christian fraternity, for the conception
of “ren” has its starting-point established on the affection between parent and child.
Mencius stated, “We should extend our affections for our parents and children to those
of others”.14 Here the implication is that although one should love and care about other
people, the love for his own family members ought to be greater than that for others.
Just due to this fact, Fei Xiaotong pointed out that the traditional social structure in
China was basically the type of “water rippling from a self-center," in which
affectionate concern decreased when further from the center. This is different from the
Western idea of each person standing on ground of the same level.15

11

The Book of Lord Shang. Ann. Shi Lei. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2016, p. 165.
Li, Zehou, Historical Ontology & Five Essays from 1999. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company,
2008, p. 181.
13
Ibid., p. 180.
14
Zhu, Xi, Annotations of the Four Books. Xi’an: Sanqin Publishing House, 1998, p. 317.
15
Fei, Xiaotong, From the Soil. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2013, p. 26.
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He further stated that Confucianism advocated an egoism instead of the Western-style
of individualism, although this egoism was not that of absolute selfishness, but, rather,
of a self-centered human benevolence.16
That is to say, although Confucianism preached that one should carry on his
responsibilities for himself, his family, his country and his world, it still emphasized
that all these responsibilities must have oneself serving as a radiating central point.
This makes Confucian egoism, a doctrine of human benevolence diminishing from the
self-center, different from Western individualism, which especially has stressed
equality. This also explains why true human equality didn’t appear in ancient China.
Although Confucianism was mainly based on egoism, it was still focused on family
relations, especially the parent-child relationship. Family was, for the Chinese people,
a spiritual harbor and the most important source of reliable friends. Very few people
would leave their families behind and act completely egoistically.
The Chinese people regard their families as their life center and extend the ethical
principles of family relations to social life, thus lacking the sense of individualism and
public spirit characteristic of Western life, as Liang Shuming argued.17 In this sense,
Confucianism couldn’t cultivate truly modern citizens, individuals with substantial
mentalities for modern political life.
The stress of moral ethics in Confucianism made principles of morality predominant as
ideological guidelines for social life, suppressing some carnal human needs and desires,
and then seeking social progress for higher civilizations of prosperity and freedom.
In Confucianism, personal conscience rather than outside instruction was highly
depended on for moral uplift, and Confucius once argued that self-disciplining and
following moral principles would lead one to achieve “ren”, and one should rely on
himself instead of others for the achievement of that merit.18 This means that one had
to conduct self-examination and self-discipline to pursue moral progress step by step,
and to shoulder his responsibilities for himself, his family, his country, and his world
stage by stage. Yet in this lay the contradictory notion that one could either be only
concerned with himself and his family, or extend his concern to his country, as well as
his world.

16

Ibid., p. 27.
Liang, Shuming, The Substance of Chinese Culture. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House,
2011, p. 77.
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Zhu, Xi, Annotations of the Four Books. Xi’an: Sanqin Publishing House, 1998, p. 149, 199.
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The difference was completely determined by his own judgment whether he was
successful or not, just as Mencius once said that one should make a contribution to his
world when he was successful, and if not he might (as well) be responsible for
himself.19 In this sense, one had to depend on his own conscience to lift up his moral
level and shoulder his responsibilities.
Thus, different people were allowed to form specific moral expectations for
themselves, and similarly to decide to be responsible either for themselves or for their
country and their world.
Naturally, people were completely allowed to be self-centered or universally-spirited,
or anywhere between the two opposites. At the same time, each person was fairly selfconfident that he had achieved the merit of “ren” or at least come very close.
Taking this point into consideration, we may understand why it was so hard for the
Chinese people to come to a completely reasonable agreement, society-wide, without
any irritation or even hatred, for each of them believed that he himself was morally
right and thus justifiable at the core, therefore unwilling to yield or change his own
idea.
During the Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi and Sima Guang, both Confucian saints and
patriots, couldn’t arrive at an agreement about how to make their country economically
prosperous and militarily strong, and they rejected each other’s political ideas totally
whether it was reasonable and helpful or not.
When Wang Anshi was in office, he couldn’t accept Sima Guang’s challenge or
criticism of his reformative policies and Sima Guang had to live in Luoyang, far away
from the national political center of Bianliang (Kaifeng at present). In return, when
Wang was removed and Sima Guang restored to his office, he had all the policies made
by Wang abolished, even if some of them proved to be effective in economics and in
military construction.
Of course, we can’t deny that, due to the fact that both of them were moral saints, they
respected each other in terms of private relationship, mutually trying not to offend or
attack the other. However, in the history of China, Confucians could seldom tolerate
different political ideas and even were moderately eager to offend and attack their
political rivals. This explains why the Chinese people couldn’t accept genuine equality
or democracy at the bottom of their hearts. It also explains why, in Confucianism, there
was no really effective means for the Chinese people to arrive at an optimal judgment
or policy.

19
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In Chinese culture the so-called term “mianzi,” face, is actually one’s moral self-image
established according to his own conscience. Since conscience is personal and selfmotivating, “mianzi” has to be shaped by means of moral self-examination, selfdiscipline and self-improvement. Therefore, when under moral criticism, the Chinese
people, believing that their personal conscience has been doubted and challenged,
usually respond furiously and fiercely. This means that people should be given
adequate respect for themselves to find and redress their moral failures, and at the same
time leads to the fact that the Chinese people are not accustomed to rational discussion
or debate.
Confucianism, advocating a moral government of benevolence, is a doctrine of an
idealized political order, but it is lacking in practical means of bringing such an ideal
into reality, as is discussed above in this section.
The Significance of Confucianism in Present-day China
Since entering the stage of national ideology under Emperor Wu of Han, Confucianism
set the guidelines for the Chinese people in all aspects of their life for more than 2000
years — up to 1949.
Ancient Chinese literature, essays, poems, dramas and novels all carried various
Confucian messages and thus shaped traditional Chinese culture, which in turn forged
the typical Chinese consciousness that one should be industrious, morally selfuplifting, and responsible for himself, his family, his country and his world. That is to
say, Confucianism always preached a moral, active and responsible life outlook, and
helped the nation survive many frustrations and hardships by providing for the Chinese
people a psychological anchor and a spiritual beacon.
In fact, Confucianism still preaches that life attitude to the Chinese people and forges
the Chinese consciousness through the reading of classic Chinese essays, poems,
dramas and novels. In this sense, Confucianism is still effective in today’s China,
serving as a spiritual beacon and a psychological anchor for the Chinese people.20

20
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But in terms of politics, Confucianism has not been helpful, and will not be helpful at
least as a main framework. Mou Zongsan stated that the moral government principles
of Confucianism were consistent with the content of democracy,21 and he was quite
reasonable in that Confucianism was calling continuously for a truly benevolent
political policy in that politics must be responsible for the life of the people, for the
future of the country and the world, thus inclined to serve the true welfare of the people,
the country and the world. This idea is essentially in agreement with Western
democratic principles. However, we still have to admit that those Confucian principles
were spiritually-based ideals of politics, lacking practical means of realistic operation,
which have been and still are nearly impossible to put into real practice.
Of course, Confucianism might be helpful in forming a more comprehensive
understanding of justice and goodness and redressing some faults of democratic
procedures, for Confucianism is more focused on the effects of justice than on stopping
at a just procedure.
Conclusion
Why are New Confucians in mainland China are calling for Confucianism to be
ideologized and put into political practice?
This is actually a continuation of the idea of the New Taiwan Confucians, and it is, of
course, a natural response from Confucianism to the Western challenge as well as to
social problems provoked by commercialism and industrialization, such as
environmental pollution, educational disorder, spiritual degradation and political
corruption. Many New Confucians in mainland China believe that Confucianism can
be an effective answer to these threats, for the doctrine has shaped the hardworking and
moral-spirited Chinese consciousness and helped the Chinese people get through many
challenges.
But as we have discussed above, there are some obstacles, Confucianism could not
overcome if put into political practice, for Confucianism has lost its crucial pillars that
existed in ancient China, and what is more noteworthy, has some inherent defects in
political construction.
Of course, Confucianism will benefit the Chinese people a great deal by providing them
with a more active and hopeful life outlook, as well as serving as a psychological
foundation. But in terms of the world of politics, of political construction,
Confucianism will not be as effective as the New Confucians of mainland China are
expecting.
21
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Five Selected Writings Authored by Prof. Palmer Talbutt
Palmer Talbutt
Editor’s Comment
Prof. Palmer Talbutt (1927- 2017) was a professor in the Department of Philosophy
and Religion at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University from 1959 to his
retirement as Professor Emeritus in 1991. He earned his B.A. in English from Harvard
University, his Master's in Philosophy from Columbia University, a B.D. from Garrett
Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois, and a Ph.D. from Duke University.
A long-time, active member of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations, he proposed in 1987 that the ISCSC organize sessions on the thought and
writings of the organization’s first president, Pitirim A. Sorokin, upon the occasion of
Sorokin’s centennial in 1989. Subsequently, he co-edited with Joseph B. Ford and
Michel P. Richard the resulting volume, Sorokin and Civilization: A Centennial
Assessment. The preface was written by Prof. Roger Wescott and leading scholars in
the field contributed chapters. A committee was authorized by the Council of the
ISCSC, upon the suggestion of then president, Dr. Michael Palencia-Roth, and the final
product was guided to publication by Transaction Publishers in 1996. A new, 2018
edition of the book is now available from Routledge.
Prof. Talbutt studied under Sorokin at Harvard,
began writing on Sorokin’s contributions while in
graduate school, and was an expert analyst on his
life and thought. He was widely published on
philosophical topics, with many books, articles,
and scholarly papers published during his highly
active career as an American intellectual.
He was also a great friend and a kindly, charitable
and thoughtful support to all members of the
ISCSC.
The following is drawn from materials he wrote
and was gathered for this printing by CCR Editor-in-Chief, Joseph Drew.
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The Relevance of the ISCSC for Scholarship

The best-selling point for the relevancy of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations, and for an academic shift of attention, is Sorokin’s prophecy of
cross-cultural flowering in the Pacific area.
Such a trend clearly follows increased trade, travel, study abroad, translations of basic
works, recent heavy investments attending “globalization,” and so on. Mostly this has
been going on, faster and faster, for over two centuries, but very much so in the past
fifty years.
On the other hand, whatever its economic progress, “Old Europe” and for that matter
the “Old (and very dangerous) Middle East” are less likely to undergo any comparable
creative change. Earlier civilizational interplays had, of course, given rise to “Athens
and Jerusalem,” then to “Mecca and Alexandria,” to “Granada and Paris.”
But Christianity and its many branches, Islam with its own, and Judaism, have all
defensively constructed their own institutional barriers to assimilation and change.
Grudging sociocultural updatings and recapitulations are as much as can be expected
in those regions.
Despite a residue of Marxisms, not to speak of local nationalisms, the Pacific realm is
much more subject to cross-cultural interactions. Anglophone North Americans have
fallen heir to post-Raj, post-Opium War British legacies. And the Asian partners are
now remarkably outpacing their Western counterparts. (Didn’t Napoleon once say,
“Let China sleep”?)
Interactive examples on the scholarly side are the “Philosophy: East and West”
movement centered at the University of Hawaii, and the Center for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations, Reitaku University, Japan. The latter group publishes a journal
partly in English, partly in Japanese.
The Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy co-sponsored a conference in
Hawaii in 1984. Its most distinguished papers were published by Princeton in 1988,
Interpreting across Boundaries. The editors were Eliot Deutsch and Gerald James
Larson. A very sizable representation to the conference was from Japan, as indeed was
the case in 1999 at the Third International Whitehead Conference at Claremont,
California.
The ISCSC has had meetings in California, in Fairbanks, Alaska, and in Reitaku, Japan.
(Clearly that listing is a very partial sampling for Pacific Rim scholarship.)
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Incidentally, the former effective leader of the state of Singapore, of the “Seven
Tigers,” Lee Kuan Yew, recently predicted: “By 2050 the world’s economic center of
gravity will move from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian oceans.” (Forbes, July
2005). Given his previous track record, that utterance should not be discounted. And
such a trend would drive the ongoing cultural exchanges faster still.
The members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
include numerous scholars whose origins, backgrounds, goals and sometimes locations,
are at for furthering cross-civilizational developments predicted by Pitirim Sorokin.
Our President is now Professor Andrew Targowski, who would welcome scholars with
cross-cultural interests.

II. Civilizationists and Think-Tankers
Civilizational study in its breadth across cultural boundaries and its long-term
orientation differs from “think-tank” worldly practicality. Perhaps Samuel Huntington
with his Foreign Affairs article and William McNeill, with his Rise of the West’s
comforting antidote to Spengler, count as bridging exceptions. Even so, let’s itemize
some contrasts for the sake of strategic self-knowledge, if not simply to nurture our
complacency.
Think-tank clients want advice, hopefully congenial with their strongly-held views and
those of the populace. (The latter, according to Sir Humphrey Appleby of Yes, Prime
Minister, only want to know “who are the goodies and who are the baddies.”) Policy
issues of some urgency focus the attention of the tankers. Emotion-laden opinions then
must be either carefully stepped around or catered to. (An opposition to “multipolarity”
and discreet favor toward so-called “Atlanticism” can be more dignified than “freedom
fries” zeal or taking French dressing off the menu.)
James Madison had warned us against “emotion-based opinions,” though he, like
Thomas Jefferson and Nathanial Hawthorne1, engaged in considerable wishful thinking
about slavery’s fading away. Insofar as he was one of the voices for Publius, he was
an early tanker. Roughly speaking, emotional opinions can be sorted in three piles.
“Wishful thinking,” which bets on continuing some doubtful policy: e.g., “There’s light
at the end of the tunnel.” “There will soon be democracy all over the Middle East, and
in all the seceded Soviets.” “Iraqi oil will pay for the occupation.”

For Hawthorne’s wishful thinking “there is still another view (which) looks upon slavery as one of
those evils which divine Providence does not leave to be remedied by human contrivances, but which
in its own good time, by some means impossible to be anticipated, but of the simplest and easiest
operation, when all its uses shall have been fulfilled, it causes to vanish like a dream.” (Wallner, Peter
A., Franklin Pierce: New Hampshire’s Favorite Son. Concord, NH: Plaidswede, 2004, p. 214.)
1
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By contrast, there is “fearful thinking,” as backing for drastic changes in policy.
Consider Senator Vandenberg’s “Mr. President, you must scare hell out of the
American people.” Red scares. The domino theory. Monolithic Communism.
Lastly, there is “grandiose thinking.” The Christian Century indicated what Protestants
optimistically thought of the 19th; “The American Century” showed what Henry Luce
thought of the 20th. “The world’s only superpower.” The Imperial Presidency. The
“imperial” theological and political thinking of Henry VIII. Such thinking leads to
vicious reactions when it is thwarted; consider former stooges who go off the
reservation or otherwise disappoint their impatient masters. Presidents Diem and
Trujillo, Russia’s stooge Imre Nagy, our Noriega, and one former stooge just recently
plucked from a spider hole.
Think-tankers and advisors likewise should tiptoe carefully, e.g., consider Confucius,
Robert Barnes, Thomas More, and Thomas Cromwell. Civilizationists are less wellknown and well-paid, but generally safer. They sail hopefully on high seas, well away
from turbulent waters, rocks and shoals. (CIA evaluations which are defective or more
wisely ignored by pigheaded clients could also be illumined by the preceding remarks.
As Roger Miller once wrote in a lyric: “I don’t like to think things I don’t like to think;
I like to think just what I please.”)
Let us return to a strategic question for the ISCSC, “Quo vadimus?” Where we shall
be going can best be charted by a vector from the past, tracing where we have been
going. Apart from my bibliographical handout, which includes some cognate items
from members of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, as well as a few
scholarly works critical of our greatest lions, here are some presentations what I found
especially stimulating.
Such remarkable samples of ISCSC work include the following: Maria Gimbutas
discussed evidence for widespread matriarchal religion in southeastern Europe. Knud
Lundback discussed the Jesuit mission to China and Leibniz’s response to Chinese
thought. John Hord, David Wilkinson, David Richardson, Matt Melko, Gordon Hewes,
Leighton Scott, Bill Edwards and others contributed to a series of lively sessions on
civilizational boundaries in space and time. Wilkinson, along with Arthur Iberall,
elaborated on his “Central Civilization” theme. Melko and Bill Eckhardt presented
wide-ranging data on wars through history. Professors Choi and Robel dealt with Asian
matters in depth, as have our distinguished colleagues from Hong Kong. James
Billington once gave a fine plenary address on Romantic nihilism in nineteenth century
Russia, closely following Vytautas Kavolis’ Presidential paper on Romanticism and
Taoism. Corrinne Gilb had presented detailed comparisons for major urban centers.
Midori Rynn, along with others, has thrown subtle light upon Japanese culture and
history.
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As well as the Presidential Addresses by Kavolis, published in the Review and
elsewhere, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito, Michael Palencia-Roth, Wayne Bledsoe, and
Matt Melko gave such major speeches themselves. As a Distinguished Visiting
Scholar, Boris Erasov discussed civilizations falling into criminality in their decline,
focusing upon breakdowns in Russia.
Braudel has come up for careful examination, as have the “world-systems” theories of
Wallerstein and his followers; Sanderson edited a series of such papers. Pitirim
Sorokin’s Centennial in 1989 occasioned several careful assessments of his work,
published later by Transactions. Our 1991 meeting in Santo Domingo had a rich
program concerning the three major interacting cultures in the area — indigenous,
Hispanic and African, arranged by Professors Elpidio Laguna-Diaz and Michael
Palencia-Roth. Gordon Hewes had given a presentation on the overland Silk Road.
Some years later Professor Eiji Hattori illumined the overseas Silk Road, both in papers
and in his fine book, translated by Wallace Grey.
There is a considerable difference, it seems to me, between the wide range of such
works couched in depth, and typical “think-tank” products. Admittedly, all are
scholarly, but the latter are rightly bound to the present time and its urgencies.
The policy-oriented “tanker-types” are often afflicted by pressures of the moment,
whether economic, political, or international. Consequently, they tend to view with
alarm, or desperately seek to reassure. Consider Daniel Bell’s “End of Ideology” and
Fukuyama’s “End of History”; the former, while implausible, is a well-meaning effort
to calm jangled nerves, and the second is a paean in favor of globalization. Far better
than either is John Lukacs’ more soberly thoughtful “End of an Age.”
Whether the civilizationist essays a balanced comparison, as Nelson and Kavolis would
have liked, or whether he digs deep within one civilization to clarify some element
crucial for a high-level comparison, most think-tankers would prefer shorter, more
expedient routes to answers for their clients. However, some tankers do take a road
less traveled.2

2

In all fairness, many think-tankers advise on uncontroversial administrative matters, helpfully refining
and improving practical procedures. Others bravely speak truth to power, even when they go unheard.
Another point: the lion’s share of governmental folly is to be laid at the door of authorities (and the fickle
populace), not at those of advisors, however timid. (I cannot resist adding a reference to P.G. Wodehouse,
one of whose characters had a specific position in Hollywood; as a variant of a “yes-man,” his role was
that of a “nodder.”)
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IV. A Scholastic Quadrant
Domain of Power and Its
Uses

Strobe Talbott
The Great Experiment

Niall Ferguson
The War of the World

Domain of Sociocultural
Meanings

Pitirim A. Sorokin
Social and Cultural
Dynamics

Charles Taylor
A Secular Age

Each point of reference may be expanded in terms of “whence” and “whither.”
Each may be read as in polylactic with the others, especially on the parallel planes,
where there are contrasts in terms of scope and of optimism and pessimism (or of
“idealism” and “realism.”)
Remarks on the Quadrant
The four monumental works give room for polylogue. That is not to say that their
assumptions and conceptual frames are congruent. Far from it. Indeed, polylogue
among members of the same choir is without profit.
Monumentality here does not mean a frozen status, but rather richness and complexity.
Each work carries a lively vector, given their antecedents, whether precedents or
influences or both. (The origins of diplomacy and international law for Talbott;
Tolstoy, Spengler, Danilevsky, and the Platonic legacy for Sorokin; the history of
conflicts and warfare for Ferguson; and the best of the Giffords lecturers plus social
scientists on secularity for Taylor.)
Talbott and Ferguson deal with the uses and misuses of power. Ferguson, like Timothy
Snyder, author of Bloodlands, confronts the qualified optimism of Talbott’s history of
the United Nations with grimly pessimistic data about human nature gone mad.
(Ferguson does suggest a three-fold diagnosis of occasions for disaster: economic
volatility, declining imperial power, and multiple small ethnicities and national
minorities.)
Sorokin and Taylor deal more with sociocultural transitions than with exercises of
power. Yet they differ; Sorokin’s scope is far wider, temporally and geographically,
while Taylor’s is localized, phenomenological, and detailed. Sorokin’s sensate
supersystem cannot be equated with Taylor’s secularity, but Sorokin’s “active sensate”
stage is at least compatible with Taylor’s “exclusive humanism.”
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The convulsive transitions of Sorokin’s supersystems in part capture challenges to
Talbott’s statesmen and the civil and international struggles of Ferguson’s account.
Secularity (Taylor’s theme) is at minimum a necessary condition for establishing a
United Nations. Were bin Laden, or even the Pope, a truly major player, we would
promptly slide into a “clash of civilizations” precluding any such founding
negotiations.
Relating Taylor to Ferguson could be done in terms of partisan religiosities, often as
scapegoating heretics or infidels, by slogans like “Gott mit uns” or “Deus vult.” Even
pseudo-religions (e.g., Communism, according to Bertrand Russell) generate a
destructive zeal. So, wars such as Ferguson recounts could be heated up by similar
fierce language.
Lastly, Sorokin’s and Taylor’s works gain illumination from two other writers. Karl
Jaspers’ The Origin and Goal of History may be superimposed on Sorokin, and Jacques
Barzun’s From Dawn to Decadence upon Taylor. Die Achsenzeit evokes the
sublimation of myth, as does the transition from ideational to idealist culture for
Sorokin. Furthermore, Jaspers’ stages of history seem to leave another Axial Age an
open possibility; Sorokin predicts another “integralist” phase centering within the
Pacific rim. Taylor also mentions the Axial transition, as does Robert Bellah.
“Decadence” is compatible with the dreariest aspects of secularity, as is Sorokin’s
“overripe sensate” phase. (Polylogue can always use a little extra help.)
The interest of the first three books lies in the future: The problematic nature of the
UN, or NATO; knight-errantry; the emerging hazards of conflict; the shifts from
“sensate” to “ideational” phenomena. That of the fourth, Taylor’s tome, belongs to the
past: The unfolding of the best Gifford Lectures, and Giffabili (works worthy of
Gifford status), as they culminate in A Secular Age. Taylor is also nostalgic for preaxial, or Dionysian, conditions.
V. Sorokin and Philosophical Polylectic: A Trilogy
Sorokin and Philosophy
Given Sorokin’s defiant attitude toward modernity and recent philosophy’s “closedshop”, not to say “inside-baseball” preoccupations, (philosophy confined to what
certified scholars say to other certified, or soon-to-be-certified, experts), this enterprise
appears unpromising.3 As does my recent trilogy upon the same topic, relating
Sorokin’s metaculture to the broadest sort of metaphilosophy.
3

As a sample of such professional parochialism, in 1987 while touring Great Britain, I went out from
Edinburgh’s King James Hotel to two nearby, amply-stocked bookstores. Having asked about their
philosophy books, I was turned away. One clerk said I should go out to the environs of the University.
This was in the homeland of David Hume and the locale for the Gifford Lectures. It would be better to
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Going back to the origins of my quixotic pursuits, there were two crucial semesters. In
the spring of my junior year, I enrolled in Morton White’s “American Philosophy.”
The major text was an anthology, edited by Muelder and Sears, richly compiling Gold
Age thought. To this White added his own excellent Social Thought in America.
Among its virtues it offered an acute critique of Dewey’s ethical naturalism, not unlike
G.E. Moore’s argument against John Stuart Mill. That point must be kept in mind.
Immediately afterward, in the fall of my senior year I enrolled in Sorokin’s course for
which he used his recently completed, very comprehensive, Society, Culture, and
Personality. My appreciation had been primed by two earlier semester courses with
the Russian historian Michael Karpovich, and by readings of Spengler, Toynbee, and
Berdyaev, also of classical Russian works.
Simultaneously, I was introduced to J. H. Randall Jr.’s Making of the Modern Mind,
the main text in my final philosophy elective. The interaction between all those
influences was stimulating. For all their different emphases — Randall had once
written a highly critical review of the third volume of Social and Cultural Dynamics),
both scholars saw philosophical change as embedded within cultural change. Each saw
these processes as stimulated from without, in Sorokin’s case by convulsive crises, in
Randall’s by scientific and social or political innovations. (My second book referred
to these as “rough” and “progressive” dialectics respectively.) Both took creative
cultural change as ongoing, both were anti-authoritarian. Neither saw philosophy as
developing solely between professionals.
Sorokin Neo-Platonized Comte’s three stages, and he turned his unidirectionality into
a loose (non-cyclical) oscillation. Sociocultural supersystems were famously labeled
“ideational, idealistic, and sensate).” Shifts among these were illustrated in his
magisterial and controversial four-volume Social and Cultural Dynamics. (In 1957
Sorokin compressed these into a one-volume book, but the full value must be sought in
the longer version, especially the fourth volume.)
Alluding back to Morton White (and G.E. Moore), I found that his critique of Dewey
illumined Sorokin’s distinction between the idealistic and the sensate. The distinction
between ideational and idealistic was typically drawn in many of the Gifford
Lectures, as well as in Jaspers’ Revelation and Philosophical Faith.

take philosophy as the very core of liberal education, indeed, to follow Karl Jaspers’ maxim:
“Philosophy is for everyone.”

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18

120

Review: Comparative Civilizations Review No. 80 Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

115

After graduation and an interval of study I proceeded to Columbia, there taking three
semesters with Randall and doing further research on Sorokin. The provocative
contrast between Sorokin and his scholarly rival Talcott Parsons should be tempered
by Sorokin’s own “Similarities and Dissimilarities” essay, recast both in Fads and
Foibles and in Sociological Theories of Today. I argue in my Centennial paper on
Sorokin and in its expansion in Rough Dialectics that there are deep affinities between
Sorokin on the one hand and Protestant and post-Protestant liberals on the other.
Kant, Hegel, and American Golden Age thinkers can be classed as Protestant liberals,
with William James at the cusp of that movement. John Dewey departed from
Congregationalism and Hegelianism to a post-Protestant liberal stance, just as J. H.
Randall Jr sublimated his father’s religious liberalism.
Now admittedly Catholic scholars, of whom a number have been rightly active in
affirming Sorokin’s continuing importance, find echoes of Thomas Aquinas in
Sorokin’s triadic scheme (Revelation, Reason, and observation in parallel to the
ideational, idealistic, and sensate). And Sorokin’s researches in altruism did attend to
the lives of saints, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic. That said and concurred
with, I would point to Sorokin’s attachment to Tolstoy, whose generalized mysticism
bears a remarkable likeness to American Transcendentalism.
But more central still to the alliance I seek to forge is Sorokin on the “internalizing of
norms,” also his student Vytautas Kavolis on Moralizing Cultures. In short, the
emulative transfer of approbated ways of life and roles – this being the common ground
shared by all. The chart drawn for my Centennial paper affirms such affinities between
Sorokin, Parsons, and Max Weber.
Myth can no longer be drawn upon for filling temporary gaps in natural science;
however, it does have its role in grounding and legitimizing, in “button-holing” the
subject as proximate center of meaning, or recipient/incipient of values — all in
commending, facilitating, the transfer and correction of approbated patterns of life.
Myth can be sublimated and re-sublimated, even in some measure attenuated. But that
does not amount to demythologizing, as Jaspers correctly argued against Bultmann.
That sublimation vector is expressed in the ideational idealistic relation, also detectably
through Jaspers’ Axial Age, in F. M. Cornford’s From Religion to Philosophy, and in
many books based on Gifford Lectures. Although the world may be disenchanted, ideal
culture may not be purged of all mythic traces. Sorokin’s rehabilitation of the
ideational and the idealistic threw down that gauntlet.
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Distinguished scholars have argued for Sorokin’s continuing importance for sociology.
Recently Russians have joined Americans in that affirmation. The trilogy I present
takes a detour, a “road less traveled,” emphasizing his contributions toward philosophy.
Such a path goes through hostile terrain.
But nonetheless, sociocultural dynamics is inclusive of philosophical change, among
other factors. His transforming use of Comte’s three stages, whereby “oscillations” or
“rhythms” preserve the relevance of “ideational” and “idealistic” symbols, finds
reinforcement in the works of Cassirer and Jaspers. His attention to crises is
appropriate, given enforced changes in religious and political thought, not to mention
modes of self-consciousness.
The hostility of the terrain follows from what William James referred to as the “PhD
Octopus,” W.H. Werkmeister called the “diremption in philosophy”, and what Cornel
West noted as the “technocratic” trend in universities. Two examples: Rüdiger Bubner
omits Jaspers from his Modern German Philosophy on the ground that he “wrote for
the educated middle class.” Secondly, some time ago a member of our department
introduced a freshman level logic course, requiring an advanced text in philosophy of
language. Responding to widespread complaints, we asked her what she had in mind.
Her answer was that students needed preparation for graduate study.
These three volumes on philosophies (mainly Western, incidentally Eastern) inscribed
within Sorokin’s sociocultural dynamics demand a Prologue. Philosophers wildly
content, and Westerners have trouble understanding Sorokin. In turn, the trilogy points
to a “basic trend of our time,” the emerging cross-Pacific “integralist” renewal.
My books Reanimation in Philosophy (1986); Rough Dialectics: Sorokin’s Philosophy
of Value (1998); and Circumstantial and Philosophical Dynamics (2007) can be
regarded as a trilogy, interrelating overviews of philosophy within a context provided
by Sorokin’s sociocultural theory.
The first was written pre-Gorbachev and thus retains some ideological content; the
second follows the Soviet Union’s collapse and the increase of ideational and “pseudoideational” preoccupations; the third, written after the fanaticism of 9/11 and
fundamentalisms elsewhere, attends to intrusive religion in “the public square.” Such
convulsive moves away from the “overripe sensate” toward nascent, sometimes
unpleasant, religious turmoil does fit in with Sorokin’s account of transitional crises.
Volume One proffers substantive sets of typologies, that is, multipolar snapshots to be
loosely interwoven as a matrix for philosophy, revealing its outline, fault lines and
contrasts, also a reaching back past Jaspers’ Axial Age toward sources in myth and
animism. The history of Western thought is sketched within Sorokin’s sociocultural
typological dynamic.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18
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The term “polylogue” suggested by Vytautas Kavolis and introduced in Volume Three
is quite apt for such typological interweaving, also displayed in the eight concluding
charts.
So, Volume One roughs out an accounting for philosophy, how we get a grip upon it,
with special attention to the transfer of ways of life and thought.
Facilitating such transfer, sublimations and attenuations of myth set up a contrast with
positivisms and naturalisms. Sorokin’s oscillations account for philosophical change,
convulsive as it is, can be contrasted with J. H. Randall Jr.’s historical matrix stressing
scientific and social innovations as change agents. That is spelled out in Volume Two.
Volume Two shifts the major focus to Sorokin himself, his life and intellectual career.
It includes a translation by Lawrence Nicholls of his defense of Tolstoy as a
philosopher together with Nicholls’ comments on Tolstoy’s influence. Two charts are
drawn, the first a follow-up to the “Chain of Being,” where three moments of
sublimated myth appear, all these attending the transfer of orientative strategies,
guidance grounded in the first, approbatability or telic structuring in the second, and
accessibility in centers of recipience/incipience for meaning in the third. Such
moments are projected, as it were, either away from or into nature.
While the first volume takes a loose grip on philosophy by way of polylogue among
typologies, the final book proposes a classificatory macrosystem drawing upon
multiple inventories. In that way, the boundaries and neighboring disciplines, as well
as internal differentiations, are suggested as central to the Noosphere. Modes of recent
philosophy that are in contention with mythic remnants are scanned, as are philosophies
of history and of culture that are compatible with Sorokin and with sublimated mythic
elements.
The ultimate point of the trilogy is to defend possibilities for cross-cultural exchanges
on a grand scale, as Polylectic Writ Large, among the Great Traditions. This would be
a mutual accommodation among high level sublimated myths. Geographically, such
exchanges and integralist enrichments, according to Sorokin, would take place across
the Pacific Rim. Given that important analogies span traditions and cultures, here are
a few instances:
Philo Judaeus claimed, “Plato must have read the Books of Moses.” These was a
(loose) analogue between biblical monotheism and Plato’s “One or Good.”
Tertullian doubted this: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”
Radhakrishnan saw affinities between Neo-Hegelianism and non-dualist Vedanta.
Also, he detected Indian influences behind Neo-Platonism, a more plausible notion
than Philo’s.
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Process Thought and Theology share features with Buddhism. Charles Hartshorne
received a warm reception in Kyoto and other Eastern centers of learning. I myself
observed a large Oriental attendance at the Third International Conference on
Whitehead, held in Claremont California.

Sorokin’s use of the term “supra-conscious” is significant, as is his enthusiasm for
Whitehead’s “intuition.” Those terms point to the remarkable origins of upper levels
of the Chain of Being, notably the founding symbol and the ways of life and thought,
authorized and integrated thereby.
Recapitulation
Volume One: Reanimation in Philosophy, University of America Press, 1986
This is mainly philosophy, plus a neo-Sorokinian scanning of Western thought, also
reaffirmed in Volume Two. It is compressed, taking account of multiple typologies in
time, Golden Age through thirty years of post-war analysis. The overall compression
suggests that expository treatments in the endnotes, and the chartings, plus
explanations, in the Appendix merit more attention.
As to origins, there’s a reaching back past sublimations in the Axial Age toward myth
and animism. Animism as nature-worship leads to the ambiguous monism of Stoicism
(and that of Taoism), later to the double-aspect monism of Spinoza. Spirit-worship
runs through Orphism to Plato (and elsewhere naturally enough to Confucius).
Sublimated myths appear in culturative symbolics, the legitimizing and transfer of
ways of life and thought. The upper levels of the Great Chain of Being provide three
operative moments of culturative symbolics, the founding, grounding, or authorizing
moment as highest, then the normative moment well grounded in the former, and
thirdly, the invocative moment for the incipient/recipient self, eliciting susceptibilities
or propensities toward ways of life. (The second and third phases are like the two
adhesive sides of Velcro.)
Shakespeare’s witches in their threefold invocation of Macbeth: “Thane of Fife, Thane
of Candor, and King thereafter,” awaken an unlucky propensity in their victim. But
surprising and very surprising invocations for the philosopher attune him to
extraordinary affinities, as in non-naturalisms, phenomenologies, and philosophies of
life. No such destructive malice entraps that innocent thinker. The unsurprising
“Thane of Fife” rubric captures the naturalist (everyone knows he is part of nature,
looking into nature for his dinner and a place to sleep), and it enlists the philosophical
analyst as well (everyone knows he’s a user of language). They proceed as unsurprised
as was the actual Thane of Fife. But res cogitans and Transcendental Subjectivity, for
example, are surprising, and rejected by analyst and naturalist alike.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/18
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The lowest level of the Chain of Being, the World, functions as the domain for
cognitive symbolics. Again, the naturalist rallies around that scientific flag. “Bring
me no surprises” is his, and the analyst’s, motto. Sorokin’s ideational and idealistic
cultures, on the other hand, are chockful of surprises.
Between the mythically sublimated “well-founded strategist” and the sturdy nononsense naturalist lies the “placement strategist.” He locates himself in Culture and
in Nature, without any support from Transcendence.
It is a comfort-zone, while “Blessed Assurance” attaches to an ideational complex, the
placement strategist finds, at a minimum, “Cognitive Assurance.” Consider C. D.
Broad’s Mind and its Place in Nature, C. I. Lewis’ Mind and the World Order, and A.
O. Lovejoy’s epistemological dualism, as in his The Revolt against Dualism. Richard
Rorty files his complaint against such comfort-seekers in his Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature. But dualisms go way back, and have been mounted in many guises, not all
of them so mythical.
As regards the eight diagrams in the Appendix (plus the two in Rough Dialectics), one
might repeat Hans Reichenbach’s objection against “picture-thinking.” But I would
respond that multiplying pictures is a salutary loosening up, a “hair-of-the-dog” remedy
against being stuck with just one dogmatic image.
Volume Two: Rough Dialectics: Sorokin’s Philosophy of Value. Rodopi, the
Netherlands, 1998.
Sorokin’s article on Leo Tolstoy enriches the book, as he defends his status as a
religious philosopher. The translator was the sociologist Lawrence Nichols, who also
adds an essay examining Tolstoy’s considerable influence upon Sorokin. The term
“Rough Dialectics” refers to the way sociocultural crises and convulsions dramatically
alter philosophy. By contrast, the historian John Herman Randall, Jr. looks at major
changes in thought as stemming from scientific or social and political innovations.
This by contrast can be called “progressive dialectics.”
Sorokin’s life and career, including controversies with rival scholars, receive
appropriate attention. Such marked differences show contrasts between urban and
regional values. Here a “radial contrariety” comes into play, where the radius reaches
out from the city to the hinterland and to outlands. Sorokin had identified with the
Social Revolutionaries, a peasant party, certainly not with the Marxists. He took a dim
view of “over-urbanization” and of the “overripe senate” culture, hence of Modernity
in general. The turning away from “Eurocentrism” advocated by Spengler and
Toynbee was emphatically shared by him as well.
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The ambivalent American response to Sorokin can be read in terms of the “radial
contrariety,” expressed locally in our nation, through politics, art, journalism, popular
entertainments, and religious self-identifications. But at the same time Sorokin’s
positions can reasonably be recognized as complementary to the best of urban values.
Eastern thought, Indian and Chinese, receives favorable recognition from Sorokin,
while Western philosophers of history and culture, such as Dilthey, Cassirer, and
Jaspers, can be drawn into alliance with Sorokin, since his social science expresses the
Geisteswissenschaften perspective so strongly. His Society, Culture and Personality
as well as Social and Cultural Dynamics, notably confirm this affinity.
Indeed, negative criticisms of Sorokin as a speculative philosopher of history do so
backhandedly as well. His long, and broad, view taken on sociocultural changes and
crises, entails a macrosociological, not a microsociological, venture, embracing a
plethora of religious and philosophical transformations.
Volume Three: Circumstantial and Philosophical Dynamics, 2007.
Lest this final volume become an orphan of the storm, its familial ties to the first two
books must be acknowledged. Parts I, two sections of Part II, and Part III look back
to, and wind up, strategic metaphilosophic proposals offered earlier, as varied
typologies within an ongoing polylectic.
A verbal novelty, “polylogue,” put forth by Vytautus Kavolis alludes to many groups
and individuals in full interaction, the results being polylectic. Polylogue is the
manifest process, polylactic the result or product. Retrospectively, both terms throw
light upon the exposition in Volumes One and Two. (Why isn’t “dialogue” enough?
In its way it may be a good thing, but it can lead to pigheaded deadlocks. Polylogue
does cover effective mediations; “blessed are the peacemakers,” in short. Second and
even third opinions can be helpful.)
The chief aspect of the macrosystem’s double-duty concerns its role as detailed
backdrop for the earlier typologies, for the “sublimated myths” on high negotiated
through Polylectic Writ Large, for the encasement of seminal positions with their
collateral sub-branchings (polylactic writ small), and for its hospitality toward a nonWestern enclave, the elements of which are loosely analogous to those from the West.
Sorokin’s ideational and idealistic cultures, not passé as they are for Comte, Dewey,
and Reichenbach, are always latent, and sometimes strikingly recurrent. Cassirer on
myth as primordial, though sometimes politically destructive, and Jaspers on the modes
of the Comprehensive and the principles of philosophic faith, give us a strong defense
against naturalist or analytic dogmatics.
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The Book’s final part sums up the implicit morals to be drawn from the macrosystem,
imagined as activated and judiciously supplied with sociocultural defenses. The
“choreography” must be taken with a grain of salt: what we have there can be taken as
a metaphilosophical monster, tuxedoed-up like Peter Boyle in the film, “Young
Frankenstein,” and attempting a soft-shoe. The inventories, not the codings, are what
provide the coverages alluded to above.
However awkward the codings, they do suggest a prototype for holding the classifying
together. Down the road somewhere, there may appear an enthusiast to improve the
coding arrangements.
Additional Thoughts on Sorokin
Looking down the road, what can we see ahead for Sorokin Scholarship? First, here
are four basic empirical insights, all shaped by his Social and Cultural Dynamics and
its later developments.
1. There has been an “epochal shift” of civilizational interactions to the Pacific
basin, Eurocentrism being bankrupt.
2. Sorokin’s descriptions of our “overripe” sensate culture in crisis were sounds
and have received additional confirmation since 1941
3. The oscillation from the senate extreme toward rising ideational symptoms has
become obvious with ethnic and religious revivals and conflicts.
4. Sorokin argued that there should be no necessary conflict between the United
States and Russia; he also held a “convergence theory” regarding the two
societies. Recent circumstances have given marked plausibility to that theory.
Here follow six insights, more theoretical than empirical, where Sorokin gives the
context for undermining positivism and presents his accounting for drastic cultural
change.
5. Social realities and cultural patterns are not only co-involved, but they are
jointly vulnerable to historic crises. Sorokin treats the Geisteswissenschaften
concretely as under tribulation.
6. Neither positivism, naturalism, nor Marxism can explain major sociocultural
shifts. Sorokin’s critiques of sociological methods make it clear that the
humane studies are not natural sciences.
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7. Sorokin deploys principles of “immanental change” and of “limits” to explain
sociocultural oscillations. One clue to this may be that supersystems are marked
by deep axiological imbalances. This renders problematic any “boundaries” of
sociocultural systems and makes moot any external vs. internal causal dispute.
8. “Integralism” must be taken dynamically, as bespeaking a transforming
unifying force:
As in culture, “putting it all together,” markedly in coherent philosophical
and religious systems.
As in society, “bringing us all together,” in altruistic ethics.
As in personality, in strivings toward integrity.
As in macrosociology, in synthesizing worldly and otherworldly values.
9. Sorokin’s multifaceted work gives the opportunity of forming three sorts of
alliances. The first sort, the alliance with “social philosophers in an age of
crisis,” was affirmed by Sorokin himself on several occasions since 1950. A
second enriching sort may be posited on the basis of affinities, one with certain
West European philosophers of culture and history. Such thinkers as Wilhelm
Dilthey, Karl Jaspers, Ernest Cassirer, Benedetto Croce, and Jose Ortega y
Gasset help shore up the defensive flanks against naturalisms and determinisms.
Crucially, many of these men also support the anti-authoritarianism in
Sorokin’s political and social thought. Thirdly, there are American empiricist
and rationalist liberals – likewise anti-authoritarian in affirming the ongoing
creative dialectic in culture – whose roots in one degree or another lie in liberal
Protestantism.
One remark is essential. Intellectual alliances, like political ones, never imply
across-the-board agreements, but rather urgent, high priority common ground
in great causes.
10. Lastly, Sorokin’s conceptual repertoire makes possible the explanation of the
world’s Great Traditions as diverse articulations of the sociocultural dimension,
illumining their clashing overlaps, providing tools for much-needed conflict
resolution.
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SCALE

CORRELATIONS

Massive

With vast systematic
interactions. A
high-level scanning
of overall “traffic
patterns”, with too
much distance for
the human. Roles
are seen as causal
linkages within
larger systems.

Midscale or
Personal

With patterns that
can be commended
as apt or
worthwhile.
Exemplifications
that may also be
seen as exemplary,
“Worldviews”
included. The role
grasped in its
integrity is
conveyed through
emulation.
With fragmentary,
privatized moments
and moods. Its
microscopic
closeness allows too
little distance for the
human.

Minute

123

IN SOCIAL
SCIENCES
“Social physics”,
the study of
impersonal systems,
e.g., geopolitics,
realpolitik, or
market analysis.

Studies involving
sociocultural
“meanings”,
susceptible to
Verstehen or the
“logico-meaningful
method”. Shared
ground between
Weber, Sorokin,
and Parsons. This
level joins the
humanities and
sciences.
Associationism,
psychological
hedonism,
Freudianism,
Behaviorism. (e.g.,
dealings with ideas,
wants and impulses,
stimuli and
responses.)

IN THE ARTS
Where the self is
swamped as an
atom. Kafka;
Chaplin’s Modern
Times; Lang’s
Metropolis; much
modern
architecture; nonrepresentational
painting such as
Pollack’s; “Pop
Art” such as
Warhol’s; Theater
of the Absurd.
Poesis: e.g.,
philosophical
poetry; most novels
and drama;
representative art
displaying
character and
humanly
meaningful
contexts, e.g.,
Rembrandt, George
Catlin, Norman
Rockwell.
Where the self is
pulverized.
Impressionism;
Expressionism;
Surrealism; short
lyrics of
momentary mood;
“stream of
consciousness”
writing.

Cosmopolis tends to deflect attention from midscale norms toward vast public
systems and toward private motivations.
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Mythological Models in Civilization Analysis
Vytautas Kavolis
This paper was presented at the Conference on Civilizational Patterns and
Intercivilizational Encounters, held by the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations, August 30-31, 1973, at the University of Chicago.
I need to begin by defining several key terms.






By a symbolic design I refer to an objectified, or documented, arrangement of
meanings, perceptions, and emotional nuances which constitutes an identifiable
configuration that, at any given time, provides a relatively self-contained and
understandable unit of empirical investigation.
By the symbolic designs of a civilization I refer to configurations of meanings,
perceptions, and emotional nuances which are so distinctive and so widely
influential that, at any given time, they identify the major differences in what
might be called the “qualities of mind” between the largest comprehensible
units of sociocultural investigation at each level of societal evolution — these
largest comprehensible units constituting “civilizations.”
By civilizational analysis, finally, I refer to the study of any symbolic designs,
when they are seen as components of one or another of the largest
comprehensible units of sociocultural investigation and compared across the
boundaries of such units.1

Civilizational analysis may be conducted either in the traditional “humanistic” or the
“sociological” manner. When conducted sociologically, it must meet the further
requirement that linkages between symbolic designs and modes of social organization
be investigated.
In my view, it is at least as advantageous, in the comparative study of the symbolic
designs of civilizations, to begin with the significant detail as to attempt to comprehend
the total structure within which this detail is located. As one proceeds in analyzing the
significant detail, one’s analytical framework necessarily expands into the aspects of
the total structure relevant to it.

Benjamin Nelson and Vytautas Kavolis, “The Civilization-Analytical Approach to Comparative
Studies,” Comparative Civilizations Bulletin, 5 (Spring, 1973), pp. 13-14.
1
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But focusing on the significant details permits us to be more sensitive to changes over
time in the symbolic designs and the underlying structures of consciousness and
sensibility, a topic which civilizationists, in contrast to the intellectual historians, have
tended rather to neglect (unless their own background has been in Geistesgeschichte).2
By the term “significant detail” I am not referring to a descriptive element such as a
particular deity in the scheme of Georges Dumézil, but to a thematic component treated,
in some way, in a mythological system (or in its equivalents) and either embodied in
an anthropomorphic or animate figure or expressed more abstractly.3
Anthropomorphic constructs embodying a thematic component frequently provide the
added bonus of a sociopsychological theory suggesting how this thematic component
is perceived to have been motivated and how this kind of motivation is thought to have
developed over time.
An anthropomorphic mythological construct may provide: (1) a universal model for
conceptualizing a particular type of behavior, (2) a psychological theory revealing how,
and of what materials, a particular civilization constructs psychological theories, and
(3) a specification of the sociological framework within which either (a) the particular
type of behavior tends to arise or (b) the particular psychological theory is generated.
These general considerations may be substantiated by comparing the myths of
Prometheus and of Satan, both of which treat the general theme of rebellion by an
individual against the supreme authority in the established order and against the rules
by which this order operates.4 But Prometheus rebels, in stealing fire against the
prohibition of Zeus, motivated by sympathy for the sufferings of others than himself
— people deprived of fire; and he gives them practical assistance without imposing on
them either his own values or his leadership. He permits them to incorporate his
technical gifts into the structure of their own life, as they themselves see fit.

In my usage of these terms, a “structure of consciousness” or a “structure of sensibility” refers to a
state of mind or perceptual orientation widely shared by people in a particular sociohistorical setting
but inferable only through the specific symbolic designs produced and employed for communication in
such settings. Over-simplifying it somewhat, a symbolic design is immediately visible in a particular
work of culture; the structure of consciousness – which might also be called the “depth structure of
symbolic designs” – is a much more general construct which the analyst employs for explaining the
characteristics shared by a variety of specific symbolic designs.
3
C. Scott Littleton, The New Comparative Mythology: An Anthropological Assessment of the
Theories of Georges Dumézil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
4
On Prometheus, see Friedrich Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1949), and George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens: A Study in the Social Origins of Drama
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1966). On Satan Rivkah Scharf Kluger, Satan in the Old Testament
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), and Henry A. Murray, “The Personality and Career
of Satan,” Journal of Social Issues, 18 (October 1962), pp. 36 – 54.
2
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Surely, what might be called the “humane attachment — practical assistance
mechanism” is a universal possibility, experienced and observed by people in all
civilizations. But what is remarkable is that the Greeks — or some significant Greeks
— have associated the humane attachment — practical assistance mechanism with
what they themselves thought of as the crime of rebellion against established authority
or, perhaps more precisely, against the existing normative order.
Rebellion is therefore a “noble crime”; and, in the long run, the substantive personal
virtue of the individual overcomes the formal criminality of his act.
This is one model for conceptualizing the behavior of the rebel. The other is the Satanic
model. As described in the literature of the Judeo-Christian tradition since the second
century BCE, but especially in the Medieval Christian writings, Satan rebels out of
resentment.
The causes of his resentment are variously interpreted by the theologians: he is the first
of the angels who thinks he has been replaced in God’s affection by a younger sibling
— Christ; he objects to having been created by someone else and wants to be his own
maker. But he rebels not out of sympathy for others, but from resentment of what he
perceives as deprivation of his interest. And he is wholly unconcerned with any
practical needs. His concern, apparently, is to create a total alternative to the divine
order, an “adversary culture,” and, within it, to assume God’s place.
But the results of his activities are wholly destructive. While Prometheus, who started
by providing a useful service, ends up creating a new conception of justice which even
Zeus, in the Aeschylean trilogy, eventually comes to accept, Satan proves unable to
create any values and can mock the old only by inverting them. The would-be total
innovator is enchained to the inverse of all of the old.
Satanic behavior can be conceptualized psychologically as governed by the resentmentdestruction mechanism.
Surely this mechanism, too, is a universal possibility,
experienced and observed by people in all civilizations. But note that in the JudeoChristian, and particularly the medieval Christian, tradition, it is the resentmentdestruction mechanism that is firmly attached to the theme of rebellion against the
established and the normative order represented by it. Within this tradition, there is no
nobility in the crime of rebellion against the normative order. Personal virtue therefore
cannot overcome the crime; it can be dealt with only the forces of “law and order.”
The connection between rebellion and the resentment-destruction mechanism is much
more central to the Christian tradition than the linkage between rebellion and the
sympathy-assistance mechanism in the Greek civilization. Prometheus was far less
important in Greek mythology than Satan in the medieval Christian.
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But, centrality aside, the linkage of the cultural theme of rebellion with the
psychological mechanism of humane attachment resulting in practical assistance to
others is, among the historic civilizations, a distinctively Greek theme.
The old Plato would not have treasured it, but in no other premodern civilization has
this linkage of themes been given a mythological elaboration anywhere approaching
that given to it by Hesiod and Aeschylus. And we are concerned not only with what is
central to a civilization, but also with what is unique in it.
We have, so far, two interpretative models of rebellion, both potentially applicable to
the behavior of actual rebels in any civilization. The first model suggests that rebellion
motivated by humane sympathy for the suffering of others and expressed through
particular acts of practical assistance, results in an enduringly valuable change in the
structure of the moral universe. The other model contents that rebellion motivated by
personal resentment and expressed in global attempts to create an alternative style of
life and impose it on others, is destructive in its consequences.
We also have the historical fact that one of these potentially universal theories of
rebellion has been created by important representatives of the Greek civilization, and
the other has possessed immense influence in the medieval Christian civilization (and
in some of its secular derivatives).
Is the selection of the theoretical model by which to interpret rebellion a consequence
of the different behavior of rebels in the two civilizations or is it an expression of
differences in the cognitive structure of the two civilizations at the time when these
models acquired their hold over the imagination?
Before addressing myself to this question, however, I wish to compare the
psychogenetic theories contained, or implied, in the Promethean and the Satanic
legends, to account for the origins of the rebel. What is most distinctive of Satan at his
earliest appearance in the Old Testament is that he is a function of God specializing in
ferreting out potential transgressors and bringing them to God’s attention to be
punished. He is, on the one hand, an absolute servant, created by his master, who has
no existence of his own, no civil rights, and no social ties except the bond of obedience
against which he eventually rebels; and, on the other hand, he is the enforcer of
morality. When the absolute servant rebels, he can only imagine himself replacing the
despot at the peak of the power structure, without disturbing the structure itself; and he
will be even more merciless than his former master. And he who begins as the enforcer
of morality, ends as the great corrupter.
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Prometheus, on the other hand, is an independent from the very beginning of his
conscious existence. He has his own independent position, not delegated to him by a
higher authority; he has his own relatives, wife, and children; and above all, he has his
own knowledge — the ability to predict the future — which is in fact superior to the
knowledge possessed by the ruler of the gods.5
It would have been inconceivable for Satan to have known more than God does. That
is, the Satanic rebel acts out of ignorance, on the basis of an inferior, self-deceptive
theory. Or so the Judeo-Christian tradition, in which knowledge tends to be
thematically linked with power, interprets the intellectual condition of the rebel. In
Greece, it was possible for highest power to be perceived as devoid of knowledge (as
well as of virtue).
Prometheus, then, begins as the equivalent of a knowledgeable, high-status adolescent
used to making his own decisions. The first significant decision he makes is, in fact,
one to support Zeus in his battle against the Titans, who are members of Prometheus’s
own family. This decision — in some ways the equivalent of Crane Brinton’s
“desertion of the intellectuals” in the revolutionary process — proves to be a mistake,
since Zeus in power becomes a ruthless tyrant.6
Moreover, rebellion, for Prometheus – if not necessarily in conscious intention, then in
its objective effects – functions as an expiation for the unintended wrongs he had earlier
helped to arise by having aligned himself with an emergent tyranny. While the
expiation is not specifically mentioned in the Greek texts, the logic of Promethean
behavior permits this interpretation, as Satanic behavior does not: Satan could feel no
guilt for what he had done in serving his master, since, having been created entirely as
a tool of that master, he had no choice in his initial actions. It is he who perceives
himself as the blameless tool of a greater power, rather than he who has reason to know
he has been foolish in his own judgments, that develops into the resentful destroyer.

5

The relationship of Prometheus to feminine figures is worth noting. By some accounts, it was Athena
(whom Prometheus, by splitting the skull of Zeus, helped to be born; thus, a woman “of the younger
generation”) who taught him many of the practical skills he then transmitted to men. And it was his
mother, Themis, who provided him with his ultimate resource – knowledge of the future. Prometheus
not only does not misuse women to gratify his whims (as Greek gods habitually do), but he makes good
use of the creative strengths women possess and willingly share with him. He is unafraid to be
dependent on women at the same time that he helps them. In contrast, there are no significant women
in Satan’s early history, and in his later career he manipulates women to achieve his goal of seducing
men to do the evil. In this respect, he is somewhat comparable to Zeus who sends Pandora, the first
human woman, to punish men for receiving the Promethean gift of fire. But in the Greek scheme, it
was the highest god – not an evil spirit – who both misused women to indulge himself and manipulated
them to exercise his control over men.
6
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938).
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One further element in the background of Prometheus is his part as a trickster god who
delights in substituting bones and fat for meat in the sacrifice to Zeus and thus deceiving
the supreme authority without any motive apparent in this action other than the pure
fun of it.7 Satan, on the other hand, does not appear capable of pure fun, unrelated to
the single-mindedness of his service to God (in his earlier career) or to that of his
rebellion against God (in his later identity).
Thus, the final psychogenetic summary of the evolution of Satanic and Promethean
types of rebellion: abstract justice, combined with resentment, corrupts the absolute
servant; playful trickery, to which sympathetic kindness is added, permits a moral
evolution in an independent mind.
We now have not only two models of rebellious behavior, but also two psychological
theories of how these respective types of behavior have come about. And the
civilization-comparative question may be repeated on another level: why did the Greek
and the Judeo-Christian civilizations develop different “psychological” theories of the
origin of rebellion against authority?
Two possible approaches to this question may be suggested.
1. The first focuses on differences in the depth structure of moral thinking of the
two civilizations.
The classical Judeo-Christian tendency, reinforced by Iranian influences, and
surviving in a variety of secular ideologies of Western-European derivation, has
been to adopt a “mobilizing,” or “reifying,” attitude toward moral issues.
The goal implicit in this attitude is to enhance the “good” and to exorcise the
“evil” in one’s experience and personality by rigidly separating them, as object
of total worship and absolute condemnation, in the mythological constructs
used to comprehend experiences and subjective states of the personality.
The Greeks, in contrast, have tended to adopt a “developmental,” or
“dialectical,” attitude toward moral issues, with the implicit goal of integrating
the potential “evil” (e.g., the authority of the legal order) in such a way that the
“evil” is gradually transformed into the “good,” or functions as an indispensable
challenge to it, while the “good” must be exposed to a searching criticism of its
claims, in the absence of which it stands in danger of revealing itself as (or
degenerating into) another form of “evil.”

On the parallels between Prometheus and American Indian trickster gods, see Karl Kerényi, “The
Trickster in Relation to Greek Mythology,” in Paul Radin, The Trickster: A Study in American Indian
Mythology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 180-182.
7
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This attitude is evident not only in the Promethean myth, and in the conception
of Zeus, in whom, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, “the problematics of the ‘wicked
god,’ the undivided unity of the divine and the satanic, reaches its highest
pitch,” but also in the treatment of Dionysus, in whom Christ-like and Satanlike elements are intertwined.8, 9


In contrast to India, where dualistic categories (the purity-pollution
distinction) are used to separate hierarchically arranged eternal entities;



In contrast to historic China, where polarities (in the Yin-Yang paradigm)
are designed to encourage peaceful cooperation with a minimal change of
identity;



In contrast to the medieval European tradition, in which polar opposites
either battle energetically until the final solution, the outcome of which is
predetermined (the God-Satan model) or are mutually interdependent in a
static hierarchical relationship, which it is impermissible to challenge (as in
the notion of the “marriage” of the soul with the body, in which the
“masculine” soul is entitled to the obedience of the “feminine” body);10



In contrast to all of these conceptions of the proper relationship between
polar opposites, the Greeks have conceived of a dialectic in which the
opposites evolve, changing their own characters and the structure of their
setting, in the course of a battle in which the cards are not stacked in advance
in favor of one participant, as they are in the God-Satan paradigm. The
“Promethean” dialectic has subsequently re-emerged in the Romantic
imagination, whereupon it was Christianized by the Marxists.11

Hierarchy challenged and torn apart by a dualism is one of the relatively
constant themes distinctive of Western civilization. But the content of the
dualistic or dialectical “battle” changes over time. Three modalities of the
Western dialectic seem particularly important:

8

Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 218.
On Dionysus, see Walter F. Otto, Dionysus: Myth and Cult (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1965), and Philip E. Slater, The Glory of Hera: Greek Mythology and the Greek Family (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968). The author adds “Freud and Goethe” in pen here.
10
Rosalie E. Osmond, “Body, Soul, and the Marriage Relationship: The History of an Analogy,”
Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (April–June 1973), pp. 283-290.
11
M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New
York: W. SW. Norton & Company, 1971).
9
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a) The “medieval”: The God-Satan struggle between good and evil;
b) The “modern”: Irrational tradition in conflict with utilitarian calculability;
and
c) The “post-modern”: A Rousseauist tension between collectively binding
social contracts and individual moral-aesthetic sensibilities.12
Each of these three modalities seems to be less necessarily committed to the
imagery of “total war” for conceiving of the relationship between the opposites
defining it.
2

The second approach to explaining the differences between the Greek and the
Judeo-Christian models of rebellious behavior, and between their theories of
the origin of such behavior, can be made on the social-structural level. Satan
has originated within the general framework of a militaristic Mesopotamian
“oriental despotism,” where the obligation of everyone, including the highest
officials, has been to serve the ruler in the manner of disciplined soldiers, and
in which, since the supreme authority was always right, rebellion necessarily
appeared as the upheaval of primeval chaos against the righteousness of
civilization.13
The Mesopotamian type of “oriental despotism” may be contrasted to the
bureaucratic “oriental despotism” of historic China, where officials, and to
some degree other classes, adhered to generalized moral standards of their own,
by which they could define their own dignity and even judge their supreme
authority, the emperor — thus retaining, at least in theory, a certain margin of
group (though not individual) independence relative to him. In the Chinese
framework, in which supreme power could legitimately be perceived as
deficient in knowledge and in virtue, rebellion could not easily be interpreted
in terms of a Satanic model and tended to be legitimated by the rebels
themselves, until the nineteenth century, in the not particularly dualistic terms
of the nature mysticism of popular Taoism and the reassertion of traditional
peasant values.14

Particular components of the “post-modern” psychocultural dialectic can be referred back to the
distant past: the Promethean myth, Roman law, the Tristanic legend, the Lutheran conscience. What is
“post-modern” is the dominance of this tension among the formulators of cultural imagery of the
present age.
13
Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1957). Wittfogel does not recognize the importance of the “symbolic” distinction
made here.
14
Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.
165.
12
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The myth of Prometheus has been put together in a society which cultivated
“individualistic heroism” in social action and in fact provided opportunities for
a privileged elite, to seek this goal. When Prometheus first appears, the
breaking down of clan controls was taking place in the absence of a dominant
state organization. With the Chinese scholar-official, or a John Stuart Mill,
Prometheus shares an aristocratic sense of obligation for the “lower orders.”
But he pursues the call of this obligation in his own “individually heroic” way,
without waiting for legitimation by any traditional standard or generalized
system of faith.
A society which permits individualistic action for at least some of its members
is probably necessary for such trust in one’s own private moral sensitivities, not
sanctioned by any agency or tradition external to the individual to be imagined.
And when Prometheus attains his full development, in the tragedies of
Aeschylus, there is at least a segmental democracy operating in Athens.
Another structural characteristic of the Greek society relevant to the
Promethean theme is the lack of effective control by an organized priesthood
over the interpretation of moral issues, whereas in the Mesopotamian
framework such priesthoods tended to be organized, like the state, along the
lines of a militaristic “oriental despotism.” (And even the Hebrew prophets
spoke in the name of obedience to the supreme authority, daring to question
only the power of the middle-level authorities, much as Russian peasant rebels
did in relation to the Czar and his subordinates until the end of the nineteenth
century.)
The militantly organized Church was presumably more important than the
feudal state in regenerating the Satanic theory in Europe from the twelfth
century on, and then briefly, on both the Catholic and the Protestant sides,
during the height of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. In modern
revolutionary regimes, we find a similar correlation between Satanic theories
and control by the equivalent of an organized priesthood over the interpretation
of moral issues.
The Satanic theory of rebellious behavior appears to require both a social
structure built for the maximization of obedience and elimination of
independence, and an intellectual tradition of rigorous (non-cooperative)
dualism. A civilization, like the traditional Chinese, which eliminates
individual independence in politically relevant action, but which does not favor
rigorous dualism in thought, does not generate Satanic interpretations of
rebellious behavior.
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And in the post-medieval bourgeois societies of Western Europe, including
those of the most rigorous Calvinistic shaping — which tended, however, to
seek maximization of individual independence in social action — the hold of
Satan did not last. Given an obedience-maximizing structure and a dualistic
tradition, social strains and particularly threats to this structure and tradition
increase the likelihood, and the virulence, of Satanic theories.15
It is conceivable that conditions under which Satanic theories arise also favor
Satanic behavior, as twentieth-century totalitarianisms suggest. But a
mythological model should probably be seen not as a reflection of observed,
that is already existing behavior, but as an expression of the categories of
imagination shaped by the conjunction of a social structure and a cognitive
model. In imagination, however, designs for alternative modes of behavior are
tried out (and sometimes, of course, found wanting).
Thus, the analysis of the interpretations of rebellious behavior underlines the
impossibility of understanding the distinctive symbolic designs of civilizations either
without reference to their social structures or as direct reflections of their social
structures. Nor, in all likelihood, should differences in symbolic designs be read as
registering corresponding differences in visible behavior, or the absence of a particular
symbolic design be interpreted as indicating the absence of the behavior which other
peoples conceptualize in such designs.
What symbolic designs express exists, outside of them, only in the imagination; and
not everything which exists outside of the imagination is transformed into its basic
categories.
I shall conclude by re-emphasizing two methodological points.
(1) An effective approach to the comparative study of the symbolic designs of
civilizations is to focus on a particular theme, found in several civilizations, and
embodied in a cultural product that lends itself to both psychological and
sociological analysis.
(2) A productive method of analysis, within this approach, is to look for the
linkages of key notions — socially strategic concepts which are treated, in
particular civilizations, as necessarily associated with each other, or as mutually
exclusive, or as having an indeterminate and variable relationship between
themselves.

15

Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and
Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements, Rev. Ed. (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1961).
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Linkages between an ideological notion such as rebellion, and a psychological
mechanism presumed to be underlying the behavior oriented to this notion are also
worth noting.
Presumed interdependencies between the notions of power, knowledge, virtue, and law
have been brought out as particularly important in the present case. But, for an
adequate analysis of the symbolic designs of civilizations through linkages between
key notions, an inventory of perhaps twenty to fifty such notions, for each civilization
at distinguishable stages of its development, might be needed.
Summary Table: Two Modes of Rebellion
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

THE SATANIC MODEL

THE PROMETHEAN
MODEL

Described Behavior

Total rebellion against
normative structure

Inferred Motivation

Resentment – destructive
mechanism

Social Role Antecedent
to Rebellion
Sociocultural
Environment

Absolute servant,
enforcer of morality
Obedience-maximizing
social structure, radically
dualistic cognitive
tradition

Partial rebellion against a
particular aspect of the
normative structure
Humane sympathy –
practical assistance
mechanism
Independent agent,
knowledgeable trickster
Obedience-minimizing
social structure,
“dialectical” conception of
relationship between
opposites in cognitive
tradition
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In Memoriam
Walter Benesch, 1932-2017
My friend, Walter Benesch, died in August 2017, at home with his family around him.
His wife, Renate, told me that he lived his life just as he liked and died in tranquility,
leaving behind many of us who admired and loved him.
Walter was that rare academic who bridged disciplines: comparative history, Slavic
literature, comparative philosophy, and comparative Western and Chinese philosophy.
He was a wonderful husband, devoted father to two boys (who were brought up without
television in their home), and a man who could think great thoughts while tending his
garden, raising chickens and turkeys, thereby feeding his family through the very cold
Fairbanks, Alaska, winters. He also continued to teach philosophy gratis after his
retirement because the demand was so great. There had been no great demand for
philosophy in Alaska before Walter’s splendid professorship. Philosophy majors have
learned to think outside the box, which makes them valuable employees in almost any
enterprise.
The year that I first met him at an ISCSC conference, I gave the final paper and he and
his 17-year-old son Oleg (currently a professor in England) asked “Do you take your
show on the road?” (he liked my presentation) and I said: “Absolutely.” As soon as I
returned home, there was an invitation from Walter to visit the University of Alaska in
Fairbanks for a week as a “visiting scholar.” I accepted, and then he gave me the date:
mid-February!” He scraped together an honorarium from four departments and I
prepared four lectures appropriate to those disciplines. The honorarium was used to
buy winter clothes that I would need in temperatures of 18 degrees below zero! I am a
Californian.
Walter and I have been friends ever since, and I am very fond of his son Oleg (who
joined our association as a scholar of Japanese Culture) and a great admirer of his wife
Renate, whom he met and married while getting his doctorate in Austria. Walter was
a superb scholar and a surprisingly good author of books for children that were both
fun and informative. He was a phenomenon as a universal man in a time of increasing
narrow specialization.
He was interviewed by his Fairbanks newspaper, the Peninsula Clarion, in 2002, with
such a charming description of this unusual man that we offer it here.
Walter, we will all miss you.
Laina Farhat-Holzman
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Retired UAF Philosophy Professor Tunes Into Chickens

Posted: Friday, September 13, 2002
By GEORGE BRYSON
Anchorage Daily News
FAIRBANKS (AP) -- Sometimes when retired University of Alaska Fairbanks
philosophy professor Walter Benesch attends a conference and addresses some of the
greatest thinkers in the world, his German-born wife, Renate, can't help but have her
doubts.
Her husband can talk Eastern and Western philosophy with the best of them, she says
-— just as he did a year ago at a meeting of the International Association of Chinese
Philosophers at the University of Beijing.
''But as he's standing up there and delivering some paper, I think: If they only knew
where this started ... as he was mucking out the chicken yard.''
Sitting now in his comfortable Fairbanks home surrounded by more than an acre of
sunny gardens, bordered by a poultry pen, Benesch laughs hearing his wife divulge his
secret.
It's true, he says. You can learn a lot from chickens.
“'The chickens' view of life is really philosophical: You see out of both sides of your
head at the same time, and you're not worried about tomorrow. It's very Buddhist.
Chickens are very, very Buddhist.”
Benesch's wide-ranging commentaries — reflecting on current events in the context of
history, literature, science and philosophy — are heard across about half the state each
Monday (with the exception of the Anchorage area) on ''Alaska Edition,'' the prizewinning public radio program produced by Fairbanks station KUAC. (Anchorage
residents can listen to audio files of the show archived on the Web at
www.kuac.org/alaskaedition.html.)
Benesch, 68, began to question his own assumptions way back in college. Raised in the
desert country of southern Colorado in the 1930s and '40s, he thought he was going to
be a pastor when he enrolled in the University of Denver but changed his mind after a
couple of years as a history major.
“If you get a lot of history, you have trouble with theology,” he says. “All you have to
do is encounter the wars of Reformation, where God wants Catholics to kill Protestants
and Protestants to kill Catholics.”
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That, and discovering Alaska.
His parents had driven the family up the new Alaska Highway in the summer of 1950,
and he'd relished the cooler climate. He'd returned to work on a stream survey in Sitka
during his summers off from college and brought with him a pile of books. That's when
he began developing an interest in Dostoevsky and other Russian authors.
“The library at the University of Denver would let me take as many boxes of books as
I wanted,” he says, “so I would pack them with Russian literature.”
It was an interest that would take his life in a new direction just a few years later.
After earning a master's degree at the University of Montana, serving a two-year tour
of duty in the Army at Fort Richardson, then taking a job in Anchorage teaching ninthgrade English, he won a local Rotary fellowship to attend college in Austria for a year,
studying Russian and Slavic cultures.
But the hard part lay ahead: attending doctorate-level classes taught entirely in German
at Leopold-Franzens University in Innsbruck. The only way to make the leap in
language, he decided, was to begin speaking German full time.
“The moment I got off the plane, I stopped all English,” Benesch says. “It took about
six weeks to two months, and then suddenly that was it. Of course, it was a lot of work
after that, but I was now thinking in the language. I wasn't translating anymore. I didn't
have to make the leap.”
He'd also met Renate, a young German translator who'd earlier attended school in
America as part of her own student exchange — and was far more adept at English than
Benesch was at German. They dated as he continued his studies in Innsbruck, then
they married in 1963 after he earned his doctorate in Slavic studies.
There was only one condition, Renate says.
“He said you'll have to live in Alaska. He was very clear on that. And when I made
up my mind, I knew there wouldn't be any wiggle room.”
In 1963, Benesch landed a job at UAF teaching courses in English, history and
philosophy. A few years later, he began teaching full time in the university's fledgling
philosophy department.
They acquired a little cabin on five acres in an undeveloped part of Fairbanks north of
the university and never moved away. They raised two boys — Ilya, now 33, and Oleg,
24 — in a bilingual household. Though mostly they spoke German.
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“Since Renate and I met in Austria, we've always spoken German,” Benesch says, “so
we decided when we came back we would just stick with that, and we still do. This is
a German house. And when the kids came along, we kept it. So, the kids are bilingual.”
To help them remain that way, Walt and Renate decided to raise them without
television.
“It's been a real interesting experiment,” Benesch says, “but it's worked beautifully.”
Renate credits her husband with “living his philosophy.”
Which seems inspired partly by the post-Aristotelian school of skeptics who valued
intellectual inquiry and partly by modern advances in science and theories of relativity,
which have found that two seemingly contradictory answers can be right after all.
“The particle explanation of light is right — in certain circumstances,” Benesch says,
“and the wave explanation of light is correct. They're both right. And so, you get rid
of the idea of contradiction.”
But a certain Buddhist “appreciation for the present” was also evident — outdoors, in
the family poultry pens, as Benesch returned to his chores.
The turkeys and chickens were calling.
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Book Reviews
Andrew Robinson. Earth-Shattering Events: Earthquakes, Nations, and
Civilizations. London and New York: Thames & Hudson, 2016
Reviewed by Ernest B. Hook
This disappointing work provides a superficial, disorganized, repetitive, incomplete,
frustrating, and even a somewhat perverse review of effects of earthquakes on human
history. With regard to perversity, the author claims, “we might even argue that
earthquakes, for all their horrors, can enhance economic growth in the long term” and
be “blessings in disguise.”
He cites Gandhi, Kant, and John Stuart Mill in apparent support. Gandhi invoked the
great earthquake in India and Tibet in 1934 as a warning to Hindus about their views
on untouchability. He saw, unsympathetically, a moral utility in great natural
catastrophes and, apparently, associated deaths of the innocents as much as the guilty,
as warnings to the credulous. Kant only went so far as to suggest we should consider
whether earthquakes “might bring us good things.” Mill went further to predict,
unequivocally, Robinson implies, long term economic benefits from disasters,
including presumably earthquakes, because they encouraged manufacturers to
introduce more efficient processes!
Even widely followed philosophies have made similar arguments about the unexpected
advantages of disease, famine, wars, and death. In Christian eschatology the horrors
unleashed upon humanity by the advent of the Four Horseman of the Apocalypse will
precede the Last Judgment, the presumed end of human civilization and reintroduction
of an existence in paradise.
Some commentators have cited the utter devastation after World War Two in the
Federal Republic of Germany and in the Empire of Japan as an explanation for the
major economic expansion in these countries after the war; they argue that the utter
destruction removed social-political barriers to growth and enabled the extraordinary
economic emergence of these countries after their destruction. But this ignores the
benign policies of the occupying victors, who allowed, indeed facilitated such growth
and then withdrew, as well as the cultural heritage in both Germany and Japan that
included a strong “work ethic.”
Robinson concludes that “earthquake-prone cities, including many capitals, generally
recover from seismic catastrophes and frequently prosper. I emphasize his
qualifications, because he does not cite any exceptions. He does refer to Antigua, the
beautiful former capital of Guatemala ruined and rebuilt four times in less than 300
years after 1586.
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He doesn’t tell us that its seismicity led to the country’s capital being removed to
Guatemala City, leaving Antigua to slumber in lessened prosperity as a consequence.
With regard to societies and civilizations, Robinson is less certain about lingering
effects. He cites two opposed views: that of Will Durant, who stated, “Civilization
exists by geological consent, subject to change without notice” and that of Jared
Diamond, who in his “Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed”, totally
ignores earthquakes and volcanoes. (Diamond might claim in this volume he addressed
human choices. In other books he does emphasize geography.)
Robinson reasonably claims that human agency and geographical factors are both
important. Humans can do things to diminish the hazards of earthquakes. Thus in 2010
the magnitude 7.1 earthquake near Christchurch New Zealand caused no fatalities;
whereas the one of magnitude 7.0 near Port-au-Prince Haiti caused 85,000 to 316,000.
Reinforced construction in New Zealand accounts for the difference.
But the important point from our viewpoint is to what extent, and how, societies and
civilizations can survive earthquakes. Haiti did survive, albeit with difficulty and with
international assistance, despite the devastation.
Robinson suggests the apparently simultaneous collapse of Bronze Age societies in
Crete and elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean around 1200 BCE in many different
sites may have been due to, or at least triggered by, an earthquake of as yet unknown
epicenter. He does not mention anywhere a frequently-cited alternative explanation:
one of the most powerful volcanic explosions of all time, on the island of Thera (now
Santorini), is often postulated as the cause of the collapse of the Minoan Civilization.
Granted an earthquake of unknown epicenter could have triggered the explosion. But
plausibly, the consequences of the catastrophe (and associated tsunami if it was an
earthquake) so weakened the Minoans that they could not resist the destruction of
subsequent raiders or invaders of whom we know little.
Robinson can do no more than speculate about civilizations, but he discusses in some
detail the effects of natural disasters on cities and nations. He reviews in detail
earthquakes in London 1750, Lisbon 1755, Caracas 1812, Naples 1857, San Francisco
1906, Tokyo and Yokohama, 1923, Tangshan (China) 1976, Gujarat (India) 2001, the
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, and Fukushima (Japan) 2011. The historical details in
these chapters are of interest and the best part of the volume.
Unfortunately, in his introductory chapter he makes implausible claims about some
events discussed in detail in later chapters where no evidence in support of the earlier
claims appear. For instance, by a series of sequential extrapolations, Robinson suggests
the Japanese earthquake of 1923 led to World War II and that the San Francisco
earthquake of 1906 triggered the formation of the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1913.
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Moreover, he states that after 1906, the subsequent economic growth in San Francisco
resulted from the earthquake, the city “went on to flourish”, and even “gave birth” to
Silicon Valley to the south of it in the 1950s! This is simply a fallacy. Silicon Valley
resulted from its location close to Stanford University, not San Francisco. Robinson
states that the Tangshan earthquake in China in 1976, about one month before Mao’s
death, led Deng Xiaoping to transform his country into an economic power, because of
the failure of the central government to address the aftermath of the earthquake, another
fallacy.
I will not elaborate further on the specific problems with the book except by providing
more suggestions for what I hope will be an improved 2nd edition:
A single chapter, with a glossary, of the technical details and definitions, e.g. “faults”,
“plates” “zones”, briefly explaining the science of earthquakes, the different types of
faults, the various causes of earthquakes, how the various measures of earthquakes
compare, and the advantages of each. Elaborate on the details of such matters as P
waves and S waves, subduction zones, etc. Where they appear these details are
scattered about, and not well defined so are simply jargon.
Regarding the list of earthquakes: add to the date and location such basic information
the numbers known or estimated killed, and magnitudes of each even if only estimated,
noting which scale is used. (Strangely, although the author informs us in the text he is
not using the well-known Richter scale, I cannot find a single remark about what scale
he does use when giving the magnitude of an earthquake, or how, for instance, the
magnitude for a particular earthquake he provides differs from that of the Richter or
other scales.) Instead of a two-page simple sketch map of seismic zones in the world,
provide expanded and labeled maps of known seismic faults. Iceland for instance is in
grey implying it is all an active zone. It may be, but no one looking at this map would
realize a fault goes right through the country. So discuss Iceland, among other areas
where one can see the effects of two major tectonic plates drifting apart above sea level.
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Yuval Noah Harari. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind.
New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015
Reviewed by Joseph Drew

Since 1967 I have spent many summers on a kibbutz, a collective farm, in Israel. When
I was there five years ago, one of the kibbutzniks, an agricultural scientist with a PhD
from Oregon State University, recommended I read the writings of Prof. Yuval Noah
Harari of Hebrew University. I didn’t. What a mistake. Today, Harari’s book entitled
“Sapiens,” as translated from the original Hebrew into English, has been residing on or
near the top of the New York Times best-seller list for many weeks.
Sapiens provides a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction for students of
comparative civilization; it describes the rise and journey of mankind, ending with
speculation about the future of the species. The work is divided into four parts — the
Cognitive Revolution, the Agricultural Revolution, the Unification of Humankind and
the Scientific Revolution.
The first chapter presents a brief review of the evolution of mankind. Our genus, Homo,
began about 2.5 million years ago, with sequential pulses out of Africa, our birthplace,
beginning about two million years ago. The nomenclature and classification schemes
for evolution seem to change with each generation of scholars. Today we can say that
from the hominid family came various subfamilies. Our subfamily is called the
Hominines, within which are two tribes, the panins and the hominins; species anywhere
on the main human clade, or line, are generally called hominins.
There is one subtribe of the hominins that includes early predecessors of ours no longer
surviving, such as the Australopithecine and Kenyanthropus; we fall in the other
subtribe, called Hominina or hominans. We, as Homo sapiens, are the sole remaining
version of our subtribe, having outlasted other forms of Homo such as H. habilis, H.
erectus, and H. neanderthalensis. (See Bernard Wood’s Human Evolution: A Very
Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.) Harari observes that
although we live today, and others in the Homo line do not, Homo erectus, “upright
man,” survived for two million years, far longer than we have to date.
Physically, anatomically modern man evolved about 150,000 years ago. We have large
brains, more than double the size of early men, but, writes Harari, “a jumbo brain is a
jumbo drain on the body.” There are other unique features to our bodies, including that
we are born too early, before all our vital systems are developed. Thus, mankind needs
to take care of our young. “It takes a tribe to raise a human” and evolution has favored
those capable of forming strong social ties. Obtaining fire enabled the rise of humanity,
too; we can cook food that we cannot digest in natural forms – wheat, rice and potatoes,
for example. By cooking, we also destroyed dangerous germs and parasites in the food.
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Harari discusses the methods by which Homo sapiens spread across the globe (leaving
Africa roughly 70,000 years ago), outlasted other humans already present, and used
language to rise to supremacy among all other creatures. It was the Cognitive
Revolution, about 70,000 to 30,000 years ago, that led to our present ways of thinking
and communicating. Why communicate? He thinks that a major reason was the human
need to gossip. And a major result of our ability to imagine via words led to the ability
to change behavior rapidly, to evolve culturally. The Cognitive Revolution led to our
ability to plan, to form larger groups, and to bring about both cooperation amongst
strangers and innovative social behavioral patterns. Thus arose the hunting and
gathering bands.
Was it a bad life? Hunters and gatherers enjoyed a more comfortable and rewarding
lifestyle than most peasants and workers who have followed them over the years.
Interestingly, Harari cites new evidence that the size of the average human brain has
decreased since the age of foraging. Moreover, hunters and gatherers were not
dependent on one single source of food, so they could make up for losses. These
individuals were taller and healthier than the peasants that followed them, suffered less
from infectious diseases, and they worked fewer hours than modern people. Further,
those who could avoid dying in the first few years of life might anticipate living into
their sixties, seventies, and eighties.
Among the major achievements of early man that he cites was the colonization of
Australia 45,000 years ago, but this led to the extinction of many native animals. He
gives other examples of the elimination of fauna whenever humans arrive, including in
the Americas. The conclusion: “the historical record makes Homo sapiens look like an
ecological serial killer.” We are, says Harari, “the deadliest species in the annals of
biology.”
In the section on the Agricultural Revolution the argument is made that it occurred in
various places around the world, not simply in the Fertile Crescent, where it happened
roughly 10,000 years ago. It was “one of the most controversial events in history.”
Moreover, it was “history’s biggest fraud” because the average farmer had a worse life
than the average hunter gatherer, “a trap.” And, says the author, with the Agricultural
Revolution mankind didn’t domesticate wheat; it domesticated us; he means that we
were the ones forced into houses, who got a worse diet, achieved little economic
security, and experienced an inability to move when things went bad, while wheat
expanded worldwide. Ten thousand years ago, wheat was “just a wild grass, one of
many, confined to a small range in the Middle East. Suddenly, within just a few short
millennia it was growing all over the world.” It had become one of the most successful
plants in the history of the earth, he writes, thanks to our efforts.
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With the Agricultural Revolution, writes Harari, the population grew; this meant that
farmers had to work harder to feed the increased population. “Population growth
burned humanity’s boats.” Further, today’s luxuries become tomorrow’s necessities,
so new obligations are created.
However, Harari says, the Agricultural Revolution was a turning point, where many
say that “Sapiens cast off its intimate symbiosis with nature and sprinted towards greed
and alienation.” Harari reports that the population exploded, rising from about 5
million before the Agricultural Revolution to more than 250 million by the first century
CE.
Settling down as farmers meant that mankind now would plan, think for the future,
something hunters and gatherers generally didn’t do. New “imagined” social order
arises, with social stratification, urbanization, government, and civilizations as
products of the Agricultural Revolution. In addition to objective facts, subjective views
emerge — including myths which assume the status of objective facts for most people.
Myths arise as necessary to sustain society — myths including beliefs in inequality
(Hammurabi) or equality (the U.S. Declaration of Independence) and often resting on
“true believers.”
Harari lauds the invention by ancient Sumerians of writing. This has enabled modern
progress and exists itself as what Emile Durkheim would call a social fact; it cannot be
reduced to the individual level but is social sui generis. Writing enables numbers and
arguments and facts to be passed on generation to generation.
In this section, Harari has essentially written a comparative study of civilizations. He
tells of how different writing systems developed, how great texts began in oral form,
and how bureaucracy arose. He points to the widespread belief in the “fiction” of social
stratification and discrimination of all sorts, how the social concepts of man and woman
arose (as distinguished from the biological existence of males and females) and what
their implications have been, and what large questions about the organization of society
remain open.
The third part of the book Harari calls the Unification of Humankind. He begins by
arguing that history is moving in a direction: mega-cultures have led to the unity of
humanity. He labels early civilizations as “worlds” separated from the others. Then,
he argues, commerce, empires and universal religion spread everywhere. Result: We
now have a single global culture, probably, he writes, the inevitable result of the
dynamics of human history.
First: Commerce triumphs. Money, he writes, is the most universal and most efficient
system of mutual trust ever devised. We might hate our enemy, but we take his money.
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Second: Empires, while frequently despised, have in fact unified countries and help
bring about a common culture; in the future, we will be seeing the erosion of
nationalism and the emergence of a global empire. Global standards of financial
behavior, environmental policy and justice are emerging, and individual countries
simply can’t stop climate change single-handedly.
Third: Religion is the third great unifier of mankind. Harari discusses the rise of
polytheism, monotheism, dualism, natural law religions (such as Buddhism, Jainism,
Taoism, and Stoicism), and modern manifestations of humanism, capitalism, socialism
and other forms of religion.
Why has history developed as it has? Harari rejects deterministic arguments based on
economics, biology, geography or ecology. We can figure out “how” history happens
but not “why” certain forks in the road were taken; I would have alluded to Max Weber
here. Harari writes: “Unlike physics or economics, history is not a means for making
accurate predictions.” Further, there is no proof that history is working for the benefit
of humanity, he says.
In Part IV Harari covers the Scientific Revolution, noting the vast changes this
revolution has brought to the life of mankind, including a growth in numbers from 500
million to 7 billion of us. The author examines the rise of science, the great
breakthroughs, and the fact that science is typically in the service of some goal. He
argues that history’s “chief engine” for the past 500 years has probably been the
“feedback loop” between science, empire, and capital.
Thus, a British ship bound for the Southern Pacific to study the transit of Venus across
the face of the sun did that study but also led to geographic discoveries which brought
on British conquest of much of Oceania and Australia and the concomitant deaths of
most of the original residents the British encountered.
Europe beat out Asia and Africa in this expansion, the author argues, because it
accepted the tenets of science and could harness technology to significant ends; further,
rapacious capitalism drove the tremendous success of Europe (much as Marx argued
in The Communist Manifesto).
In an interesting section, the author ponders why the great Chinese admiral Zheng He
with his huge armada (far more powerful than Columbus’s) and his gigantic voyages,
undertaken in the early fifteenth century, did not make a lasting impact such as the
Europeans did only a few decades later. Why did China not take control of Indonesia,
India, Arabia, and East Africa? The answer: the Chinese under Zheng He and the later
Europeans both were explorers; only the Europeans sought to conquer and rule, as well.
The Chinese were interested in local matters, goings-on at home only, not in expansion
to new found lands they could have ruled.
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Not all of what European expansionism achieved was harmful.






Harari tells the story of how the British, once ensconced in India, were able to
uncover Mohenjo-Daro, and thus find out about that early Indian civilization of
which Indians themselves were unaware.
He describes how the British were able to decipher the long unused writing
system of cuneiform, thus bringing to modern men the 3,000-years-long ancient
life of the Middle Eastern Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian cultures.
He talks about how William Jones, the great founder of the Calcutta-based
Asiatic Society, was able to study Sanskrit in depth and then come up with the
concept of the existence of the Indo-European language family.

Finally, money. Harari describes the idea behind capitalism — it’s based on faith in
the future and coupled with the argument that those who make profits will reinvest their
profits in the business, growing it. Capitalism, he says, rests on the existence of capital
(money, goods and resources invested in production) not wealth, wasted on
unproductive activities. The principal tenet of capitalism is that economic growth is
the supreme good; justice, freedom and happiness all depend on economic growth.
Example: within 80 years the relatively small swampland called Holland, owned by
Spain, gained its independence and grew to be the richest country in Europe; how?
Credit and capitalism.
Capital has driven European expansionism over the past few centuries and capitalism
has been closely related to empire-building, as European countries stepped in militarily
to advance the interests of their investors. The Opium War was a perfect example, as
was the British takeover of Egypt and the English fight against the Ottomans on behalf
of Greek independence — all intended to protect their countrymen’s financial interests.
Especially egregious was the murder — driven by greed for profits in the rubber
industry — of up to ten million people in the Congo by Belgians between 1885 and
1908.
Harari sums up: “Some religions, such as Christianity and Nazism, have killed millions
out of burning hatred. Capitalism has killed millions out of cold indifference coupled
with greed.” He writes that consumerism is a result of capitalism; so, too, is the vicious,
insensitive mistreatment of animals whose products (such as milk and meat) we utilize.
Environmental destruction also is a result of rapacious capitalism.
With the Industrial Revolution has come standardized time, urbanization, the
disappearance of the peasantry, democratization, and the collapse of the family and
one’s local community (now replaced by the state and the market). From our status as
members of a family and a community, we have become alienated individuals. This
parallels the arguments of Henry Sumner Maine and Ferdinand Toennies, among
others.
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In one fascinating discussion, Harari points out that war has greatly diminished in
recent decades. Most people cannot imagine real war interrupting their lives these days,
as opposed to the situation for much of history. Countries with borders generally see
those borders respected by neighboring countries; Iraq’s attempt to gobble up Kuwait
in 1990 was a rare exception. Empires have fallen peacefully in the period following
World War II — particularly the Soviet Union. Most of the final stages of the British
and French empires were generally peaceful.
Thus, peace has become the rule, rather than the exception, according to the author.
The atomic bomb makes any major war a suicide pact. Moreover, the profits of war
have declined, since a country’s wealth these days is in the minds and abilities of the
scientists, engineers, and artists — not in minerals found underground or animals in the
fields, easy to loot. Trade increases the profits of peace, and most of today’s
international elite are interested in peace rather than war.
He writes that: “As far as we can tell, from a purely scientific viewpoint, human life
has absolutely no meaning. Humans are the outcome of blind evolutionary processes
that operate without goal or purpose.” Thus, any meaning that people ascribe to their
lives is just a delusion. He also writes that studying the rise and fall of empires, or the
discovery and spread of technologies, says nothing about how all this influences the
happiness and suffering of individuals. Are we Homo sapiens happier today than in
the past? This is the biggest gap in our studying of history, one that we should start to
address, he says.
We are probably coming to the end of our species as we now exist. It looks like the
pace of technological development will soon lead to the replacement of Homo sapiens
by completely or partially different beings, ones who possess not only different
physiques but also very different cognitive and emotional worlds. Harari talks of great
medical advances and the change from what we are now to cyborgs, with some parts
of us replaceable as they wear out, enhanced human abilities, and the elimination of
certain diseases as fatal to us.
But, will a brain reproduced inside a computer be a person? If it is your brain copied,
is it you in that machine? What about consciousness?
Perhaps soon, all extant concepts that give meaning to the world will be challenged as
irrelevant. Anything happening beyond that point of evolution will be meaningless to
us, according to Harari. But, he writes, the future is unknown, and we cannot predict
whether these forecasted changes will occur as anticipated today. So, we need to
consider that the next stage of history may well include not only technological and
organizational transformations but also fundamental alterations in human
consciousness.
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Overall, this is a wide-ranging review of the rise, triumphs, failures, and likely end of
our genus. The book excites the imagination and it certainly highlights the importance
and wide expanse of the social sciences, and, not coincidentally, the comparative study
of civilizations, for all readers.
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Didier Maleuvre. The Art of Civilization, a Bourgeois History.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016
Reviewed by Pedro Geiger
The Art of Civilization, a Bourgeois History is an excellent, erudite book. After the
Introduction, its first chapter, Birth of the Aesthetic, deals with the concept of
“civilization” and with the role of cities in the production of “civilization” — the
product of the citizens, of the bourgeoisie. Even when the Church or the Aristocracy
was running European societies, the making of the goods of the civilization was in the
hands of the bourgeoisie. The author undertakes a deep analysis of classical Greek
production. Birth of the Aesthetic divides historical times between the oldest periods,
when art was produced without the existence of the concept of “art,” and the periods
which followed the formation of such a concept. Thus, the role of the classical Greeks
in creating the idea of beauty is presented.
Didier Maleuvre prefers to use the word “civilization” as meaning “pertaining to the
city.” Comparing it with the more static term “culture,” which includes rural and folk
environments, the author sees civilization as expressing an instance where one looks
differently, more dynamically, inward and outward, to the past and the future. As to
the place of art production in the process of civilization, he declares that “art indeed is
useful to civilization, and to one civilization in particular”; the many forms and uses of
art in western societies “served a demystifying function advancing a rationalized (some
say “disenchanted,” others, “bourgeois”) frame of mind which, in the specific sense
detailed below, we shall call “civilized.”
“The purpose is to show how the civilizing mind (i.e., the view from the city, the towndweller’s lorgnette) shapes, and is shaped by, artistic expression. More polemically,
the aim is to see how art since ancient Greece mostly (though not exclusively, and
certainly not uncritically) advances a mentality we should now call by its name, to wit,
bourgeois.”
“Art looks at things not just for what they are, but for what they are not and what they
could be. The city does strange things to the mind. The eighteenth-century philosophes
said that it civilizes it; more neutrally, we could say that it citifies it; and poetically, we
will say that it aestheticizes it.”
The eight following chapters of the book describe a sequence of civilizations during
different historical periods, as being directed “toward the rationalizations of
mentalities.” These chapters are named The Time of Images, Into the Time of Art, The
Time of Makers, The Time of Work, The Time of Knowledge, The Time of Taste, The
Time of Ideologies and The Time of Production. The book concludes with the chapter
Triumph of the Aesthetic.
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Chapter 2, The Time of Images, is dedicated to the period of feudalism in Europe, when
one saw a decline of the cities, and when Christianity became the source of artistic
production. At its inception in Europe, “Christianity spread down the roads and routes
of the city-building Pax Romana. As an economic and cultural vector, the city … was
a spent force, surviving mostly in the spiritualized medium of theology, such as
Augustine´s City of God (fourth century).”
Until the ninth century, the Church was the force driving the civilization, and it
promoted the production of images, such as the images of Christ. The diffusion of
images expressed the insertion into Christianity of Neo-Platonism, with its principle of
the importance of Form.
Chapter 3, Into the Time of Art, deals with the Middle Age in Europe, with its
Renaissance and with its post-Renaissance. The chapter divides the styles into a
Romanesque Middle Age and a Gothic Middle Age. This is a time when cities begin
to revive. “Cave-like architecture was out; now was the age of the cliff–and forest–like
building. The Romanesque emphasized tight-knit community, the Gothic romanticized
transcendent yearnings. ... The new cathedral wasn’t just a big space for big crowds; it
was a divining rod for the imagination. It made religion intensely spectacular, bid the
gaze to soar. … The edifice itself proclaimed the city mindset — competitive,
experimental, and assertive. Assertive because the city, by its very existence, confirms
the power of men-made environment over nature, and the cathedral symbolized
newfound confidence in man’s power to create a world made and designed by us for
our use and enjoyment.”
“The Middle Ages knew the arts of rhetoric, of drawing, of sculpting. These arts
generally looked back on precedent or social authority: they were methods. Ars became
art when creative authority drew inward; when the scholar-teacher betook himself to
double and to rebuild. The scholastics rediscovered the art of thinking, thinking not
merely as the transmission of knowledge but as production. The shift from
transmission to production parallels the transition from agrarian work to city-life
artisanship.” The chapter ends with comments about the arts of poetry and singing.
The Time of Makers, the fourth chapter, covers the lives and work of major figures in
the arts, philosophy and politics, from the 14th to the 16th centuries, when mercantilism
flourished, and the port cities were developing and creating the Hanseatic League. At
this time the Renaissance started new cycles of Art and began the production of science,
and man’s consciousness of his individuality appeared. Among the figures whose lives
and works are analyzed in this chapter are Boccaccio, Dante, Donatello, Durer, Francis
Bacon, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Machiavelli, Montaigne, Petrarch, Raphael,
Shakespeare, and Thomas More.
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The Time of Work, the fifth chapter, covers the Reformation, the appearance of the
Protestants, and their influence in art. It was a time when paintings started to be sold
to the bourgeoisie, and representation shifted from religious figures to common people,
and to still life (natures mortes). The rise of the Dutch Golden Age (1590-1680), with
painters as Rembrandt, Vermeer, and Brueghel, is analyzed as valuing “accuracy over
grandiosity.”
The sixth chapter, The Time of Knowledge, points to the religious wars in Europe as a
result of the Reformation, but, on the positive side, to a knowledge revolution, “a
revolution inside the concept of knowledge itself.” Knowledge is not a loyalty to
dogma, but a search for veracity. “New knowledge observes, tests hypotheses, and
never declares itself above error.” Doubt is embodied in the classic Hamlet
exclamation “to be or not to be.”
The end of the religious wars in Europe came with the emergence of the Nation-State
as the transcendent power during the 17th century, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648
being its legal instrument, along with the abolition of the Hanseatic League.
Emphasizing the concept of motion, the chapter points to the changes in thought
influenced by Copernicus’ findings about the Earth’s rotation. The chapter deals with
Bacon, Caravaggio, Cervantes, Descartes, Galileo, Lope de Vega, Montaigne, Pascal
and Shakespeare, among others. It also comments on the Baroque.
Chapter seven, The Time of Taste, starts with the “Quarrel between Ancients and
Moderns” at the end of the 18th century, and with the appearance of concepts such as
“modernity” and “academic.” It was a time when “the bourgeoisie became the major
economic player, so its empiricism, its taste for clarity and due process, for material
security and peaceful compromise took center stage.” The chapter covers the
Enlightenment and notes that it was only in 1750 that the German philosopher
Alexander Baumgarten coined the term “aesthetics,” derived from ancient Greek.
Among those the chapter considers are Diderot, Kant, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Jean
Jacques Rousseau, the Marquis de Sade, Smith, and Voltaire.
The Time of Ideologies is the eighth chapter. It deals with revolutions that express the
decline of the aristocracy and the emergence of mass movements, including the
American (1776) and the French (1789) revolutions. It shows the relations between
these revolutions and movements in arts, philosophy and sciences, citing and analyzing
Balzac, Beethoven, Bell, Burke, Marie Curie, David, Goethe, Hegel, Hertz, von
Humboldt, Keats, Mozart, Pasteur, Schelling, Schiller, and Wagner. It mentions the
Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 and subsequent world expositions.
The Time of Production is the title of chapter nine. It addresses the advance of realism,
a movement parallel to the growth of industrial capitalism and the formation of the
proletariat class, a class opposed to the bourgeoisie.
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The bourgeoisie itself generated a significant division between its high, middle and low
bourgeois layers, according to differing levels of income. The two last layers and the
proletariat formed the people, and an idea of art produced for the people appeared. In
a list that runs from Courbet and Goya to the Impressionists and to the Cubists, one
finds, among others, the names of Cézanne, Daumier with his caricatures, Degas,
Gauguin, Manet, Modigliani, Monet, Picasso, Renoir, Seurat and Van Gogh.
This is also a time of the birth of the political socialist movements, with Proudhon,
Marx and Engels. The author explains why, in his view, art cannot be politicized in
the way imagined by the left and the right. “The goal of politics is to maintain or change
a concrete social situation. Politics operates in the immanent and the feasible. Art is
reflection, … a work of art is a mirror, and a mirror image exists on a different plane
of reality. It takes a holiday from the here and now. This holiday creates spectators —
which is not what political activists should be.” The chapter also deals with
philosophers such as Bergson and Nietzsche, and it gives attention to the introduction
of Art Education as a way to bring the masses to Art.
The tenth and final chapter, Triumph of the Aesthetic, deals with the twentieth century,
one characterized by works on art in impressively high numbers. “The problem with
the twentieth century isn’t that art was used to beautify politics … the core problem
was that politics and morality were enclosed by an aesthetic view of life.” The author
sees the conflicts between artists and communist regimes as linked to the bourgeois
nature of Art, to the liberty of the city, and to the communist opposition to the
bourgeoisie while praising the nation state. The book finishes with consideration of
present conditions and the possibilities of the future. “What is space? What is time?
What is energy? How does history move? What is gender? What is consciousness,
society, religion, art? Who or what are we?”
New lines in arts, as of the German Bauhaus, the Russian Concretes, Dada, Futurism,
Minimalism, Pop Art, and Surrealism are discussed in this chapter, as are more current
developments in philosophy and science. The names of individuals and their works
include, among others, Aragon, Apollinaire, Duchamp, Freud, Gorky, Le Corbusier,
Keynes, Kierkegaard, Paul Klee, Malevich, Thomas Mann, Stravinsky and Warhol.
A very rich bibliography, containing material from Greek philosophers to
contemporary scholars, completes the contents of the book. As a small criticism, one
can wonder at the omission of Heidegger in the bibliography and the absence of a
discussion regarding cinema and Video Art, although there is a brief mention of Buster
Keaton. Regardless, the ideas presented in this book represent a very strong
contribution to our debates about the definition of what is civilization.
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Robinson, Chase F. Islamic Civilization in Thirty Lives.
University of California Press, 2016
Reviewed by Norman C. Rothman
In this work the noted Islamic scholar, Chase F. Robinson, traces the development of
Islamic Civilization through the biography of notable figures — some known such as
the Prophet Muhammad, and the fearsome world conqueror, Timur, who ruled over a
large chunk of western Eurasia, and some less known, such as the poet Rumi, the
traveler Ibn Fadlan, and the cartographer al-Idris.
The book has four major sections based on chronology and themes. It covers the first
millennium (actually from the seventh century to the sixteenth century CE).
The first section — entitled “Empire” — traces the foundation and spread of Islam from
600 to 850 CE from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa — and by extension, the
Iberian Peninsula, the Middle East, much of central Asia and parts of the Indian subcontinent. In this period, there was a fairly unified administration or empire ruled first
from Damascus, under the Umayyad dynasty, and then from Baghdad, under the
Abbasid dynasty. The individuals covered are the Prophet; his cousin Ali, who was the
fourth caliph and whose descendants began the Shia movement; Abd-al-Malik, whose
reign as caliph gave the Umayyads a new lease on power; Ibn al-Muqaffa, a scholar of
Persian extraction who translated Persian learning into Arabic; Rabi’a, a woman whose
teachings became a foundation of the Sufi tradition; and al-Ma’mun, who was the last
consequential member of the Abbasid dynasty.
Part II deals with the period of 850 to 1050 CE. This period witnessed the loss of
political unity. At the same time, however, the disparate peoples under Islamic rule —
Persians, Egyptians, Berbers, Turks — gradually adopted Islam even to the point of
schism. A number of them became Arabized, as Egyptians and Berbers especially
subsumed previous identities since the Qur’an was written in Arabic. This section is
called the “Islamic commonwealth,” as various people forged a new identity based on
missionary work often carried out by Sufis and extended commerce both land and sea
to Sub-Saharan Africa and East and Southeast Asia. Islam arrived in these last two
areas due to missionary work and trade. The figures covered in this part include a
courtesan, a martyr, a rationalist philosopher, a physician, a world traveler, a scribe and
a calligrapher; a man who conquered what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, and north
India; and a man who was both a high-ranking government official and a noted writer
on applied mathematics and astronomy.
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Part III, “Provisional Synthesis,” covers 1050 to 1250 CE, often termed the “Golden
Age of Islam.” The classical heritage of the Greeks was combined with ancient
learning from India and neighboring regions to produce advanced works in
mathematics, science, philosophy, and applied subjects, such as medicine. Indian
numerals became the Arabic numbers which replaced the cumbersome Roman
numerals previously used in the Middle East and Europe. Decimals and the concept of
zero inherited from the Mesopotamians were introduced and this concept of zero,
borrowed from India, spread globally.
The individuals covered in this section are the writer of 400 works on many subjects; a
female scholar of the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet); a writer who systematized Sunni
thought; a merchant millionaire; and the famous Muslim opponent of the Crusaders,
Saladin. Most significantly, Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes in Europe, was considered
the foremost philosopher of his age. He was a judge as well as a physician, and through
his work he became the foremost interpreter of Aristotelean thought and rationalism.
His work was translated and read by scholars in Europe as late as the 18th century.
Part IV, “Disruption and Integration,” deals with the end of the Golden Age, as the
Islamic world gradually succumbed to external attacks by Timur, a Turkified Mongol
who conquered much of Central Asia, Iraq, Iran, northern India, the upper Middle East
and neighboring areas; Mehmed II, who converted the Greek Byzantine Empire into
the Turkish Ottoman Empire; and Shah Ismail, who established Shia rule in Persia.
However, this period, which dates from 1250 to 1525 CE, saw the writings of the Sufi
poet Rumi, Rashid al-din (a global historian), Ibn Taymiyya who wrote copiously on
law and philosophy, and Ibn Khaldun, a famous historian and social theorist whose
works were widely read in Europe.
Professor Robinson has written a work that is both scholarly and entertaining. It is
readily accessible to both layman and scholar. He trends to a middle ground in his
biographical sections. These are neither hagiography nor critical assessments. He
gives both positive and negative coverage. His sources are both timely and copious.
His ancillary material is outstanding; he gives a complete index, impressive
illustrations, a large bibliography as well as detailed notes, and a glossary. The only
deficiency is that the book stops at the 16th century. Let us hope that a future volume
will complete the picture!
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CALL FOR PAPERS/ABSTRACTS
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CIVILIZATIONS
2019 Annual ISCSC Conference
Please join us for the 49th Annual Conference
of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
to be held June 25-28, 2019
El Retiro San Iñigo, THE JESUIT RETREAT CENTER OF LOS ALTOS
(near both San Jose Intl. and San Francisco Intl. Airports)
300 Manresa Way, Los Altos, California USA 94022

DEADLINE for Abstracts is April 1, 2019
Conference Theme:
Comparison of Civilizations:
Ancient and Modern and Theories of Civilizational Studies
This year’s conference promises several exciting and new approaches. When ISCSC
was founded in 1961 it crafted itself as big-picture, multi-disciplinary society. In the
following years, increased specialized focus of academic research affected this
orientation and the dynamics of actual ISCSC activities. Recently, there has been a
surge of academic interest in transdisciplinary and meta systems approaches. This
presents a unique opportunity for the society to do several things: revive its founding
orientation; encourage new thoughts and approaches; and encourage diverse classical
approaches within different disciplines. The 2019 49th conference is structured to
begin this process. All current and future members are urged to take an active part in
this process.
To broaden participation and the sharing of ideas, we will strive to maximize plenary
session during the conference. Plenary sessions will be organized to reflect the variety
of sub-themes. We are also planning to include a special session for “Young Scholar
Papers”.
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Examples of illustrative thematic topics could include:















Comparative Models of Economic Development
Comparative Legal Histories
Comparing Literatures in China and the West
Asian-American International Relations
Asian Culture, Values and the West
Africa, Polynesia, Latin America, the West and Globalization
Comparative Environmental Protection and Survival of Civilization
Histories of Science and Institutional Development
What Constitutes “Wisdom” or “Justice” Among Disparate Civilizations?
How to Encourage Constructive Engagements and Encounters Between Civilizations
Comparative Religion and How it Relates to Civilizations
Comparative Economic and Political Systems
The Importance of Cultural, Linguistic and Artistic Studies

As always, other topics with civilizational relevance are welcomed. Send Abstracts of up to
300 words describing your proposed paper by May 15, 2019, simultaneously to both ISCSC
Vice President Michael Andregg at mmandregg@stthomas.edu and to ISCSC Executive
Director, Peter Hecht at peter.hecht@iscsc.org. Abstracts are requested to be in English, using
MS WORD, Times New Roman, 12-point font. Accepted abstracts will be included in program
materials and Conference Proceedings. Those submitting abstracts will be notified within two
weeks of submittal regarding acceptance for presentation at the conference.
All Abstracts should include: your name, contact email, phone number and professional
affiliation on the document itself. Please see the ISCSC website http://www.iscsc.org for
conference updates, details, registration, logistics and transportation suggestions. The website
will be updated as new information becomes available.
Whether submitting an Abstract for presentation or not, you are warmly invited and encouraged
to register and attend the 2019 Conference at the Jesuit Retreat Center of Los Altos. A firm
DEADLINE for CONFERENCE REGISTRATION is June 25th, 2019.
Please note: The unique venue of the conference presents an opportunity for young scholars
and students in the vicinity - who may otherwise be unable to afford fulltime attendance - to
participate as day commuters. Interested local students are encouraged to contact our special
sub-committee for Young Scholar Assistance by contacting either Dr. Michael Andregg
(Conference Chair) at mmandregg@stthomas.edu or Dr. John Grayzel, at
jagrayzel@alumni.stanford.edu for further information.
Sincerely,

Lynn Rhodes, President, ISCSC
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CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts
Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer,
graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation,
if any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words). Do not include page numbers,
headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do not utilize automatic
formatting for indents, space following subheads and paragraphs, etc.
Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures,
appendices, etc., as a single Microsoft Word or PDF file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11
inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables
and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right
margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are
included, use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript.
Maximum length of article is 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.
Do not indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are
in bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should
be placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks,
and preceded and followed by one-line spaces.
Except for common foreign words and phrases, the use of foreign words and phrases
should be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested
guides include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; and The
Chicago Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.
Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text
that you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc and for foreign
terms. Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take
advantage of the ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the
extent possible, tables and figures should appear in the document near where they are
referenced in the text. Large tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves.
Avoid the use of overly small type in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in
a separate document or file. All tables and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on
all sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
Footnotes should appear at the bottom of the page on which they are referenced rather
than at the end of the paper. Footnotes should be in 10 pt. Times New Roman, single
spaced, and flush left, ragged right. There should be a footnote separator rule (line).
Footnote numbers or symbols in the text must follow, rather than precede, punctuation.
Excessively long footnotes are probably better handled in an appendix.
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The subhead References (denoting Bibliography, Works Cited, etc.) should appear
right after the end of the document, beginning on the last page if possible. They should
be flush left, ragged right. Use the format with which you are most comfortable, such
as APA (American Psychological Association), MLA (Modern Language Association),
Chicago/Turabian.
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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered
to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the
26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as
Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,”
problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the
Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and
the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the
Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press
coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and
the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the
decision to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that
transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia.
Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years
included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott,
Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf.
In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present
there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and current president Lynn
Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 47 meetings, most of them in the United States but
also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland;
Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New
Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual
dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its
annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons,
Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall
Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best
be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety
of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979.
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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Membership Information
If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining for a $70
USD yearly membership fee, plus $8 USD for non-mainland USA
postage. Members receive a one-year subscription to this journal, are
invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC newsletter, and
may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is open to all
interested in civilizations. Visit www.iscsc.org for further information.
To Obtain Issues of This Journal
You may order back issues at www.iscsc.org/ccr.html for $35 USD + $8
USD shipping per copy. Availability is limited.

Online Access
This and previous issues published since 1979 may be accessed, searched
by keyword or topic, as well as read, downloaded, and printed by going
to the following website:
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr
Or by going to this additional website:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service for
free to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.
our website:

http://www.iscsc.org
our blog:

https://civilitasblog.blogspot.com

International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations
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